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This project provides an analysis of the Army’s acquisition of the Land 
Warrior (LW) Soldier System.  Its objectives are to document the history of the 
LW and provide an overview of the program to establish the components of both 
its development and deployment and its associated business and management 
characteristics.  The product is a document that provides an analysis of the 
actions taken and the obstacles encountered and how the materiel developers, 
warfighters, user representatives and lawmakers dealt with them. 
The LW need was approved in 1993.  The requirement was to provide 
improvements for dismounted soldiers in the five specific capability categories of 
lethality, command and control, mobility, survivability, and sustainment.  For a 
period lasting approximately 15 years, the LW has evolved.  Despite this 
evolution, the Army terminated the program in FY 2007.  Regardless, it has laid 
the foundation for follow-on soldier system initiatives.  The LW was unsuccessful 
initially due to the misalignment of three interrelated and supporting components: 
1) technical immaturity, 2) poor user acceptance, and 3) lack of senior leadership 
support. Successes that are more recent can be attributed to: 1) soldier-driven 
design, 2) improved technical maturity, and 3) proven employment of the system 
in combat by warfighters. 
Keywords: Land Warrior, Land Warrior Soldier System, Soldier as a 
System, Ground Soldier  Ensemble, 4-9 Infantry Battalion, Unit System 
Integrators, TCM Soldier, PEO Soldier, Program Manager Soldier Warrior, 
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I. Introduction 
Our warfighting edge is the combined effect of quality people, trained to razor 
sharpness, outfitted with modern equipment, led by tough, competent leaders, 
structured into an appropriate mix of forces by type, and employed according 
to up-to-date doctrine[...]. I am certain the single most important factor is the 
soldier. (Haley et al., 1991, p. 4) 
The Nation has entrusted the Army with preserving its peace and freedom, 
defending its democracy, and providing opportunities for its Soldiers to serve 
the country and personally develop their skills and citizenship. Consequently, 
we are and will continuously strive to remain among the most respected 
institutions in the United States. To fulfill our solemn obligation to the Nation, 
we must remain the preeminent land power on earth—the ultimate instrument 
of national resolve; strategically dominant on the ground where our Soldiers' 
engagements are decisive. (Department of the Army, 2005, p. 17) 
The United States military has achieved radical technological advances in the 
last twenty years.  Military combat vehicles, aircraft and missile defense systems 
have evolved from their Vietnam-era predecessors (which, at the time were 
considered technologically superior and first-rate) to revolutionary, network-enabled 
instruments of combat power.  This first-rate equipment, when combined with top-
quality soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen, realistic training and intense leader 
development, has been a key element of our continuing operational successes 
(Shalikashvili, 1996).  Joint Vision 2010 and Joint Vision 2020 describe this 
combination of people, equipment, training and readiness, and leader development 
as their foundations (1996).  Current doctrine carries this vision and tailors it to the 
realities of the present-day Global War on Terror.  United States Army Field Manual 
1 characterizes current Army transformation as the most profound since World War 
II.  Former Secretary of the Army, the Honorable Francis J. Harvey, describes this 
transformation as a continuous, adaptive cycle of innovation and experimentation 
informed by experience.  The Army has changed its focus from the division level to 
the brigade level to achieve a more agile, modular force that is organized to fight as 
part of a joint force (Department of the Army, 2005). 
 =
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Past efforts to achieve military dominance have spurred publicly announced, 
as well as highly classified, military-related technological innovation.  However, until 
the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, public focus for technological advancement 
was on systems and combat platforms at the division-level and above—not 
necessarily on the individual soldier and the small combat unit.  After these 
invasions and swift preliminary successes, the Department of Defense was lauded 
for a job well done; however, the public realization that US warfighters needed better 
situational awareness, lethality and survivability at the small combat unit level did not 
become apparent until highly publicized fighting ensued with the insurgencies in 
urban and rural areas across both Afghanistan and Iraq.  Insurgents, embracing 
guerilla warfare tactics, attempted to negate our technological superiority by 
“hugging” our dispersed, small combat unit forces in tight urban and high mountain 
terrain and, thus, reduced our ability to apply combined arms firepower and leverage 
joint, cross-boundary operations.  In Iraq, they chose dense, urban terrain and close 
proximity to civilian personnel and infrastructure to ambush, attack and confuse. 
Despite vehicle-mounted, blue-force tracking technologies, the infantryman in 
contact on the ground lost situational awareness.  To regain situational awareness, 
leaders and soldiers alike had to either get back to a combat vehicle or employ 
outdated, difficult methods such as tracking maneuvering friendly and enemy forces 
using a radio, map board, compass and grease pencil.  As the capability gap in 
situational awareness at the soldier and small-combat-unit level became more 
apparent, many commands submitted operational needs statements requesting 
materiel solutions to resolve their deficits in capability.  To date, program managers 
(PM), vendors and scientists continue to rush to the aid of the military and work 
diligently to close these gaps. 
The Land Warrior (LW) Soldier System has recently closed many of these 
capability gaps.  After 15 years of development, the LW Soldier System has been 
developed, tested and deployed with soldiers in combat.  Its story has been an 
interesting one.  Despite being replete with naysayers, restarts and controversy, its 
 =
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final chapter is yet to be written.  LW’s revolutionary contributions to the modern 
battlefield are influencing the way dismounted soldiers fight today and perhaps for 
years to come.  
A. Background 
The LW Soldier System need was identified on September 8, 1993.  Since its 
inception, it has been one of the most controversial programs in the United States 
Army.  For a period lasting approximately 15 years, the LW Soldier System has 
evolved.  It has laid the foundation for follow-on soldier system initiatives like Ground 
Soldier System (GSS) and other complementary Soldier-as-a-System (SaaS) 
initiatives like Core Soldier System, Mounted Soldier System and Air Soldier 
System.1 
The LW Soldier System is a first-generation integrated fighting system for 
dismounted soldiers.  LW is intended to enhance the lethality, command-and-control, 
survivability, mobility and sustainability of individual soldiers, leaders and infantry 
units and to be fully interoperable with the digital command-and-control of other 
platforms.2 The LW System’s capabilities contribute to the Joint Vision 2010/2020 
operational concept of situational awareness and dominant maneuvering by 
dismounted forces.  Its capabilities enable the Army’s current focus on brigade-level 
(and below) adaptability in a joint environment.  All four Services, including Special 
Operations Forces (SOF), have considered LW as a materiel solution to address 
some of their capability gaps.  The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics (USD (AT&L)), the Defense Acquisition Executive, 
designated the LW System as an Acquisition Category IC program on 17 December 
2002 because the LW Program met the requirements for an (ACAT) IC program 
                                            
1 Ground Soldier System is now called the Ground Soldier Ensemble (GSE). For more information on 
SaaS, see Appendix A. 
2 For a complete description of the LW Soldier System, see Appendix B. 
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based on estimated research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) costs 
(Ugone et al., 2002). 
The LW System went through an extensive Doctrine, Organization, Training, 
Material, Logistics, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) assessment and Limited 
User Test (LUT) in late 2006 and 2007.  It then deployed with the first unit equipped, 
4th Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment, 4th Brigade Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd 
Infantry Division, to Operation Iraqi Freedom from 2007 to 2008.  During this 
deployment, attached teams of contractors, program management personnel and 
user representatives were on-hand to assist, gain feedback and capture lessons 
learned.  A majority of this data is unrefined and has not been correlated to previous 
studies or research. 
In November 2006, funding for LW and its successors such as Ground 
Soldier Ensemble (GSE) lost traction with lawmakers, and the program was 
terminated.3  However, based on 4-9 Infantry’s successful employment of the 
system in theater and on subsequent Operational Needs Statements (ONS) from 
both 4th and 5th Brigade Combat Teams, 2nd Infantry Division, both the LW and 
follow-on GSE Programs have regained congressional funding.  The Army is 
currently in the process of procuring a brigade’s worth of the current LW System, in 
addition to the planned GSE Program.  Program Executive Office, Soldier (PEO 
Soldier), plans to establish the GSE PM in early Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 after the Joint 
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) approves the GSE Capability Development 
Document (CDD) and a Milestone A decision is achieved. 
The United States Army has had a difficult time developing, fielding and 
retaining support for the LW Soldier System.  Disagreements originated from 
conflicting perspectives during the concept refinement phase and through to low-rate 
                                            
3 The Ground Soldier System was re-designated the Ground Soldier Ensemble (GSE) in FY 2008. 
For consistency, we refer to GSS as GSE from this point forward. 
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initial production (LRIP).  There was a validated requirement for LW, but its intended 
capabilities and basis of issue (BOI) changed over time based on both conflicts 
within the materiel development and user communities, as well as on budget 
concerns.  Conflicting views stemmed from the leadership’s early focus on designing 
for leaders’ requirements and later emphasis on soldier usability.  In other words, 
Army leadership agreed to the design of a system to provide command-and-control 
and situational awareness to small combat unit leaders, but during verification and 
validation, Army leadership switched its focus to the effectiveness of the system at 
the basic soldier and junior leader level.  Compounding this were the technological 
challenges encountered when trying to connect the dismounted soldier to the 
network with a materiel solution that was acceptable in form, fit and function.  A 
second contributing factor slowing LW’s acceptance was the fact that soldier 
systems are open to significant amounts of subjectivity and user opinion compared 
to other system platforms.  This is due to the fact that it is not a “one size fits all” 
system; soldiers come in many different sizes, must be able to perform a diverse 
mission set ranging from dismounted to airborne to mounted operations, and reside 
at multiple levels within the current Army formations.  Last, complete understanding 
of the pros and cons of a system cannot be fully realized until the system is 
deployed or tested in large enough numbers to demonstrate the second- and third-
order effects of changing the way soldiers, leaders and units fight (Kempin, 2008). 
These issues are not unique to the LW Program.  In a budget-constrained, 
cost-sensitive defense acquisitions environment that is replete with operational 
urgency, reliance on commercial off-the-shelf items has become the norm instead of 
reliance on traditional, developmental methods—especially for soldier programs.  
The Army is probably getting what is right for soldiers now; however, as our doctrine, 
organizations and equipment evolve, dismounted soldiers and leaders have to 
maintain pace, or they will not be integrated with future network-centric formations 
(Berger, 2008).  By providing insights into the lessons learned for the acquisition of 
the first soldier system, this research will assist future efforts to effectively move the 
soldier and leader into the digital battlefield. 
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B. Objectives and Approach of This Study 
Despite being the first soldier system to be developed, fielded to infantrymen, 
deployed to combat operations and then “terminated,” the LW System still remains.  
The LW System will transition to the follow-on GSE—the ground-based soldier’s link 
to the Future Combat Systems (FCS).  This fact marks the study of the LW Program 
as a beneficial and, likewise, necessary exercise for disseminating information on 
issues of future soldier systems acquisition.  For this same reason, this study 
focuses on capturing the lessons learned from the LW experience and on describing 
how they can be applied to similar programs.  The following were the main questions 
that arose in our analysis.  As such, they represent our key objectives: 
 What is the LW Soldier System? 
 What are the history and components of the context within which the 
LW Soldier System was conceived, designed and fielded? 
 How did the United States Army organize for and execute the 
acquisition of the LW Soldier System? 
 How did the Product Manager, LW, organize and execute the 
acquisition of the LW Soldier System? 
 How did the prime contractor, General Dynamics, execute the 
acquisition of the LW Soldier System? 
 What are the results of the 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry’s experience 
during training, fielding and deployment of the LW Soldier System? 
 What are the budget and policy decisions that affected the acquisition 
of the LW Solider System? 
 What are the lessons learned from the United States Army’s 
acquisition of the LW Soldier System? 
 Which lessons can be generalized and applied to other programs for 
their successful management? 
To answer these questions, we employed several methods for collecting and 
analyzing information.  We interviewed key Government and contractor personnel, 
reviewed historical documentation, consulted with colleagues and faculty, and 
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reviewed after-action reports and interviews with soldiers of 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry 
Regiment, 4th Brigade Stryker Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, 
Washington.  These efforts resulted in detailed analyses that are organized into 
several categorical perspectives. These analyses are then synthesized, and 
significant issues are drawn out as considerations for future soldier program 
acquisition efforts. 
Interviews of key players within the LW Program, both Government and 
prime-contractor, were critical to ensuring a complete representation of the issues.  
We spoke with stakeholders with differing perspectives on the program: 
 Former and current Program Executive Office, Soldier, 
 Former Program Manager Soldier Warrior,  
 Former and current Product Manager LW,  
 Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager Soldier, United 
States Army Infantry Center,  
 Director of Infantry Futures, United States Army Infantry Center, 
 Director of Combat Developments, United States Army Infantry Center, 
 United States Army Research Institute, 
 United States Army Test and Evaluation Command, 
 Former and current General Dynamics LW Program Managers, 
 Current manager for General Dynamics C4ISR Business 
Development, 
 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Infantry Division Leadership 
and 
 Training and Doctrine Analysis Centers Monterey, California, and 
White Sands, New Mexico. 
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C. Scope 
Notwithstanding our goal to provide a comprehensive case analysis of LW, 
we could not possibly address all facets of this highly complex program within the 
scope of an MBA Project Report.  There are many important research questions (for 
example, those dealing with LW contracting strategies) that remain to be 
investigated.  Nor could we interview all relevant LW participants due to time and 
resource constraints.  This report provides an in-depth, yet admittedly initial, 
analysis.  LW thus remains a ripe area for further and more detailed research. 
D. Organization of the Report 
Chapter I introduces and frames the study.  Chapter II provides an overview 
of the evolution of soldier systems from concept inception to current efforts.  This 
chapter concludes with an overview of LW-related studies and their major findings.  
Chapter III describes the LW materiel developers’ perspectives—including the 
acquisition strategy, details about its development, production, evaluation and 
deployment from both the Government and prime contractor’s perspectives.  
Chapter IV provides the users’ perspectives by combining information from both the 
user representative (Training and Doctrine Command System Manager - Soldier) 
and the first unit equipped (4-9 Infantry).  This chapter captures the challenges of 
fielding new capabilities to a deploying unit and the soldiers’ feedback from using 
LW during both user assessments and combat operations in Operation Iraqi 
Freedom.  Chapter V delves into the budget decisions affecting the LW Program.  
Affordability and funding considerations—along with LW-specific budget decisions— 
are explained in an effort to build context to explain key programmatic decisions 
described later in the study.  Chapter VI develops the way ahead for soldier systems 
by synthesizing previous chapters’ analyses and highlighting key lessons learned 
from this study.  We tie lessons learned into the strategic perspective for Department 
of Defense (DoD) acquisition and provide some issues that should be considered as 
the LW Program transitions to the GSE Program in FY 2009.  Chapter VI concludes 
with several recommendations for further research. 
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II. The Historical Context for the Land Warrior 
System 
When the smoke cleared away, it was the man with the sword, or the 
crossbow, or the rifle who settled the final issue on the battlefield. (Urlings, 
2004, p. 4) 
To adjust the condition of the Army to better meet the requirements of the 
next century, we articulate this vision: “Soldiers on point for the nation 
transforming this, the most respected army in the world, to a strategically 
responsive force that is dominant across the full spectrum of operations.”  
With that overarching goal to frame us, the Army will undergo a major 
transformation. (Shinseki, 2000, p. 2) 
Two schools of thought prevail in the challenge to develop cutting-edge, 
soldier-related technology.  The first, as Marshall points out, is rudimentary: keep it 
simple—combat is hard enough; leave the technological enablers at the strategic 
level because in the end, it is the soldier on the ground that fights and wins on the 
battlefield.  The second, as General Shinseki asserts above, is transformation: 
harness technological advances and push technology down to the tip of the spear to 
keep the warfighter in-step with the ever-changing battlefield of tomorrow.  Both 
schools of thought are applicable and, when combined, help strike the precarious 
balance that must be achieved to provide the warfighter with the right equipment for 
the job.  Like the formal acquisition process, the business of developing wearable, 
fightable, state-of-art soldier systems is a complex one.  Full appreciation of the 
types of general issues raised, as well as methods implemented during the LW 
concept and product development, demonstration, production and deployment 
requires a full understanding of its context.  The context for the LW System is best 
illustrated by providing historical information about its development.  Furthermore, a 
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brief description of notable supporting research about LW provides a point of 
departure for our study and its findings.4 
A. An Abbreviated History of the LW Soldier System 
An Army is capable of functioning without horses or cannons, but an Army 
ceases to exist without Soldiers. (Jones, 2006, p. 1) 
Know the enemy and know yourself, in a hundred battles you will never know 
peril.  When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances 
of winning or losing are equal.  If ignorant of both your enemy and yourself, 
you are certain in every battle to be in peril. (Sun Tzu, 1910, p. 50) 
The general unreliability of all information presents a special problem: all 
action takes place, so to speak, in a kind of twilight…like fog.  War is the 
realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action in war is 
based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty…The commander 
must work in a medium which his eyes cannot see, which his best deductive 
powers cannot always fathom; and [with] which, because of constant 
changes, he can rarely be familiar. (Von Clausewitz, 1908, p. 5) 
B. Soldier System Origins 
History includes many examples of the need for addressing the soldier as a 
system.  Just after World War II, in his book The Soldier’s Load, S.L.A. Marshall 
recognized the need to manage the soldier as a complete system in order to make 
the soldier more efficient and effective.  BG Marshall pointed out that more thought 
and care was needed in the overall design of not only what soldiers are expected to 
carry into battle, but also of how they carry the total ensemble more efficiently and 
effectively (as cited in Jones, 2006).  In general, this mindset has driven past and 
current science and technology (S&T) efforts to combine soldier equipment in a 
system-like manner to reduce size, weight and power requirments for what the 
soldier has to carry. 
                                            
4 Also important to understand is the strategy that LW has evolved to operate within the Net-centric 
Warfare Strategy (NCWS).  The NCWS and the digital battlefield are detailed in Appendix C.  In 
addition, LW resides within the overarching SaaS strategy, which is outlined in Appendix A. 
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In addition to addressing the soldier as a system, the importance of 
communication between individuals, units and joint forces has become a critical 
capability gap for the current force.  “Information, information processing, and 
communications networks are at the core of every military activity.  Throughout 
history, military leaders have regarded information superiority as a key enabler of 
victory” (Shelton, 2000, p. 8).  Since its inception, the Army has worked diligently to 
provide the right type of communication systems, information-processing tools and 
situational-awareness enablers to its forces to enable information dominance. 
 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 12 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
C. The Soldier’s Computer 
Almost twenty years ago, in the late 1980s, a research analyst, James 
Schoening, “envisioned a small, wearable computer, integrated with a wireless link 
and helmet-mounted display (HMD), which could help individual soldiers on the front 
line”  (Zieniewicz, Johnson, Wong & Flatt, 2002, p. 30).  Along with a colleague, he 
transformed his idea into a system architecture with “targeted technologies, such as 
wireless data transmission, image capture, integrated Global Positioning System 
(GPS) receivers and menu-driven software” (2002, p. 30).  By 1990, they put their 
ideas together and presented an early surrogate system—the Soldier’s Computer 
(see Figure 2 below)—at the Army Materiel Command’s trade show in Aberdeen, 
Maryland.  It weighed approximately ten pounds, included software for creating 
reports and displaying tactical maps and used a trackball for data input.  Soldiers 
could also transmit simple text reports to other units.  The system was a success 
with senior Army leaders and congressional staff members.  Thus, as the Soldier’s 
Computer, the soldier system concept was quietly born. 
 
Figure 2. The Soldier’s Computer at First Trade Show in 1990 
(Zieniewicz et al., 2002) 
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D. SIPE ATD 
The Soldier’s Computer shifted from a proprietary “brick” design to an open 
system, wearable design in 1991 (Zieniewicz et al., 2002).  This concept served as 
the key component for the Soldier Integrated Protective Ensemble, Advanced 
Technology Demonstration (SIPE ATD).  This initiative, led by Mrs. Carol Fitzgerald, 
was a three-year, 6.3A5 program initiated by the Department of the Army in March 
1990.  The SIPE ATD was to provide a “proof of principle” of the soldier as a system 
(Middleton, Sutton, McIntyre & O’Keefe, 2000).  More specifically, its goal was to join 
the soldier’s entire individual electronic components (e.g., radio, weapons, etc.) into 
a single integrated system. 
Successful testing of the SIPE ATD by soldiers at Fort Benning, Georgia, in 
1992 solidified the concept from the users’ perspective.  This was the Army’s first 
attempt at “digitizing” the individual soldier, and the soldiers who used the system 
were in awe (Zieniewicz et al., 2002).  In particular, the soldiers were most 
impressed with the Thermal Weapon Sight (TWS), which fed directly to the helmet 
display, enabling them to fire around corners without exposing their upper torso and 
head to the enemy (Fernandez, 1992). 
In addition to the TWS capability, the SIPE ATD demonstrated other 
components. 
The Headgear Integrated Subsystem (HIS), Weapon Subsystem 
(WSS) and the Individual Soldier Computer (ISC) significantly 
enhanced lethality by allowing the soldier to detect, identify, acquire 
and engage enemy targets at increased ranges during both day and 
                                            
5 The DoD organizes its budget into 11 major force programs.  One of these major force programs is 
Program 6—Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation. These program elements fund all 
research and development activities for weapon systems and forces that have not yet been approved 
for operational use.  The category has six subcategories: 6.1, basic research; 6.2, applied research; 
6.3a, advanced technology development; 6.3b, demonstration and validation (DEMVAL) activities; 
6.4, engineering and manufacturing development, which completes engineering for and development 
of products that the Services will use (production-quality blueprints are typically an output); 6.5, 
RDT&E management support; and 6.6, operational systems development (CBO, 2008). 
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night and with improved accuracy.  The HIS, WSS, and ISC proved to 
be vital to increasing the squad leader’s capability to communicate with 
both superiors and subordinates, as well as to exercise more positive 
command-and-control over personnel, weapons, equipment, 
information and procedures.  The Advanced Clothing Subsystem 
(ACS) and Microclimate Conditioning/Power Subsystem (MCC/PS) 
provided multi-threat and environmental protection while allowing the 
soldier to operate longer in a fully encapsulated mode. 
The soldier’s survivability was enhanced by the combination of the 
HIS, WSS and ISC, as well as by the ability to operate with greater 
dispersion, indirect viewing and increased lethality. (Middleton et al., 
2000, p. 2). 








Figure 3. Soldier Wearing the SIPE During Testing in 19926 
(Fernandez, 1992) 
Although each of the SIPE components provided the dismounted soldier 
tactical and operational benefits, it was determined that the greatest payoff was the 
synergistic effect of the various components working together, improving survivability 
                                            
6 The visor reduced ambient light and was a flip-up, flip-down display. It also provided ballistic and 
laser protection. The right-mounted sensor on the helmet’s top was an image intensifier for night-
vision capabilities. The large brown case is the computer radio-GPS unit. 
 =
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 15 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
and performance on the battlefield (Middleton et al., 2000).  The integrated, yet 
modular, nature of SIPE enhanced mobility by allowing equipment to be configured 
based upon the mission, enemy, troops available, time available and the terrain 
(METT-T)  (Middleton et al., 2000).  As a direct result of the SIPE ATD, the 
capabilities in Figure 4 transitioned into LW full-scale development beginning in 
1993. 
Soldier to Soldier Communications Weapons Interface 
Integrated Video-enhanced Image 
Intensification (I2) 
Ballistic, Laser Eye and Respiratory 
Protection 
Advanced Uniform Components Integrated Body Armor/Ammunition 
Carriage 
Handwear Footwear 
Load-bearing Equipment M16A2 
Thermal Sight Laser-aiming Light 





Figure 4. Capabilities Transitioned from the SIPE ATD  
to the LW Program 
(Middleton et al., 2000) 
Although the SIPE ATD system enhanced the soldier’s fighting capability, it 
needed to be more compact, lighter and to operate longer before it would be 
battlefield ready.  The backpack-sized computer-radio-GPS unit weighed 18 pounds; 
the Helmet-mounted Display (HMD) integrated into the helmet weighed 8 pounds, 
and the high-voltage supply unit (driving the cathode ray tube-based display) 
weighed 15 pounds.  Delays in capturing and sending still video images needed 
improvement, as existing communication channel capacities were maximized, and 
transmission delays of 45 to 75 seconds were causing the system to shut down.  
Clearly, soldier systems needed more work to take early materiel solutions and 
evolve them into combat-ready battlefield enablers. 
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E. The LW Soldier System 
After two-and-a-half years of work within the SIPE ATD, the Chief of Staff of 
the Army was enthusiastic about furthering efforts to field an integrated fighting 
system with a wearable computer-radio-GPS unit for soldiers (Zieniewicz et al., 
2002).  On 8 September 1993, Headquarters, Department of the Army approved the 
mission needs statement for the LW Soldier System.  After this approval, the LW 
project officially began.  Its aim was to significantly improve and enhance the 
soldier’s capability to shoot, move, communicate and survive on the future 
battlefield.  Incorporated into the LW project were the capabilities offered from the 
SIPE ATD (see Figure 4 above), as well as additional capabilities such as mission 
data and manual storage devices.  LW technologies were based on 
communications, computing, control, command, intelligence, sensor and 
reconnaissance (C4ISR).  Efforts were made in the area of human factors 
engineering to make the system more user-friendly and comfortable, and strides 
were taken to reduce the weight and power requirements of the early SIPE ATD 
prototypes.   
Design engineers faced other significant challenges, such as the range of 
LW’s intended operational environment.  Providing for extreme weather conditions 
and waterproofing requirements took considerable efforts.  In sum, LW had to be 
easy to use, weigh almost nothing, work all day and all night, be rugged enough to 
withstand the rigors of intense combat, be comfortable to wear and be conveniently 
located on the body. 
In 1994, the Army started writing the Operational Requirements Document7 
(ORD) for the LW Soldier System.  The United States Army Infantry School provided 
the initial doctrine for the ORD.  For a year, users and technical experts conceived 
                                            
7 The ORD was replaced by the Capability Development Document (CDD) with the advent of the 
Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) process. See Appendix D for a 
description of the JCIDS process. 
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and reviewed LW’s requirements’ feasibility and applicability.  Once the ORD was 
complete, the TRADOC Systems Manager, Soldier8 at Fort Benning briefed the user 
requirements to the PM for Soldier Systems9 and, thus, began the next phase of 
LW’s acquisition lifecycle: materiel development. 
The materiel developer, in coordination with the user, developed 
performance-based system specifications—describing what the system should do 
and specifying interface standards between components and other systems.  The 
primary materiel developers (PM, Soldier Systems and PM, Soldier Electronics) 
wrote the system performance specifications as well as the contract for developing 
the system. 
Hughes Aircraft (now Raytheon) was selected as the prime contractor for 
system development; however, in April 1998, technical difficulties (failed immersion 
and electromagnetic interference requirements) resulted in a program restructure.  
The Army decided to use an innovative approach, moving from “proprietary 
development” to one that maximized use of COTS technologies.  A consortium of 
contractors was established, vice a prime contractor for system development 
(Augustine, 2008a).  This consortium of contractors worked with the Government to 
allocate requirements to the subsystem level. Through the late 1990s, these 
contractors performed detailed design, build, integration and test tasks to produce 
the LW System (Zieniewicz et al., 2002). 
                                            
8 Now known as TRADOC Capabilities Manager, Soldier (TCM Soldier).  For consistency, we refer to 
TSM Soldier as TCM Soldier from this point forward. 
9 Now known as the Program Executive Officer, Soldier (PEO Soldier). 
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Figure 5. LW v0.6 in September 2000 
(Zieniewicz et al., 2002) 
F. LW Version 0.6 
In 1999, work began on the first rugged design of LW: LW Version 0.6 (v0.6) 
(see Figure 5 above).  The LW v0.6 used commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) and 
Government-furnished equipment/components (GFE), packaged to accommodate 
the users’ operational requirements (Zieniewicz et al., 2002).  The goal was to 
present it at the Joint Contingency Force Army Warfighting Experiment (JCF AWE) 
the following year, in September 2000.  The plan was briefed at the highest levels, 
and during the Soldier Systems Review on 7 December 1999, senior Army 
leadership made the decision for LW to participate in the JCF AWE (Berger, 2008). 
After over a decade of research, development and testing, in September of 
2000, the LW v0.6 (see Figure 5 above) made it to the field with real soldiers at the 
JCF AWE at Fort Polk, Louisiana.  LW v0.6 was tested during three different mission 
sets.  The mission sets were completed with one platoon of 45 infantrymen from the 
82nd Airborne from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, outfitted with the LW v0.6.  A 
conventionally equipped opposition force made up of soldiers from Fort Polk, 
Louisiana, simulated enemy personnel.  The first mission was to conduct a 
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parachute assault and follow-on airfield seizure/security under conditions of limited 
visibility (at night).  The second mission was an assault on a village, simulating 
urban terrain.  The third mission was an ambush conducted at night (Zieniewicz et 
al., 2002). 
During the conduct of the missions, using their helmet-mounted displays, 
soldiers could see their own locations and the location of the members of their unit.  
Wireless voice and message communication proved beneficial as well.  
Automatically transmitted situational reports allowed the platoon to assemble in the 
dark in record time.  Night-vision image intensifiers proved advantageous while 
soldiers were lying in ambush.  Overall, the system performed well, showed an 
improvement in fighting capabilities, and the results impressed the soldiers (2002). 
The first major test of a working LW prototype was successful.  By all 
accounts, the LW platoon scored high marks in lethality, situational awareness, 
navigation, and fratricide avoidance due to the LW leaders’ capability to track their 
own troops.  The final report from the JCF AWE experience noted: 
The mission test results broke all records when compared with previously 
equipped soldier results, hence proving the efficiency of wearable electronics 
in military applications by achieving revolutionary improvements in 
performance and the realization of capabilities never before imagined on the 
battlefield. (Zieniewicz et al., 2002, p. 37) 
During 2001, substantial work was done on the LW ORD by Fort Benning and 
TRADOC.  ORD requirements were restructured and put into a new format that 
attempted to link it to the Future Combat System (FCS)-enabled Objective Force 
Concept (Berger, 2008).  This concept was only in draft and was, at the time, not yet 
approved.  TRADOC Capability Manager Soldier (TCM Soldier) worked diligently to 
scope LW in the light of the Objective Force Concept.  Hand-in-hand with the 
materiel developer, TCM Soldier rewrote the Operational & Organizational (O&O) 
Concept. The revised ORD was approved by TRADOC on 31 October 2001 and 
forwarded to Headquarters, Department of the Army (Berger, 2008). 
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Also during 2001, the materiel developer worked on the system’s size, weight, 
power and communications issues.  As far as size and weight were concerned, the 
LW v0.6 weighed 91 pounds with no relief in sight for the next increment, the LW 
Initial Capability (LW-IC) (Block I).  Power issues were a major challenge, as 
conventional units were using up to one ton of batteries per day per infantry 
battalion.  Both the materiel developer and the user realized that this would become 
a key dynamic of the basis of issue (BOI) equation: in other words, who would get 
LW and in what quantities.  Compounding the logistics supportability issues was 
another dynamic of the BOI equation: cost per unit.  Cost per unit was upwards of 
$32,000 per system at the time (D. Gallop, personal communication, November 3, 
2008).  While cost per unit remained an issue, logistics supportability ideas like 
vehicle-mounted battery charging were considered for future implementation.  
Communication issues were centered on whether or not to make the LW a secure 
communications system and how to connect it to the lower tactical internet (Berger, 
2008).  Developers wrestled over connectivity challenges associated with linking a 
dismounted materiel solution to the Lower Tactical Internet (LTI).  The significant 
constraint to connectivity to the LTI was the L-Band gateway of complementary 
systems like FBCB2 and Blue Force Tracker (BFT) (D. Gallop, personal 
communication, November 3, 2008).  Dismounted units did not “carry” these 
complementary systems on their backs—they were only resident on vehicles.  These 
Army-wide issues were bigger than LW, but definitely had to be considerations 
during development. 
Additional guidance on the acquisition timeline for LW was given in late 2001.  
Developmental testing (DT) for LW-IC (Block I) was to begin in October 2002, with 
training for operational testing (OT) beginning in April 2003.  Operational testing was 
to take place in June 2003, right before the planned Milestone C Low-rate Initial 
Production (LRIP) decision in August 2003 (Berger, 2008). 
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Figure 6. LW Initial Capability Block 1.0 
(Zieniewicz et al., 2002) 
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G. LW Initial Capability (LW-IC) Block I 
LW-IC (Block I) (see Figure 6) spent 2002 in system development and 
demonstration.  It was being developed using an Other Transactions Agreement 
(OTA)10 with a consortium of “best of breed” contractors known as the LW 
Consortium (D. Gallop, personal communication, November 3, 2008).  In 2002, its 
designers completed the critical design review (CDR).  Also in 2002, efforts by the 
combat developer and user representative to establish the threshold LW capability 
as a bridge to the Objective Force continued.  In November 2002, the Chief of Staff 
of the Army approved the LW ORD; subsequently, on 17 December 2002, it was 
designated an ACAT IC program (Berger, 2008). 
The Product Manager for LW (PM LW) was working several issues at the 
same time during 2002.  While LW-IC (Block I) was his focus, he was also working 
on competing a contract for LW Stryker Interoperable (LW-SI) Block II development.  
To establish a functional baseline—to determine what he had with the LW-IC (Block 
I) in an attempt to inform the LW-SI Block II developmental effort—he completed an 
ATEC-run early functional assessment (EFA) at Aberdeen Proving Ground with 
soldiers from the 82nd Airborne in December 2002.  Based on their assessment, LW-
IC was determined unreliable.  The issue was that the LW-IC used a commercial-
based architecture that was not robust enough for soldiers’ needs and did not 
provide connectivity to the LTI.  Regardless, the EFA accomplished the PM’s intent; 
it established a functional baseline for LW-SI Block II developmental efforts (D. 
Gallop, personal communication, November 3, 2008). 
Further developmental testing was planned to continue through March of 
2003 in preparation for Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E), which would 
begin in the 3rd Quarter of FY 2003.  The first units scheduled to be equipped with 
                                            
10 An OTA is a transaction agreement characterized by enhanced flexibility and reduced 
administrative burden when compared with typical Government procurement contracts (Department 
of the Army, 2008). 
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the system were the 75th Ranger Regiment, followed by the newly formed Stryker 
Brigade Combat Teams (SBCT) and selected Special Operations Forces (SOF) 
(Berger, 2008). The PM LW wanted to give the intended end-user a vote as to LW-
IC’s form, fit and function (D. Gallop, personal communication, November 3, 2008).  
Thus, in January 2003, the 75th Ranger Regiment conducted a second early 
functional assessment (EFA) of the LW-IC (Block I) system.  Results were available 
upon completion in February, and they were very distressing to both the materiel 
developer and the user representative.  Similar to the 82nd’s EFA the previous 
winter, issues surrounding reliability were the Rangers’ main concern.  These 
concerns, coupled with cost per unit and LTI connectivity challenges forced 
Congress and the PEO Soldier to dissolve the OTA with the LW Consortium for the 
development of LW-IC (Block I) (J. Moran, personal communication, October 27, 
2008). 
This decision halted production of the 140 systems being produced for the 
IOT&E.  Furthermore, PEO Soldier indefinitely delayed IOT&E (previously scheduled 
to begin in the late spring) in favor of a different materiel solution, the Dismounted 
Battle Command System (DBCS)11 (D. Gallop, personal communication, November 
3, 2008).  His reasoning for this choice came down to two issues: affordability and 
senior leadership directives.  With respect to affordability, the DBCS was a materiel 
solution that met most of the LW requirements with a BOI that was palatable from a 
cost perspective—leader-focused instead of soldier-focused.  From the senior 
leadership’s perspective, Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) and the 
Congress provided directive guidance to develop the DBCS materiel solution.  On 
the other hand, the TCM Soldier, Colonel Ernie Forrest, was adamant that the 
optimal materiel solution was LW due to its lethality component, the WSS, as well as 
its intended BOI to every soldier.  He wanted to capitalize on the synergistic effect of 
                                            
11 The DBCS was a material solution that provided LW-like situational awareness and 
communication capabilities.  For a detailed description of DBCS, see Appendix E. 
 =
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 24 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
an interconnected force with a lethality package that allowed the user’s hands to 
remain on the weapon.  From the materiel developer’s perspective, there was 
impartiality as to the form factor.  The former PEO Soldier stated that he viewed 
getting the dismounted soldier capability in one of two form factors: “having either a 
handheld tablet [DBCS] or an eye-piece [LW]…I was impartial to either of them” (J. 
Moran, personal communication, October 27, 2008).  Regardless, the OTA for LW-
IC (Block I) development was officially dissolved in March 2003, and DT was 
stopped (D. Gallop, personal communication, November 3, 2008).  
H. LW Block II 
After the Rangers conducted their early functional assessment, but prior to 
the results being released on 30 January 2003, General Dynamics C4 Systems 
(GDC4S) was awarded the LW contract as the prime contractor for the design and 
production of LW Block II.  Since GDC4S was awarded the contract for producing 
the LW Block II, PEO Soldier directed GDC4S to re-scope and develop both LW-IC 
(Block I) and LW Block II Systems for Stryker units instead of the Rangers.  “This 
directive was based on HQDA guidance to restructure the program around the LW-
SI capabilities to leverage the existing Stryker EPLRS network to connect with the 
LTI” (D. Gallop, personal communication, November 3, 2008).  Later that spring, the 
Commanding General, United States Army Infantry Center12 (USAIC), signed a 
memorandum approving an update to the Critical Operational Issues and Criteria 
(COIC).  This update to the COIC reflected the aforementioned LW Program 
restructure activities and the combining of the LW Block I and II efforts.  The COIC 
was approved for LW Block II by Headquarters, Department of the Army, on 30 
September 2003 (Berger, 2008). 
                                            
12 Now known as the Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE). 
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GDC4S wasted no time after contract award, and the preliminary design 
review (PDR) was conducted for LW Block II on 30 July 2003.  In late November, 
two issues came up.  First, LW did not have an interoperability certification from the 
J6.  Second, it was determined that an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) had been 
started, but not completed for LW (Berger, 2008).  The AoA had yet to be restarted 
when the LW Consortium OTA was dissolved earlier in the year.  J6 certification13 
was completed; however, the AoA conducted—jointly by TRADOC Analysis Center-
White Sands (TRAC WSMR) and the TCM Soldier—would not be completed for 
almost a year.  For LW, calendar year 2003 ended with the approval of the LW Test 
and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) on 8 December 2003 (Berger, 2008). 
The events of 2004 shaped the future of LW as we know it today.  In August 
2004, soon after completion of the LW Block II CDR on 27 May 2004, the Army 
reduced the funding for the LW Program in the FY 2006-2011 Program Objective 
Memorandum (POM) in favor of the DBCS (Augustine, 2008a).  Procurement was 
refocused to fielding emerging situational awareness and command-and-control 
capabilities to the current force and merged the LW and FFW Advanced Concept 
Technology Demonstration (ACTD) to focus on the future force14 (US House of 
Representatives, 2004a). 
Immediately following this decision, the Commanding General, USAIC, and 
PEO Soldier briefed the Army Systems Acquisition Review Council (ASARC) to 
confirm the strategy to resource soldier modernization.  The Chief of Infantry 
submitted a proposal, addressing the Army’s need for an integrated modular soldier 
system to improve the warfighters’ ability to fight in the Global War on Terror 
(GWOT).  His proposal included funding to conduct a DOTMLPF assessment with a 
battalion within a Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT).  The intent of this 
                                            
13 J-6 System Validation of Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) 
Acquisition Category (ACAT) programs/systems (CJCS, 2006). 
14 For a detailed description of the FFW ACTD, see Appendix F. 
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assessment was to explore LW basis of issue (BOI) alternatives within the construct 
of a SBCT.  A secondary benefit of the assessment was further refinement of the 
capabilities required in the future with Future Combat Systems (FCS) (Berger, 
2008). 
To reinforce the value of his proposal, the Chief of Infantry ordered a 
demonstration of LW Block II.  Even though LW’s funding was reduced in the POM, 
research and development had continued with GDC4S when it was returned to the 
tech-base for maturation in mid-2004 (Augustine, 2008a).  GDC4S had prototype 
systems ready to demonstrate, and this venue would prove to breathe life back into 
the program. 
From September to November, a side-by-side experiment was run at Fort 
Benning, Georgia, comparing the capabilities of a LW-equipped squad with those of 
a conventionally equipped squad.  This “side-by-side” was successful in that it 
demonstrated tangible LW-enabled capabilities to decision-makers.  Immediately 
following the “side-by-side,” the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General Cody, 
recommended (in FY 2006) the equipping of one Stryker Battalion with LW-SI (Block 
II) capabilities (440 systems).  Based on this recommended course of action, the 
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology 
(ASA(ALT)) directed the equipping of a Stryker Battalion with LW to conduct a 
DOTMLPF assessment and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) 
development.15  The Stryker Battalion chosen was the 2nd Cavalry Regiment, 2nd 
Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, Washington.16  This directive did not reverse the 
previous POM decision to reduce the LW Program; however, it gave the program 
one last opportunity to prove its value for the Army (Berger, 2008). 
                                            
15 See Appendix G for the memo directing the equipping of a Stryker Battalion with LW to conduct a 
DOTMLPF assessment and tactics, techniques and procedures development. 
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I. LW Stryker Interoperable (LW-SI)—“Manchu” 
In 2005, conditions were set for LW-SI (Block II) fielding to the 4th Battalion, 
9th Infantry Regiment (Manchus) at Fort Lewis, Washington.  The Manchus were 
reorganized and started standing up as new soldiers reported for duty and the chain 
of command was established.  An agreement to do a limited user test (LUT) in 
conjunction with the DOTMLPF assessment was approved by unit leadership.  
GDC4S and the PM LW initiated further production of prototype LW-SI (Block II) 
Systems in preparation for the first unit to be equipped with soldier systems.  By the 
end of the year, the train-the-trainer course began for the Manchus (Berger, 2008). 
Systems production, testing and evaluation continued through May 2006.  
The unit received its LW-SI (Block II) systems and started new equipment training in 
June.  DOTMLPF assessment activities paralleled unit-training activities throughout 
the rest of the year.  Soldiers and materiel developers worked hand-in-hand on 
system upgrades and ergonomic improvements throughout the summer (Augustine, 
2008a).  The result was a user-improved LW-SI (Block II) named the “Manchu,” the 
battalion’s namesake (see Figure 7 below).  These systems were not re-issued 
systems.  They were user-improved systems, not new prototypes.  They were the 
same prototype systems that underwent soldier-improved software and hardware 
upgrades and configurations (Augustine, 2008a). 
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Figure 7. LW “Manchu” Configuration 
(Zieniewicz et al., 2002) 
By the end of October 2006, the unit had embraced LW and demonstrated its 
capabilities at two VIP days.  Initially, at the first VIP day in July 2006 (which was 
synchronized with the budget cycle by program management personnel), the unit 
expressed frustration with the system’s capabilities, configuration and weight.  
However, by the second VIP day, in October 2006, unit acceptance was achieved; 
the commander of 4-9 Infantry Regiment, LTC W.W. Prior, announced that he 
wanted to take both LW and its mounted counterpart, Mounted Warrior (MW), to Iraq 
in 2007.17  The unit acceptance that influenced his decision was a direct result of the 
extensive soldier-driven, material developer-executed improvements to the system 
(Berger, 2008).  The ATEC-run limited user test (LUT) conducted in September 
produced favorable results as well and reinforced his decision. 
Almost immediately following LTC Prior’s decision, the LW Program was 
terminated by the Army.  This termination was a direct result of the perception that 
Army decision-makers had of the program based on the dissatisfaction that 4-9 
                                            
17 For a detailed description of the Mounted Warrior system, see Appendix H. 
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Infantry expressed during the first VIP day (Cummings, 2008, July 17).  In addition, a 
Milestone C Low-rate Initial Production (LRIP) decision was attempted in early 2007 
but in the end, was denied by the Army.  Regardless of these decisions, the Army 
supported LTC Prior’s request, and LW was deployed to Iraq with his battalion in 
May of 2007.  
The materiel developer and the users’ representative accompanied 4-9 
Infantry to conduct an in-country DOTMLPF assessment, as well as maintenance 
and logistics support (Cummings, 2008, July 17).  After approximately six months of 
successful combat operations with the 4-9 Infantry, LW became very popular; other 
units were eager to see how well the system performed.  During the deployment, a 
sister unit of the brigade to which 4-9 Infantry was assigned (5th Brigade, 2nd Infantry 
Division) was so impressed with the system’s performance that its commander 
submitted an Operational Needs Statement (ONS) for the LW (2008, July 17).  
Funding for the ONS was approved through a supplemental budget request in May 
2008 to conduct this equipping.  At the time of this writing, efforts were underway to 
train the rest of this brigade on the LW System (US Senate, 2008). 
To date, lessons learned and after-action reports from 4-9 Infantry Regiment’s 
in-country experience are being compiled to capture the effectiveness of the LW 
Soldier System.  These reports will provide a way ahead for the GSE18—the soldier 
system of tomorrow. 
J. LW Supporting Studies and Related Research 
From studies on human factors engineering to science and technology 
research, LW has had its share of attention in the past.  Numerous supporting 
                                            
18In an effort to explain the importance of LW relative to the future GSE, the researchers wish to 
stress the origins and current status of the SaaS initiative and the GSE Program itself.  See Appendix 
A for a complete overview of SaaS and Appendix I GSE Program Description. 
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studies, reports and research have been completed by academia, industry and the 
Department of Defense.  This study builds upon the foundations of those studies in 
an attempt to gain insights for present and future program managers. To provide a 
point of departure for this study, a brief summary of eight key LW supporting studies 
and reports follows. 
K. 1991 Army Science Board (ASB) Summer Study 
In 1991, the ASB conducted a summer study with the following objectives:  
[E]valuate all aspects of the “soldier as a system”; consider how we do 
business today and whether that should change for the future; identify 
potential soldier performance “leap-aheads” and enabling technologies; 
consider psychological and physiological interfaces and assess science and 
technology: “Is it good enough?”. (Haley et al., 1991, p. 1)  
The 1991 summer study came to the following five conclusions:  
1. The requirement to properly equip the soldier for combat is as complex 
as the requirements of other programs—such as the Abrams tank, 
Bradley Fighting Vehicle, Patriot Missile System, and Black Hawk 
helicopter programs; 
2. Existing soldier equipment mismatches (due to lack of integration) are 
reducing combat efficiency and endangering soldiers;  
3. The planned “block change” concept of equipping the force (no new 
equipment is fielded until enough is procured for the entire Army) is an 
outdated concept;  
4. Promising new technological capabilities should be exploited to ensure 
battlefield overmatch for the American soldier; and,  
5. The Army should develop and employ experimentation (wargaming 
and simulations) with emphasis on future soldier system threats 
(Lockhart, 2006). 
The study further concluded that there was a need for the Army to manage 
the soldier as a system.  It recommended that soldier requirements be derived from 
the functions soldiers have to perform in the face of the threat on future battlefields.  
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It also recommended that TRADOC provide prioritized capability needs in the form 
of requirements to guide the DOTMLPF development process for future soldier 
systems (Lockhart, 2006). 
Last, the 1991 summer study surmised that the TCM Soldier’s ability to 
effectively perform all functions within the existing manpower resources was 
questionable at best due to its greater breadth of responsibilities as compared to 
other TCMs.  Due to multiple program requirements and the complexity associated 
with achieving required capabilities, the study further recommended that a general 
officer manage the acquisition of soldier systems (2006). 
While the findings of the 1991 study were supported in most Army circles, 
they lacked an authoritative sponsoring force to guide the recommendations into 
Army-wide practice.  Interestingly, shortly after its publication, the SIPE ATD verified 
the study’s findings.  The SIPE ATD demonstrated the soldier as a system, as well 
as the capability management necessary when developing systems for the soldier. 
L.  1994 ASB Ad Hoc Study “Technology for the Future LW” 
Momentum was building thanks to the successes of the SIPE ATD and the 
drafting of the LW ORD; thus, in 1994, the ASB conducted an ad hoc study entitled 
Technology for the Future LW.  The study had three purposes: 1) identify high-payoff 
technologies, 2) recommend programs to overcome technical and system barriers, 
and 3) recommend appropriate demonstration projects (Montgomery, Godden, 
LaBerge & Wagner, 1994). 
The ASB study found that the then-recent SIPE demonstrations offered 
convincing verification that new and affordable technology-driven techniques could 
provide cost-effective improvements to LW capabilities.  Furthermore, these 
capabilities would have a profound positive effect on the Army’s ability to perform its 
most stressing future contingency missions.  The report concluded that there were 
three major barriers to the implementation of LW technologies: 1) the then-current 
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acquisition system, 2) weight, and 3) cost.  The study suggested that LW equipment 
must be delivered in quantity to soldiers in the field and that warfighters must be fully 
trained in the use of the equipment for them to be effective. 
The final report of the 1994 study stated that Army planning was not 
adequately detailed for the evolution of LW technologies and that specific focus 
areas (which set priorities) were not defined.  Due to unclear descriptions of novel 
capabilities, the report pointed out that near-term fielding of new LW technologies 
was uncertain.  Lastly, the 1994 study report compared the Army’s product planning 
process with the high-technology sector of US commercial business.  The study 
described the planning process of US high-technology firms as focused on areas of 
greatest improvement, careful to avoid substantial proliferation of examined options, 
and as cross-functional in nature—whereas the Army did not have a top-down, new 
product planning process that came close to that in such firms.  Panel members 
urged the Army to consider paralleling its processes for formulation of successful 
research programs with those of its successful industrial counterparts. 
Eight key recommended management strategies emerged from the 1994 
study: 
1. Immediate effort should be undertaken within the Army to quantify the 
comparative cost effectiveness of production and fielding of LW 
technologies compared to the utility derived from other non-LW 
production options. 
2. A continuing funding wedge must be budgeted to support production.  
3. The funding wedge should be based on procurement with the following 
approximate goals: 
a. Minimum fielding quantity/item    10,000 
b. Average build-out period/item   5 years 
c. Average number of projects in pipeline at any time 5 
d. Average production cost/item   $10,000 
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e. Total funding for new capability  $100 Million/year 
4. The Army must formulate a prioritized list of appropriate production 
candidates to be programmed and budgeted to support continuing 
production (along the lines of the outline above). 
5. Based on the availability of LW items for production and funds 
available within the proposed budget wedge, a commitment to a 
schedule of new programs for future production must be laid out.  
Otherwise, funding should be used to procure initial equipment for all 
units rather than to continue procuring newly developed equipment. 
6. A series of SIPE-like technology demonstrations should be conducted 
to qualify candidate technologies. 
7. Based on long-term user needs and the timing of future SIPE-like 
user/technology testing, focused advanced technology programs 
should be selected from within the Army LW research and technology 
menu.  While not all potential technologies should be focused toward 
these testing gates and user preferences, the Army must ensure the 
bulk of its technology exploration selections come from this process. 
8. The Army should adopt a top-down, industry analogous, new product 
planning process whose end-product is definable.  A definable product 
allows for meaningful prioritization, funding and sequencing of 
technology development efforts (Montgomery et al., 1994, pp. 7-8). 
The significance of the ASB ad hoc study is that it set the course for the 
emerging LW acquisition strategy.  At the time, the acqusition strategy was focused 
on the evolution of the system through technology demonstrations and focused 
upgrades and capability. Futhermore, in retrospect, its suggestion that LW 
equipment should be delivered in quantity to soldiers in the field and that they must 
be fully trained to be effective  proved to be essential to its success.  Unfortunately, 
its recommendations with respect to cost per unit were not used as a guideline.  This 
proved detrimental to LW’s support during the early 2000s. 
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M. United States General Accounting Office (GAO) 1996 
Report 
Following the 1994 ASB ad hoc study, the GAO completed a report in 1996 
cautioning Congress that the LW acquisition strategy was too ambitious.  The 
report’s objectives were to: 1) determine the status of various technology and 
human-factor problems associated with system development, 2) evaluate the 
acquisition strategy for the LW System, and 3) assess plans to integrate the system 
within the digital battlefield (GAO, 1996). 
The report pointed out that the program was facing a number of technical and 
human-factor problems that were not being adequately addressed.  Furthermore, the 
report highlighted the fact that the Army had not yet developed prototypes for LW 
and that these lingering development problems could affect the system’s ability to be 
ready for its then-scheduled IOT&E in August 1998.  It suggested that program 
compromises could be on the horizon because of the then-recent Army decision to 
compress the overall acquisition schedule (GAO, 1996). 
The significance of this report was its predictions of potential shortfalls in LW 
Program cost, management, performance and schedule aspects based on technical 
complexity.  At the time, the Army planned to overlap development and operational 
testing of LW.  The report cautioned that this change in acquisition strategy 
(permitting more rapid production and deployment) could bump procurement costs 
to over $1.4 billion.  This projected cost and the complexity of the program were 
presented as evidence that the program needed more management attention.  The 
report suggested that the program was incorrectly classified at ACAT III; because of 
its projected cost and complexity, it should be managed at the ACAT II level.  Last, 
and perhaps most important, the report noted that because LW prototypes were not 
available while the Army tested other components of the evolving digital battlefield, 
successful demonstration of its ability to operate within the construct of other digital 
battlefield elements was not accomplished.  The study’s authors warned that there 
was no assurance that LW would perform as intended and that if it was produced on 
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schedule, ahead of other digital battlefield components, interoperability of hardware 
and software components would be unproven and potentially compromised. 
N. USAIC 1997 Dismounted Soldier Study 
In 1997, the United States Army Infantry Center (USAIC) conducted a holistic 
study of the future requirements for dismounted soldiers.  This study concluded that 
through the beginning decades of the 21st century, US forces will engage in smaller 
scale wars against asymmetric threats and that this dynamic will increase the need 
for dismounted ground forces (Lockhart, 2006).  Also in 1997, the LW Early 
Operational Experiment Report confirmed that a systems approach to soldier 
requirements would provide greater payoffs in lethality, survivability, mobility, and 
situational awareness—for both the individual and the unit (2006). 
These findings and previous work on SaaS and LW prompted the Army to 
create the Soldier System Command (SSCOM) to meet requirements for the SaaS.  
The SSCOM Project Manager, Soldier at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, was charged with 
coordinating the engineering/manufacturing development of the LW System with a 
program to insert new technology (Objective Force Warrior) under the direction of 
the Natick Research, Development and Engineering Center in Natick, 
Massachusetts (2006). 
O. GAO 1999 Report 
In December 1999, the GAO produced another report entitled Army’s 
Restructured LW Program Needs More Oversight.  This report followed up on the 
1996 report and set out to: 1) identify the status of the system, 2) evaluate whether 
the current level of monitoring and oversight was sufficient based on projected LW 
development costs, 3) determine how the Army was ensuring LW’s ability to operate 
with other digitized battlefield systems, and 4) assess whether technical and human-
factor problems still needed resolution (GAO, 1999). 
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The report pointed out that LW was not going to meet its fielding date of 
September 2000 because technologies were not being developed fast enough.  
Time of completion was estimated to be delayed until 2004, with an estimated cost 
increase from $1.4 billion to $2.1 billion.  Based on the schedule risk, cost increases 
and the technological complexity of the program, the report concluded that oversight 
of the program was insufficient.  As in the 1996 report, this report mentioned 
integration issues with other digital battlefield components like the Force XXI Battle 
Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2).  This interoperability issue was essential to 
the envisioned digital construct of the Objective Force.  At the time of the report, 
incorporation of this important capability was unplanned for the LW System due to 
computer architecture incompatibility issues.  Last, the report pointed out that some 
technical and human-factor problems remained unsolved and could cause the 
system to be ineffective altogether.  Battery problems, ergonomic issues, 
electromagnetic interference issues and weight problems were noted as significant 
(GAO, 1999). 
To remedy the noted deficiencies and to ensure that the LW development 
was completed before systems were fielded, the report recommended that the 
Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to return the LW Program to 
the Program Definition and Risk Reduction phase until workable prototypes were 
produced.  Furthermore, the GAO auditors recommended that LW be reclassified as 
an ACAT I system to ensure appropriate oversight and monitoring.  Third, the GAO 
recommended that LW be required to demonstrate interoperability with FBCB2 as a 
risk-reduction measure and to ensure battlefield situational awareness.  Last, the 
report recommended the Army should be required to thoroughly field-test LW 
prototypes and ensure that they passed water immersion, electromagnetic interface 
and airborne certifications prior to the fielding of any systems (1999). 
The relevance of this report to the LW Program was its emphasis on 
increased oversight and increased interoperability with FBCB2.  This report 
strengthened the May 2002 decision to manage the program at the Army Acquisition 
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Executive (AAE) level.  This decision to designate LW as an ACAT IC program was 
based upon both this report’s recommendation and estimated RDT&E costs (Ugone 
et al., 2002).  The report’s emphasis on interoperability was crucial to materiel 
developers, as this capability was unplanned due to system architecture.  This 
recommendation proved to be a critical consideration during the LW System 
development—especially when the LW Consortium was its primary developer.  It 
foreshadowed one of LW’s darkest times from 2003-2004. 
P. 2001 ASB Summer Study  
Another Army Science Board summer study was completed in 2001, entitled 
The Objective Force Soldier/Soldier Team.  The purpose of this study was to 
determine ways to enhance the Objective Force soldier and to recommend 
roadmaps to guide soldier integration as part of the FCS (Lockhart, 2006).  The 
study produced three important findings: 1) that our country had a critical need for a 
Soldier/Marine team that can be deployed in time of crisis and can accomplish 
assigned missions with minimal casualties; 2) that if the Army took a systems 
approach oriented toward qualitative advance in six synergistic dimensions (lethality, 
survivability, C4ISR, mobility, sustainability, people), it could achieve a vision of a 
Soldier/Marine ten times as effective; 3) that there were certain priority programs 
(identified in the study) which would achieve desired gains; the study produced a 
series of roadmaps for implementation (Douglas, Downing, Steele, Hyder & Otstott, 
2001). 
Perhaps even more important to the soldier as a system concept was the 
study’s recommendation for a top-level systems engineering approach to designing 
soldier systems.  The study concluded that the term “soldier system” was a 
misnomer.  It stated that soldier systems were being designed and developed as a 
series of programmatic and technical stove-pipes—with no overall systems architect 
charged with ensuring system performance, weight, power and sustainability 
objectives (Lockhart, 2006).  It recommended assigning a chief engineer with overall 
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system design responsibility that was empowered to conduct trade-offs to ensure 
system design technical feasibility, affordability and producibility (Douglas et al., 
2001).  The SaaS management concept can be attributed to the conclusions of this 
study. 
Q. 2002 Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector 
General (DoD IG) Report  
In 2002, the DoD IG provided a report to the Army’s Auditor General and 
Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA).  The report’s subject was the 
acquisition of the Army LW System (Ugone et al., 2002).  The intent of the report 
was to highlight management, support and oversight issues regarding the LW 
Program.  The study found that though the PM for the LW System effectively 
implemented an evolutionary acquisition strategy to develop and produce the system 
in three sequential blocks to reduce both technical risk and to expedite the fielding of 
its capabilities, additional management attention was required. 
The DoD IG concluded that, due to incomplete system and operational 
requirements, undecided BOI definition, insufficient performance parameters (most 
notably, reliability), and force structure requirements, the Army would be less able to 
make informed affordability decisions to support future budget submissions for the 
program.  Second, the IG noted that the PM would be less able to provide the 
acquisition community with measurable information on the value of using an Other 
Transactions Agreement (OTA) for acquisition programs.  Using an OTA would allow 
for an increased level of commercial industry involvement and would maximize the 
rapid prototyping process.  In addition, the PM had not inserted a provision for 
performance metrics in the OTA with the LW Consortium.  Next, the study pointed 
out that the delegation agreement between the agreements officer for the program 
office and the DCMA, Syracuse, provided limited and vaguely defined requirements 
for administration support.  The report stated that as a result, the PM would find it 
hard to obtain timely and meaningful information on LW Consortium performance 
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against cost, schedule and performance requirements.  The report concluded that 
the PM had not implemented specified processes, documentation, and reporting 
requirements in the risk management plan. Furthermore, promotion of continuous 
risk management and timely reporting to acquisition decision-makers on program 
risk and risk mitigation was not accomplished.  Publication of this report prompted 
revision of the ORD by TRADOC and Government and contractor tightening of risk-
management methods (Ugone et al., 2002).  Furthermore, its conclusions 
strengthened the 2002 decision to compete the program and the 2003 decision to 
dissolve the LW Consortium. 
The findings and recommendations of the aforementioned studies set the 
stage for further research.  Included here were several of the major studies about 
soldier systems and LW from several different perspectives.  Other notable research 
has been conducted surrounding soldier systems in the past.  Dr. Jean Dyer, Army 
Research Institute, Fort Benning, Georgia, has spearheaded much of this effort.  We 
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III. The LW Materiel Developers’ Perspectives 
I guess a lot of people would probably stand up and show you a great flow 
chart with arrows about a process they developed that revolutionized 
acquisition and how great it was, and they would publish an article on it.  My 
lesson learned is that all of these things, sometimes, well, just don’t work.  I 
hate to say that, but complete persistence is the only thing you can actually 
count on….I don’t want to oversimplify it, but complete persistence, seeing 
where a problem is, taking great people—and those resources are 
unbelievable if you have good people that really want to try, that are loyal to 
what they are trying to do—loyal to the program, not the king, or the person, 
but to the program and they know it is the right thing—[is essential].  Having 
solid, good people who have the same mindset every day that they have to 
win—and they do—that is the difference with what we have done.  When 
problems came up, this program [Land Warrior] has refused to have a show-
stopper—refused. (Cummings, 2008, July 17) 
In my opinion, we could have been a lot more successful [initially] if there had 
been a better relationship between the PM and the contractor.  Too many 
times it was too adversarial instead of more of a “let’s work together and 
figure out what’s going on” [relationship].  That has turned around.  We have 
a very good relationship with the PM shop now; it seems to me that there is a 
lot more cooperation.  That, to me, is one of the things that sure makes life 
easier—if you can establish a good relationship and maintain it between a 
contractor and the PM. (Spears, 2008) 
A. Introduction 
The comments above represent the perspectives of both the government PM 
for LW, LTC Brian Cummings, and the prime contractor, GDC4S, LW PM, Mr. Roger 
Spears.  The first comment is grounded in persistence and the second, in 
cooperation.  Both PMs have been at the helm during the LW’s recent past and have 
provided unique perspectives on the acquisition efforts surrounding it.  The intent of 
this chapter is to describe the events that took place from the perspectives of these 
two men in an attempt to gain an appreciation for the challenges that were overcome 
and to garner the lessons learned. 
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This chapter describes the roles of a PM from the perspectives of both the 
government and civilian materiel developers.  We highlight some of the challenges 
inherent in the 21st century government acquisition environment.  The relationships 
that PMs should have with their industry counterparts, as well as some new 
concepts to consider for today’s acquisition environment, are discussed.  Several 
tenets of program management are then described as guidelines for current and 
future PMs to consider.  Next, we briefly define what an acquisition strategy is and 
some of the approaches that can be used to develop a new system or item. To 
frame the context within which the materiel developers operated, we then discuss 
the LW Program acquisition strategy by calendar year from 2001 until 2008.  
Included in this discussion are the LW PM’s fielding plan, several key developmental 
activities during fielding, as well as major challenges encountered prior to 4-9 
Infantry’s deployment.  We also detail the PM’s plan to train and maintain the LW 
System during 4-9 Infantry’s New Equipment Training (NET) through the 4-9’s 
deployment in order to emphasize some of its unique challenges.  We provide 
emphasis on the employment of the Unit System Integrator (USI) concept to show 
how the PM was able to incorporate changes identified by the user in both training 
and in combat.  We conclude by providing some general lessons that may be 
applicable to other materiel developers in the defense acquisition community. 
B. 21ST Century Program Management Challenges 
PMs face many challenges due to the complexities inherent to the DoD 
acquisition environment.  In some cases, these challenges have been around for 
years, in others, since just recently.  They are based on several factors.  First, while 
requirements are stated, many times they are not stable.  They evolve with changes 
in Army doctrine, user needs and rapid advancements in technology.  The PM’s 
ability to keep pace with changes is a complex task in itself.  Furthermore, when 
funding instability and bureaucracy are combined within the acquisition environment, 
they stifle rapid change, increase schedule and drive up program costs.  Next, 
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combat and support operations since Vietnam have added complexity to an evolving 
set of joint requirements that have broadened the scope of what the acquisition 
environment requires.  Operation Urgent Fury, for example, revealed many problems 
in joint operations.  These new joint requirements tore down the “stove-piped” walls 
of the traditional acquisition environment and created a host of new interfaces and 
strategic partners.  Third, growing system complexity creates both technical and 
managerial challenges.  A recent study completed by the US Air Force suggests that 
system complexity is perhaps the largest factor contributing to the reality of today’s 
acquisition environment.  Its authors describe complexity as “the interactions 
between all of the entities comprising a system” (Rothenflue & Kwolek, 2006, p. 79).  
This “system complexity is a root cause and enables funding instability and 
bureaucracy to play larger roles in the overall schedule and cost of defense 
programs” (p. 79). 
Consequently, the demands placed on PMs have rapidly increased since the 
start of the GWOT and have caused an evolution in acquisition management 
methods.  Likewise, because industry counterparts must execute the government’s 
guidance, prime contractors’ methods have changed accordingly.  The 21st century 
PM must be able to operate across the joint community—crossing functional, 
organizational and programmatic boundaries in order to deliver materiel within the 
recently implemented JCIDS construct. To be effective, a PM must have a broad 
technical background and have the ability to manage programs at the tactical level 
(1-year horizon), the operational level (2 year horizon) and the strategic level (3 
years and beyond) with industry partner(s).  In most cases, PMs have to get 
capabilities to the force quickly given today’s wartime posture and user expectations.  
They do not do this alone.  They must foster support from appropriate government 
commands, staffs and agencies (Yakovac & Renee, 2007). 
Some of today’s PMs, both government and civilian, must have the ability to 
manage “mega-systems.”  These are “large-scale, potentially complex systems that 
cross traditional boundaries to provide capability beyond that achievable by their 
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component parts” (2007, p. 4).  While not all future systems will be “mega-systems,” 
PMs must be able to manage the complexity of future software-intensive systems 
while managing the DoD-imposed interoperability requirements.  PMs today must be 
able to manage in an environment in which requirements are often stated as “vision 
statements” or broad architectures.  They must deal with a fluid, ever-changing 
technological atmosphere in which some system functionality of the program may be 
achieved only through interaction of various components.  PMs have to manage 
uncertainty both in risk and in unanticipated and unforeseen opportunities that are 
due in large part to technology and software challenges.  PMs must be able to 
leverage capabilities from other programs in an effort to find alternative solutions that 
meet their users’ needs (Yakovac & Renee, 2007). 
Figure 8 below depicts the evolution of program management—moving from 
traditional perspectives to a characterization of the current acquisition environment.  
This progress is framed within the contexts of the system, its implementation, its 
stakeholders and its strategic scope and mission environment.  The model has three 
different layers: the inner and middle layers that represent how the acquisition 
environment has traditionally been characterized, and the outer layer representing 
how the acquisition environment can be characterized today.  The inner and middle 
layers begin by characterizing acquisition program management as a single scope of 
effort within a relatively stable environment, with singular-user-generated 
requirements and predictable stakeholder relationships.  This paradigm depicts 
acquisition management’s desired outcomes as an improvement to existing 
capabilities of systems that have well-defined and known characteristics.  The 
model’s author suggests the two inner layers often times lead to the development of 
single-user, “stove-piped” designed systems.  A “stove-piped” system is defined as a 
single piece of equipment that is based on an independent requirements document 
and has a single-user interface (2007, p. 6).  The components within the system may 
have been complex but were independent of other systems on the battlefield.  The 
systems tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) were developed once the 
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system was fielded.  Once the system was fielded, the unit determined how it would 
interface with already existing capabilities (2007, p. 6). 
The outermost circle depicts today’s increasingly complex program 
management environment and is applicable to the LW Program.  PMs have to 
consider system capabilities (such as responsiveness, deployability, agility, 
versatility, lethality, and survivability).  Today, more than ever before, these 
characteristics apply to everything we give our soldiers.  PMs must cross multiple 
acquisition boundaries based on complex operational needs and evolving, forward-
thinking, mission requirements that are used by the entire joint community.  The 
current environment has multiple programs that, in some cases, are 
interdependent—with outputs that are more complicated than ever before.  
Expectations include fundamentally new capabilities at the extended enterprise level 
in the form of complex, interoperable, mega-systems that cross previously 
independent functional domains (Yakovac & Renee, 2007).  PMs must synchronize 
programs that, in the past, were based in large part on individual requirements 
documents and single-user, “stove-piped” systems.  These independent systems 
exist in the Joint, Interagency and Multinational environment.  PMs must be able to 
design systems that interface with these systems so the warfighters on the ground 
can be interoperable across the battlespace and more lethal—due to an integrated 
design process with multiple capabilities at their disposal.  Today’s PM must be able 
to make trade-offs within a complex battlespace, within a system-of-systems (SoS) 
concept, to find the best capability that meets the warfighters’ needs (2007, p. 6). 
We will describe later in this chapter and in Chapter IV how the PM LW dealt 
with these ideas.  With respect to trade-offs, the PM continuously fought affordability 
for capability trades within the context of distinct changes in Army vision—Net-
centric Warfare and the Objective Force Concept.  Added to the complexities of the 
increased interoperability requirements inherent to these concepts was the linking of 
the LW System to the FCS SoS.  Furthermore, he dealt with these challenges with 
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his user counterpart who, as detailed in Chapter IV, was representing an often split 
community that rarely spoke with one voice. 
 
Figure 8. Emerging Acquisition Framework 
(Yakovac & Renee, 2007) 
C. PM Tenets for Managing Complexity 
In order for the PM to succeed in today’s fluid and complex acquisition 
environment, he should implement a few key tenets (Yakovac, 2004).  These tenets 
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can assist the PM in optimizing the program’s operational capability, maximizing 
competition with industry, and ensuring interoperability with other battlefield systems 
and other developing programs.  These tenets, coupled with the use of methods like 
a Modular Open System Approach (MOSA),19 can reduce overall lifecycle cost and 
help a PM manage complexity.  Today’s PMs should consider these tenets as they 
strive to maximize program competition, maintain key acquisition milestones, and 
assist in increasing system performance attributes: 
 Create opportunity for best of industry to participate. This will attract 
the best technological approaches and most reliable industry 
organizations to participate in developing future programs. 
 Leverage the government technology base to the maximum extent.  
This allows the PM increased flexibility and the ability to incorporate 
technology.  By leveraging this base, a PM will reduce proprietary 
issues, reduce overall program costs, and allow for rapid integration by 
the government with products supplied by multiple contractors. 
 Use a collaborative environment from design through lifecycle 
management. The PM must continue to reach across the joint 
community—crossing functional, organizational and programmatic 
boundaries to integrate the most current and mature technologies.  
 At minimum, implement component commonality at subsystem and 
component level to the maximum extent possible.  This will reduce 
lifecycle cost of the program and allow for ease of capability upgrades 
during its lifecycle.  
 Design and plan for technology integration and insertion to enable an 
overall integrated warfighting capability (this is closely related to 
MOSA). 
 Maintain and shape the industrial base for future system capabilities/ 
technologies.  The PM must conduct periodic risk analysis of the 
program’s industrial base—ensuring that both the manufacturers and 
suppliers are continuing to meet the needs of the program. 
                                            
19MOSA is the Department of Defense implementation of “open systems.” The program manager 
should incorporate MOSA principles into the acquisition strategy to ensure access to the latest 
technologies and products, and to facilitate affordable and supportable system development and 
modernization of fielded assets (DAU, 2008, November). 
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 Provide a consistent and continuous definition of requirements.  To do 
this, the PM must receive continuous user feedback and implement 
changes to the system that are cost effective and that meet the users’ 
needs. 
 Program Affordability—Balance performance and sustainment 
(Yakovac, 2004). 
These tenets, when employed by a PM, will help him survive in today’s 
complex acquisition environment.  The relationship between the government PM and 
his industry counterpart is as important as it has ever been.  Both must work 
together by exchanging ideas on new, integrated, cost-effective solutions to meet 
the demands of the user.  In sum, both must be willing to take chances in breaking 
through technological issues by thinking outside the traditional acquisition 
environment’s bounds. 
In the case of LW, many chances were taken.  For example, the PM LW’s 
incorporation of soldier-driven design was a breakthrough.  To accomplish this, he 
had to work closely with GDC4S.  They did not have a lot of time to make this 
happen because the unit was preparing to deploy.  Taking this chance was risky.  As 
we later describe, the PM was able to go outside of the traditional acquisition 
paradigm and make it happen. 
D. Acquisition Strategy 
All government PMs must operate within the framework of an acquisition 
strategy.  An acquisition strategy is defined by the Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(FAR) as “a strategy that is specifically tailored to a particular major system 
acquisition program” (General Services Administration, 2005).  The acquisition 
strategy is the PM’s overall plan for satisfying the mission need in the most effective, 
economical, and timely manner.  The development of the acquisition strategy 
requires collaboration between the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA), the PM, and 
the functional communities engaged in and supporting DoD acquisition.  A well-
developed acquisition strategy can minimize the time and cost required to satisfy 
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approved capability needs, and can maximize affordability throughout the program’s 
lifecycle.  The strategy should define the management approach and fully define the 
planning considerations and decisions of the program such as contract type and 
incentive arrangements (DoD, 2004). 
The acquisition strategy defines the approach a program will use.  To get 
away from a single-user system approach and to allow for faster procurement, the 
DoD’s preferred strategy for rapid acquisition of mature technology is through 
evolutionary acquisition (EA).  EA delivers capability in increments of useful military 
capability, recognizing the need for improvements.  EA defines, develops, produces 
and fields an initial hardware or software capability.  These initial capabilities can 
then be fielded to the user in a compressed period of time and are usually followed 
by subsequent improvements.  This methodology, coupled with MOSA, can result in 
systems that are adaptable and that can respond to evolving needs of the user.  The 
objective of EA is to balance required capabilities with available technology to put 
warfighting systems into the hands of the users quickly and affordably.  The success 
of the EA strategy depends on a consistent and continuous definition of 
requirements and the maturation of technologies, the combination of which may lead 
to a structured approach to the development and production of systems.  This 
structured approach provides increased capability while the program moves towards 
a materiel concept (DoD, 2008).  This was the technique employed by the LW 
Program beginning in 2001.  There are two different approaches to achieve EA—
incremental and spiral. 
An incremental approach is based on the premise that each individual system 
has its own set of thresholds and objectives that are defined by the user.  The 
incremental approach requires well-defined requirements but lends itself to a stove-
piped acquisition approach.  The reason it creates “stove-piping” is because it is 
focused on individual systems instead of multiple, complementary systems.  In an 
incremental approach, the capability has been identified, and the desired capability 
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is known.  The requirement is met over time through a series of increments, each 
dependent on available mature technology (Hawthorne & Lush, 2002). 
The spiral approach differs slightly as it offers an “open-ended” approach.  If a 
capability is identified, but its end-state requirements are unknown, requirements are 
refined through demonstration and risk management.  Spiral development requires 
continuous user feedback.  User feedback is essential to spiral development, as it 
ensures that each increment provides the user with the best possible capability.  
Updated requirements in future increments depend on user feedback and 
technology maturation (DoD, 2008).  An example of a program that plans to apply 
this technique is the FCS Program.  In this case, the FCS Program began with a 
capability that was more of a concept. This vision was identified well before end-
state requirements could be completely defined.  As the FCS Program matured, 
requirements have been refined through spirals defined by technology maturation 
and user feedback. 
E. Land Warrior Program Management 
During the early years of the LW Program (1996-2001), there were many 
decisions that affected the program.  However, due to its long history and the 
researchers’ limited access to early program management personnel, this study 
focuses on the decisions affecting the program from 2001 to 2008.  As detailed in 
Chapter II, the LW Program has been in existence as a Program of Record (POR) 
since 1996.  During 1996-2001, the LW Program focused RDT&E efforts to enhance 
ground soldier capabilities in the areas of performance, lethality, survivability, and 
sustainment.  The program began in 1996 with a sole-source developer, Hughes 
Aircraft (now Raytheon).  By 1998, the PM Soldier had restructured the program, 
moving it from proprietary development with Hughes Aircraft to a COTS-based 
approach with the LW Consortium.  The program leveraged this consortium of 
companies through an OTA to prototype the LW v0.6 and to mature its components.  
Its PMs also leveraged the work of the Government’s FFW ATD (then known as the 
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Objective Force Warrior ATD) to reduce program risk.  These efforts got the LW 
Program off to a good start technologically. 
Program challenges were encountered for the next several years, however, 
when in 1998 the Army embraced Net-centric Warfare (NCW).  This concept evolved 
to the Objective Force Concept introduced in 2000, linking LW to the FCS vision and 
introducing myriad interoperability requirements.  The years 1999 and 2000 were 
instrumental to early program efforts when the LW v0.6 advanced prototypes were 
built and effectively employed by soldiers during the JCF AWE.  This effort marked 
the program’s initial success and encouraged program management personnel and 
users.  We continue the rest of the story below by providing a breakdown of the LW 
Program events by year (starting in 2001) and highlighting important points during 
each year that affected the program. 
1. 2001 
After success at the JCF AWE, in 2001, the program shifted from an 
incremental acquisition approach—utilizing LW-unique hardware and software 
technologies—to an EA strategy.  The new strategy continued leveraging 
components and technologies available from other Government agencies, as well as 
COTS providers, to mature the functionalities of LW v0.6 and to build LW-IC (Block 
I).  It incorporated MOSA to provide flexibility and reduce program risk.  The idea 
was to open up the LW System’s architecture so that when technology matured, it 
could be incorporated into the baseline LW v0.6 System.  Also, as interoperability 
increased, it would give the materiel developer the ability to plug into other future 
Army and joint systems.  This approach was also meant to reduce proprietary 
issues, reduce costs and allow the integration of products supplied by multiple 
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The LW Program was part of the Army’s vision for soldiers to collectively fight 
at the small-unit level—stressing the collective synergy of a digitized team.  During a 
LW update briefing on 21 February 2001, GEN Abrams, the TRADOC CG, 
recommended that the LW Program be “nested” in the newly created Objective 
Force Concept.  This recommendation was intended to link the LW System to the 
newly created FCS.  To incorporate this recommendation, TRADOC and the PM LW 
began restructuring the LW ORD.  They constructed two different LW Operation & 
Organization concepts (O&O).  One was a threshold capability O&O, the second, an 
objective capability O&O (Berger, 2008). 
These changes caused the PM to reassess the LW Program’s overall 
strategy, as well as to determine the technical feasibility of emerging interoperability 
requirements to the FCS System-of-systems (SoS)—which at the time was only a 
concept on paper.  Of note, the PM received additional guidance from Congress to 
push the Science & Technology (S&T) community for more efficient power and 
weight reductions and to continue exploring non-secure communications options. 
The PM did this with the Government’s FFW ATD.  The FFW ATD was designed to 
develop and demonstrate technology improvements of the LW baseline system for 
Pre-planned Product Improvements (P3I) and to address critical technical issues of 
LW’s size, weight, power, fightability, and cost.  Also, an important study (described 
in Chapter II) was completed in 2001: the ASB Summer Study.  This study reported 
that the LW Program had several technical and programmatic stove-piped systems 
and lacked an overall systems architect to oversee system performance, weight, 
power and sustainability issues (Lockhart, 2006).  This study recommended 
assigning a chief engineer to conduct trade-offs to ensure technical feasibility, 
affordability and producibility (Douglas et al., 2001).  It is unclear whether or not the 
PM acted on this recommendation.  What is clear, however, is that the PM was not 
without challenges.  Due to technological challenges and program restructuring 
activities in 2001, the scheduled LW developmental test (DT) was moved from 
December 2001 to October 2002—a ten-month slip in schedule.  In addition, the 
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scheduled operational test (OT) training scheduled for November 2002 was moved 
to April/May 2003—a seven-month schedule slip (Berger, 2008). 
2.  2002  
In 2002, the PM continued to pursue a MOSA approach.  In anticipation of 
increased interoperability requirements, some of which were yet to be defined, he 
did this to both minimize developmental challenges and build flexibility into the 
product.  In addition, the LW PM used an OTA as the procurement method with a 
consortium of contractors known as the LW Consortium.  The PM Soldier at the 
time, Colonel Bruce Jette, intended to increase the level of commercial involvement 
in an effort to address anticipated technology challenges (D. Gallop, personal 
communication, November 3, 2008).  One significant point brought out by the 2002 
DoD IG Report to the Army Auditor General and DCMA (discussed in Chapter II) 
highlights the reasoning behind this change.  “Because of incomplete LW System 
and operational requirements, undecided BOI definition and insufficient performance 
parameters (reliability), the Army would be less able to make informed affordability 
decisions to support future budget submissions if a sole source method was used” 
(Ugone et al., 2002). 
To address concerns surrounding the program’s complexity and the need for 
additional oversight of the LW Program, the program management office was re-
designated PEO Soldier from PM Soldier in June 2002.  This elevated the top-level 
management of the program from an O-6/Colonel level to an O-7/Brigadier General 
level.  Additional changes in oversight at the Army level occurred in 2002, as well.  
The LW Program had started as an ACAT III program in 1996, but on 29 May 2002, 
the LW Program was re-designated an ACAT ID program by the Army Acquisition 
Executive (AAE).  Then, in December of 2002, it was re-designated an ACAT IC 
program by the USD (AT&L).  Both of these decisions were directly attributable to 
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The change to ACAT I classified the program as a major development.  Major 
developments are not authorized under an OTA; therefore, when the program was 
first elevated to an ACAT I program in May 2002, the PEO Soldier at the time, BG 
Moran, directed a full and open competition for a new LW contract.  This process 
took approximately nine months (J. Moran, personal communication, October 27, 
2008). 
Despite the LW Program’s elevated ACAT level, the OTA was still in place 
over the course of 2002.  The PM LW continued with the LW Consortium for the 
remainder of the year and into early 2003.  During late 2002, LW testing took place 
at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland.  This developmental test (DT) was an early 
functional assessment run by ATEC and negotiated by soldiers from the 82nd 
Airborne.  Its purpose was twofold; first, LW had to meet specific criteria prior to 
entering operational testing planned for 2003; second, the PM LW wanted to get a 
functional baseline to determine the performance of the LW-IC (Block I) prior to 
entering a contract for Block II development (D. Gallop, personal communication, 
November 3, 2008).  Results of the assessment were grim.  ATEC reported that the 
capabilities were not ready and would probably never be (J. Moran, personal 
communication, October 27, 2008). 
The results of the assessments at Aberdeen caused concerns over continuing 
program technology issues.  These concerns caused the PM to re-schedule LW’s 
OT from November 2002, to June/July 2003—a schedule slip of seven months.  In 
addition, he re-scheduled LW’s Milestone C for October 2003—lengthening the 
schedule by two months.  By the end October of 2002, the PM LW had a good idea 
of the LW-IC (Block I) issues in terms of reliability.  However, he had not given the 
intended first end-user a vote, so he maintained the scheduled early functional 
assessments planned for early 2003 with the 75th Ranger Regiment. He realized that 
multiple data points in terms of functional capabilities and limitations would reinforce 
the need for development of LW-SI (Block II) (D. Gallop, personal communication, 
November 3, 2008). 
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3.  2003 
In January 2003, the scheduled early functional assessment of the LW-IC 
(Block I) was performed by the Army Rangers.  The results of the assessment 
proved to be initially devastating to the program.  The Rangers assessed the system 
as unsatisfactory in the areas of form, fit and function.  While this assessment and 
the October 2002 assessments provided a functional baseline, they both indicated 
that the LW-IC commercial architecture provided by the LW Consortium was not 
robust enough for the soldier’s environment and could not provide requisite 
connectivity to the lower tactical internet (LTI).  In addition, the Rangers’ assessment 
determined that the weapon subsystem (WSS) provided minimal utility—
foreshadowing later findings with 4-9 Infantry in 2006. 
In the opinion of many at the program management office and GDC4S, this 
test was set up to be a failure from the beginning.  The Rangers were only given 
basic instructions on how to use the system and then told to go out and execute their 
standard operations.  Consequently, the Rangers did not understand or attempt to 
use the capabilities that the LW System was designed to offer.  Because the 
Rangers did not train-up on the system and fully incorporate it into their standard 
operating procedures, they determined that it did not provide them with enhanced 
capabilities.  The Rangers contend that the mindset of some decision-makers going 
into the test was that the system had to “stand on its own.”  They felt that if the 
integrators had to assist with the training, employment and integration, then there 
was something wrong (Augustine, 2008a). 
The viewpoints of the PEO Soldier and the PM LW during that timeframe 
were opposite of those interviewed at the PM office and GDC4S.  In their opinion, 
they trained the participants in both assessments properly and did the assessments 
as risk-reducing and data-gathering efforts in an attempt to inform the LW-IC 
functional baseline and prepare for LW Block II development.  PEO/PM intentions 
were never to set up the program for failure.  Instead, they were setting it up for 
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successful transition upon contract award (J. Moran, personal communication, 
October 27, 2008). 
Based on the negative feedback from the Rangers, the PEO Soldier 
concluded that he had concerns about LW-IC (Block I) operational reliability and, 
consequently, he dissolved the OTAs with the LW Consortium.  This action stopped 
the production of the 140 LW-IC (Block I) Systems being produced by the LW 
Consortium for the IOT&E that was scheduled to be executed in June-July 2003 
(Augustine, 2008a). 
In line with the PM’s EA approach and concurrent with the Rangers’ failed 
assessment, on 30 January 2003, GDC4S was awarded a cost-plus-fixed-fee 
(CPFF) contract to build the LW-SI (Block II) (Berger, 2008).  After the experience 
with LW-IC (Block I), the PEO Soldier recommended that GDC4S focus its efforts on 
incorporating the LW-IC (Block I) capabilities into the LW-SI (Block II) Systems 
(Berger, 2008).  Consequently, the OSD and HQDA restructured the program in 
February 2003 to leverage the LW-IC lessons learned and to focus LW development 
on Stryker interoperability requirements (D. Gallop, personal communication, 
November 3, 2008).  LW-SI (Block II) Systems were scheduled to be fielded to 
Stryker-equipped units in FY 2009 (Berger, 2008). 
The major challenge for the materiel developer was to provide the required 
functionality in an affordable materiel solution.  Due to LW ensemble cost concerns, 
HQDA provided additional guidance to focus on command-and-control and 
situational awareness capabilities.  The resulting materiel solutions were the 
Dismounted Battle Command System (DBCS) and Commander’s Digital Assistant 
(CDA).  The challenge of both efforts was effective connectivity to the LTI—similar to 
LW’s shortcomings.  The significant constraint to connectivity to the LTI was the L-
Band gateway of Force XXI Battle Command Brigade & Below (FBCB2) and Blue 
Force Tracker (BFT) (D. Gallop, personal communication, November 3, 2008). 
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The DBCS was not intended to be a substitute program to replace LW.  
Instead, it was offered as an option due to LW developmental challenges.  The PEO 
Soldier had to look for alternative technical solutions to fill the gaps for a dismounted 
soldier situational awareness/command-and-control capability.  He viewed the 
dismounted soldier capabilities in either the form of a handheld tablet (DBCS) or an 
ensemble with an eyepiece (LW).  He was impartial to either form factor.  After 
congressional direction, primary focus shifted to the DBCS for the next eighteen 
months (J. Moran, personal communication, October 27, 2008). 
4. 2004 
In 2004, the PM worked with GDC4S to procure LW Block II variants and the 
DBCS.  For LW, in accordance with the PEO Soldier’s guidance, the LW-IC variant 
was targeted for issue to the Army Rangers and the LW-SI variant, for one Stryker 
Brigade Combat Team (SBCT).  When GDC4S was awarded the contract to build 
the LW Block II variants, the PM established an ambitious schedule to complete 
prototyping by the end of 2004.  He did not want to waste any time given a planned 
first unit equipped (FUE) goal of FY 2009 (Augustine, 2008a).  However, out of LW’s 
unit cost concerns and the aforementioned congressional direction, the PM’s 
attention shifted towards DBCS for the duration of 2004. 
The LW Program’s budget was significantly reduced in the POM 06-11 in 
favor of the aforementioned less-expensive, less-capable system, the DBCS (Office 
of the Secretary of the Army, DoD, 2003).  The budget for procurement was 
decreased by Congress because of the failed DTs in late 2002 and early 2003, as 
well as the LW funding reduction in the POM.  “The decision to re-focus the 
capabilities of the DBCS set the LW Program back by at least a year, if not 18 
months” (Spears, 2008).  Also, a recommendation was made to merge both the LW 
and FFW ATD.  This was because of a perception by both Congress and senior 
Army leaders that the two programs were very similar, and the two systems’ 
differences were unclear to them (US House of Representatives, 2004). 
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During 2004, the PEO Soldier and Commanding General (CG), USAIC, 
briefed the ASARC on soldier modernization.  They submitted a request to the Army 
Systems Acquisition Review Council (ASARC) to conduct a DOTMLPF assessment 
with one LW-equipped SBCT Battalion to explore LW Basis of Issue (BOI) 
alternatives and refine the capabilities that were required of LW with the FCS.  
Additionally, the Commanding General (CG), USAIC, requested a side-by-side 
demonstration with LW Block II prototypes that GDC4S had just completed to 
demonstrate LW’s enhanced capabilities as compared to standard equipped soldiers 
(Berger, 2008). 
The side-by-side demonstration was approved, and its success prompted the 
VCSA to recommend the equipping of one Stryker Battalion at Fort Lewis, 
Washington, to conduct the DOTMLPF assessment as well as further define Tactics, 
Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) for the system.  Based upon this 
recommendation, the ASA(ALT) directed TRADOC and the LW PM to do the 
DOTMLPF assessment and a Limited User Test (LUT) in FY 2006.  This directive 
was a turning point in the program.  Within the span of approximately eighteen 
months, LW went from being a rejected system to a more capable Block II prototype 
that now had a chance at two essential SDD activities.  This was a testament to the 
efforts by both the PM and GDC4S. As pointed out in the opening statements of this 
chapter, persistence paid off, and cooperation was essential. 
5. 2005 
During 2005, the PM LW and GDC4S were not without challenges.  Early in 
FY 2005 (November 2004), the AAE approved the PEO Soldier and CG USAIC’s 
joint request to do the DOTMLPF assessment.  However, in the memorandum that 
he directly issued to the LW PM, he directed a complete shift in the PM’s focus from 
LW Block II development to the development of the DBCS.  Now the LW PM was 
directed to provide DBCS capabilities for up to 30 Brigade Combat Teams (to 
include SBCTs) as well as support the VCSA’s decision to equip one SBCT with LW 
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capability.  The memo directed that the LW PM modify the CPFF contract for LW 
Block II with GDC4S in an effort to conserve resources and re-focus efforts to get a 
baseline command-and-control capability to the force faster (Bolton, 2004). 
This directive was in response to growing pressure from the warfighter to get 
a dismounted command-and-control capability for the fights in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
Accordingly, the LW PM shifted his acquisition strategy to solely focus on developing 
the DBCS.  Conveniently, LW’s prime contractor, GDC4S, was also developing the 
DBCS.  Despite the change in the PM’s priorities, GDC4S continued to work on the 
LW System—incorporating some of its own Internal Research and Development 
(IR&D) funds.  This allowed the General Dynamics team to continue working on 
improvements to the LW Block II System while also supporting the PM’s new focus 
on getting DBCS developed and out to the Army (Spears, 2008). 
In July, PM LW and TCM Soldier held a meeting to review DOTMLPF study 
issues and finalize recommended study issues for the LW DOTMLPF assessment 
scheduled for FY 2006.  Shortly after this meeting, in August 2005, the PM LW 
supported Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) at a DBCS Operational Test 
(OT) at Fort Drum, New York, with the 10th Mountain Division.  This test was also 
supported by both GDC4S and TCM Soldier. 
There was a consensus with many of those involved in the testing that, like 
the failed LW DT in 2003, the DBCS test was also set up to fail from the beginning.  
“The system was given to a unit that was not digitally savvy.  They did not even have 
the basic FBCB2 System in their vehicles and did not have the communications 
infrastructure to support a system like the DBCS” (Augustine, 2008a).  On the other 
hand, GDC4S personnel who supported the OT at Fort Drum felt that the DBCS 
capabilities and requirements were dictated from the PEO Soldier rather than having 
a performance-based requirement.  From some perspectives at GDC4S, this was 
due in large part to personalities in the PEO Soldier Program Office that were 
unwilling to listen to recommendations from the contractor on how to make the 
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system better.  “The PEO Soldier was very rigid with no trade-offs or compromises in 
what the system needed to look like and in what the system must be able to do” 
(Kempin, 2008). 
The former PEO Soldier and PM LW contend that these perceptions were 
inaccurate.  The PM LW at the time viewed the DBCS path as “just another chance 
at provding situational awareness capabilities to the dismounted force in an 
affordable manner.  At the time, many vendors were going directly to deployed units 
with handheld command-and-control capabilities.  Some felt threatened that the 
DBCS would take over the LW effort” (D. Gallop, personal communication, 
November 3, 2008).  He viewed the entire event as a parallel effort with LW instead 
of a competing effort.  “There were never any intentions to replace it [LW]” (D. 
Gallop, personal communication, November 3, 2008).  As mentioned, the PEO 
Soldier at the time described his perspective as impartial.  He was directed by 
Congress to look at alternative solutions, and he intended to do just that (J. Moran, 
personal communication, October 27, 2008). 
The DBCS OT demonstrated that the system was not ready for fielding due to 
issues encountered with its inconvenient size, excessive weight, poor soldier 
integration, interoperability limitations and increased soldier workload.  The DBCS 
evaluation went so poorly that it caused the PM LW to again restructure his efforts.  
Based on input from users as to what they actually wanted from a dismounted 
soldier system, he quickly turned his attention back to LW (Augustine, 2008a).  
Given the technical difficulties encountered with a digitally immature unit and the 
upcoming DOTMLPF assesssment, his priorites shifed back to prototyping LW-SI 
(Block II). 
To prepare for the DOTMLPF assessment and LUT, a train-the-trainer course 
was conducted with 4-9 Infantry at Fort Lewis, Washington, in December 2005.  
Facilitated by the Omega Training Group, the course was designed to familiarize 
leaders in 4-9 Infantry with the LW System.  The Omega Training Group sub-
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contract was through GDC4S.  The first day of training specifically focused on 
presenting a detailed system overview, providing familiarization, as well as laying out 
the plan to train the rest of the battalion.  The next day of training focused on 
educating battalion and company leaders on the system itself.  Their instruction 
consisted of a LW-SI (Block II) System capability overview and was designed to 
show the leaders what the system did and how it could be employed to enhance 
their unit’s capabilities.  The PM believed that this initial train-the-trainer course 
would greatly enhance the unit’s acceptance of the LW System.  In addition, this 
training was used as a trial run for NET in an effort to smooth it out.  NET training 
was planned to begin for the rest of the battalion beginning in June 2006 (Augustine, 
2008a). 
6. 2006 
In response to the failed DBCS OT at Fort Drum and the upcoming equipping 
of the 4-9 Infantry, the PM LW’s number one priority was LW.  His main effort shifted 
to the production of prototype LW-SI (Block II) Systems, to include applicable long-
lead items for 4-9 Infantry’s equipping and evaluation.  The PM LW focused GDC4S 
on the production of essential LW interface equipment like vehicle integration kits 
(VIK).  In conjunction with TCM Soldier and unit leadership, he conducted 
DOTMLPF assessment, NET and LUT preparations.  In addition, he made 
significant progress in coordinating efforts with the FFW ATD in accordance with 
Congressional recommendations made in 2004 (Augustine, 2008a). 
Based on our research, we believe that 2006 represented the biggest 
challenge to the PM LW.  The PM LW dealt with an increasing “chasm” that had 
existed between the user and the acquisition community for about ten years.  This 
chasm was brought to the forefront in 2006.  It was created by an Infantry 
community that was split into sub-communities (heavy, light, airborne and SOF)—all 
with differing ideas on what “right looked like” for soldier systems.  These differing 
opinions created many LW naysayers within the user community.  In addition, due to 
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the GWOT and the pressing need for command-and-control/battle 
command/situational awareness capabilities, users could not understand why a 
program that had been around since 1996 had offered little in the way of fielded, 
effective equipment.  They were frustrated because they could get a civilian cellular 
telephone with enhanced communication and GPS capabilities in a small-form 
factor, but could not get the same out of a soldier system.  In addition, they did not 
want to add a lot of weight to their already overloaded dismounted infantryman. 
a. Moore’s Model 
This chasm, identified in the book Crossing the Chasm by Gregory A. Moore 
(2002), is described within a marketing context.  Moore defines it as the gulf 
between two distinct marketplaces.  While this “chasm” is a marketing concept, the 
researchers feel this is very applicable to the LW System’s acceptance by the Army, 
its sub-communities and lawmakers.  Moore describes these two distinct 
marketplaces as an “early market” and a “mainstream use market.”  The early 
marketplace is dominated by early adapters—in this case, the TCM Soldier, PM LW 
and the VCSA—as well as insiders who are quick to appreciate the nature and 
benefits of new developments.  The insiders included the 4-9 Infantry’s Battalion 
Commander, Command Sergeant Major and several company First Sergeants.  The 
early market is made up of people who are enthusiastic about a product because 
they believe it shows great potential.  This group tends to be relatively small.  The 
second is a mainstream marketplace that represents the “rest of us” who want the 
benefits of the technology but do not want to “experience it” in all of its gory details.  
In this case, the mainstream marketplaces were senior Army leaders and 
Congressmen.  Moore states that “making the transition from the early market to the 
mainstream market is the greatest peril for any marketing plan” (Moore, 2002, p. 20). 
Continuing with the model, there is then a period in which everyone tends to 
watch and see if anything can be made of the product and its capabilities; this is 
where the chasm comes into play.  If the product is found to deliver a set of tangible 
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outcomes or capabilities at a reasonable price, then a mainstream market is formed 
(user acceptance) (Moore, 2002).  In his book, Moore introduces The Revised 
Technology Adoption Lifecycle Model shown in Figure 9 below. 
 
Figure 9. The Revised Technology Adoption Lifecycle 
(Moore, 2002, p. 17) 
Moore’s model depicts several cracks in the traditional technology adoption 
bell curve.  The first is between the innovators and the early adapters.  This occurs 
when there is a useable product, but its benefits cannot be properly translated to 
potential users.  In LW’s case, this can be illustrated by the failed LW assessment 
with the Rangers in early 2003 when a gap was opened between potential early 
adapters and its innovators.  The product was useable, but its benefits were 
dismissed due to a lack of training and poor incorporation into standard operations.  
The second crack identified, equally important as the first, is the gap between the 
early majority and the late majority.  This gap occurs because innovative technology 
demands that the user community be technologically proficient.  As the late majority 
are much less apt to become technologically proficient, this gap becomes reality.  In 
order to bridge this gap, the technology must be made easier for the late majority to 
accept; if it is not, then successful transition to the product or system may never 
happen.  The last group identified on the curve is the laggards.  This group does not 
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want anything to do with technology based on both personal and/or economic 
reasons and will most likely never adopt the new technology (Moore, 2002). 
For LW in 2006, the most relevant part of the curve is the “chasm” that 
separates the early adapters from the early majority.  This is the most dangerous 
part of the bell curve, but one that goes largely unnoticed until it is too late.  This part 
of the curve is characterized by early adapters who are trying to introduce some kind 
of revolutionary change like the LW System.  They appreciate and understand the 
benefits of the new technology; however, they have a strong sense of practicality 
and are sometimes content to wait and see if the new technology is beneficial.  If the 
technology is successful, they will want to purchase the system; however, they will 
want to keep with the old ways of operating.  In addition, they want the new 
technology to enhance their current procedures and want it to work properly from the 
beginning (Moore, 2002). 
To cross the chasm, Moore advocates that a company focus on a single 
market or a “beachhead.”  This focus is required to win domination over a small, 
specific market and to use it as a springboard to win extended markets.  This is 
applicable to the PM’s struggle with marketing the LW System to the Army.  He had 
to establish a beachhead with 4-9 Infantry and then leverage its acceptance to 
proliferate LW technology adoption to the rest of the Army.  As his beachhead, 4-9 
Infantry would become an advocate for the system to win over senior leaders by 
showing that the LW System was acceptable for the warfighter.  This was no small 
task.  He first had to win over 4-9 Infantry before he could even begin to work on the 
rest of the Army.  He had to do this within the context of a constrained budget 
environment, the precedence of a rocky program history and an infantry user 
community that was reluctant to add additional weight to soldiers and was split on its 
idea of what was best for a “one-size-fits-all” soldier system. 
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b. Points of Light 
Out of concern for the soldiers in the unit that were preparing for deployment, 
the PM did not want to disrupt the way the unit trained.  Initially, he wanted to 
integrate the LW System into 4-9 Infantry’s standard deployment train-up as well as 
show how LW would enhance unit capabilities.  This in itself was difficult.  In 
addition, the PM knew his biggest challenge would be user acceptance (Augustine, 
2008a).  In an attempt to accomplish both unit training synchronization and LW 
training and assessment, he devised a NET schedule with 4-9 Infantry and planned 
the LUT (with ATEC) following a three-month period of pre-deployment training.  To 
gain early acceptance in the unit, the PM implemented his “points of light” plan.  His 
points of light plan required an identification of the formal and informal leaders in the 
unit.  This was his method to gain LW System acceptance using the natural leaders 
that were mentors to soldiers.  The PM hoped that by getting LW accepted by these 
unit points of light, the unit as a whole would be quicker to accept the LW System 
(Cummings, 2008, July 17). 
c. New Equipment Training (NET) 
The battalion NET was different from the train-the-trainer block of instruction 
in December 2005.  It was conducted by company, in a sequential manner, which 
coincided with each company’s LW equipping (see NET plan, Appendix J).  The 
NET was a two-week event of mainly classroom instruction that focused on 
familiarizing soldiers with the complexities of the LW-SI (Block II) System.  The first 
week of NET focused on the technical aspects of the LW System; the second week 
emphasized field training.  The NET was facilitated by full-time instructors from 
Omega Training Group with TCM Soldier, PM LW and GDC4S personnel in support.  
Field Service Representatives (FSRs) and Contractor Logistic Support (CLS) 
personnel were provided by the PM LW and GDC4S respectively.  Following NET, 
the battalion was to use the LW Systems in the conduct of its pre-deployment 
training to gain familiarity and either accept or reject the system.  NET for all 
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companies was completed by early June, when the unit’s focus shifted to battalion 
pre-deployment training. 
One of the issues later identified in the PM’s NET plan was that he failed to 
properly plan for follow-on training for soldiers who arrived at the unit after the initial, 
battalion-wide NET was conducted.  Consequently, when new soldiers arrived at the 
unit, the PM did not have certified instructors at his disposal to train the unit.  
Regardless, he had to get them trained.  To accommodate these late arrivals, he 
conducted a series of mini-NETs.  He ended up spending nearly $30,000 per mini-
NET over the course of the rest of the year on indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity 
(IDIQ) contracts with GDC4S—sending trainers back to Fort Lewis to train incoming 
soldiers.20  Another issue that ended up affecting the PM’s NET plan was a lack of 
consistency in the quality of NET instructors.  Some instructors were temporary and 
only hired for a short duration.  These trainers did not have enough experience with 
the LW System to properly teach its employment.  This caused a gap in the learning 
curve for some of the companies in the battalion and did not help foster ownership of 
the systems (Cummings, 2008, July 17). 
Shortly after all units in the 4-9 Infantry had received NET, the PM scheduled 
a LW VIP day in July to coincide with the budget cycle.  The timing of the VIP day 
was planned with the hopes of positively influencing the Army’s near-term budget 
decision.  This VIP day was an effort to build on perceived LW Program momentum 
and create senior leader “buy-in.”  This buy-in was noted as critical to the success of 
LW after the PM’s experience with the failed DBCS test in 2005.  Using the chasm 
analogy, this was a method the PM and GDC4S planned to use to try to cross the 
acceptance gap between early adapters and the early majority. 
Unfortunately for the program, during the VIP day, several soldiers from 4-9 
Infantry expressed frustration with the system’s overall size, weight and 
                                            
20 IDIQ contracts provide for an indefinite quantity of supplies or services during a fixed period. 
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configuration.  In hindsight, one of the biggest downfalls of the first VIP day was that 
the soldiers picked to participate in the demonstration had yet to fully incorporate the 
system into their operations and were unfamiliar with the system’s ability to enhance 
their unit’s operations (Berger, 2008).  There was also a lack of focus on the part of 
the unit on the importance of the event.  To some in the unit, the LW was a 
distraction, to others a tremendous capability.  Most, however, agreed that the 
system needed to stand on its own (Augustine, 2008a). 
d. Unit System Integrators (USIs) 
During 4-9 Infantry’s LW training, the PM LW had trouble with properly 
integrating all he needed to get done with all that the unit had to accomplish prior to 
its deployment.  In other words, while the unit was preparing for combat, the PM 
wanted to get the unit trained on LW and to support the DOTMLPF assessment and 
LUT.  This conflict in priorities caused a lack of synchronization with the 4-9 
Infantry’s training schedule, which the PM did not own.  The result was the PM’s 
daily struggle to integrate his requirements and desires with the unit’s training 
priorities.  Admittedly, the PM did not have the right personnel with the right skill sets 
or the right amount of personnel on his staff to integrate with 4-9 Infantry’s 
subordinate units’ training schedules. In fact, for most of the summer, he had only 
one or two personnel dedicated to promoting the LW’s capabilities.  Instead, most of 
the PM’s team’s time at Fort Lewis was spent with acquisition issues such as 
working with GDC4S, conducting VIP visits and monitoring training, rather than on 
assisting with incorporating the LW and its capabilities into unit Standard Operating 
Procedures (SOPs) and TTPs.  This shortfall in personnel and the PM’s inability to 
have direct, credible links to the unit directly influenced his ability to decipher the 
changes the unit wanted (Cummings, 2008, July 17).  This lack of integration caused 
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This growing chasm led the PM to establish the Unit System Integrator (USI) 
concept.21  The primary purpose of the USI concept was to utilize a certified LW 
instructor, knowledgeable on all technical issues of the system and that could assist 
the unit with incorporating the LW System into its training plans and operational 
procedures.  The USI team consisted of retired, senior, non-commissioned officers 
(NCOs) placed at the company and battalion levels throughout the 4-9 Infantry.  This 
concept was the single biggest means by which the PM gathered relevant feedback 
from the unit (Cummings, 2008, July 17). 
The responsibilities of the USIs were different at each level within the 
battalion, but all had the same purpose: build unit confidence in the LW System and 
assist the unit in incorporating it into its operations.  The battalion-level USIs were 
responsible for the training and integration of LW to the battalion support and 
specialty platoons (scouts, mortars and the Battalion Commander’s Personal 
Security Detachment).  They participated in battalion training meetings to ensure 
that all battalion-level LW needs were identified and reported to the PM.  These 
needs were subsequently prioritized by the PM, GDC4S and unit leadership.  The 
USIs developed integration plans for soldier-improvements to 4-9 Infantry’s LW 
equipment and provided training recommendations to incorporate the system into its 
unit SOPs.  Company-level USIs were responsible for being “coaches, teachers and 
mentors.”  The company-level USIs coordinated with company leadership for 
training, maintenance and employment of the LW System through company training 
meetings; they also participated in field training events.  During training meetings, 
the USIs were responsible for assisting company leadership in developing training 
that would incorporate the use of TTPs that leveraged the capabilities of the LW 
System.  During field training events, the USIs helped the unit prepare for combat 
using their personal experiences as former senior NCOs and their extensive 
knowledge of LW (Augustine, 2008a). 
                                            
21 For a detailed description of the USI Concept and Top-Ten Process, see Appendix K. 
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Compatibility between the USI and the unit proved to be vital to LW’s 
successful implementation.  To get compatibility, the PM evaluated each USI’s 
personality and the personality of the unit leadership.  He then placed the USIs 
within the unit that had the best personality match.  The USIs were empowered to 
provide feedback directly to the PM on issues ranging from the units’ technical 
thoughts to recommended changes to the units’ training schedule (Cummings, 2008, 
July 17). 
The implementation of the USI concept improved communication overnight 
for the PM LW.  Once the USIs were integrated, he was able to gain a better idea of 
the real changes that needed to take place with the system—both from the 
technological perspective as well as the human-system-integration perspective.  The 
USIs acted as communication conduits to exchange information and ideas between 
the PM and the unit; they also served as the eyes and ears of the PM (see Figure 10 
below).  Their credibility inspired buy-in from the unit, increased unit confidence and 
started to bridge the chasm between LW and 4-9 Infantry as they started 
incorporating LW into their standard operations (Augustine, 2008a). 
 
Figure 10. Integration of the Unit System Integrator (USI) 
(Cummings, 2008, September 22) 
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The USI program did not come without challenges.  Initially, some USIs did 
not fully embrace or understand the LW System and became sympathetic to the 
naysayers within the unit.  In some cases, the USIs actually negatively impacted 
some parts of the unit.  This damaged LW System acceptance in some of the 
companies early on.  This initial setback frustrated the PM, but he saw the USI 
concept’s potential, and, in a bold decision, he decided that rather than having the 
entire battalion be successful with the LW System, that he was going to focus on 
one company—Bravo Company (who happened to be the company chosen from the 
LUT).  He believed that if Bravo Company embraced the LW System, then the rest 
of the battalion would follow (Augustine, 2008a). 
e. The Top-Ten Process 
The PM’s focus on Bravo Company, coupled with the USI concept, jump-
started unit acceptance and initiated the process of human-centered, soldier-driven 
design.  To manage this, the PM LW implemented the “Top-Ten Process.”  The Top-
Ten Process became a structured means of information exchange between soldiers, 
USIs, the LW PM and GDC4S engineers.  It resulted in significant cost savings and 
schedule compressions for the LW Program.  The Top-Ten Process allowed for 
immediate incorporation of user feedback and helped the PM reduce time-to-delivery 
by providing an accurate picture of user recommendations for system changes 
(Augustine, 2008a). 
The Top-Ten Process became iterative and proved to effectively capture, 
analyze, and prioritize user inputs regarding potential system improvements and 
further technology integration time after time.  The result of the process was a “Top-
Ten List” that was prioritized based upon soldier input and cost and schedule 
feasibility.  GDC4S, in coordination with the USIs, PM and PM SWAR engineers, 
developed a capability modification plan that incorporated recommended 
modifications from the Top-Ten List.  The process was updated regularly, ensuring 
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there were continuous soldier-driven improvements to the LW Systems (Augustine, 
2008a). 
The most important goals for the PM and prime contractor were to show the 
users that they were responsive to their needs.  By making responsive 
improvements to the system’s form, fit and function, the PM and GDC4S created unit 
confidence that fostered a sense of ownership of the LW System within the 4-9 
Infantry.  For GDC4S, being a part of the integration effort at Fort Lewis helped them 
to hear first-hand what the soldiers wanted, rather than just read about it in an e-
mail.  This collaboration made the Top-Ten Process extremely effective.  The lead 
GDC4S engineer commented that “once the process was developed and refined 
with the PM’s input, it was important to show the users that we were responsive to 
their needs.  We looked for the ‘low-hanging fruit’—changes that could be made to 
the system within a day or week” (Wood, 2008). 
After the USI concept was implemented, and soldier-driven improvements 
started bringing tangible results, a second VIP day was conducted in late 
September.  This VIP day was conducted by the 4-9 Infantry’s Battalion Commander 
and C Company, 4-9 Infantry.  By this time, soldier-driven improvements were being 
made, and unit confidence was growing.  Bravo Company was just completing the 
ATEC-run LUT, and early results were encouraging.  Also by this time, C Company 
had incorporated the LW System into its operations and had embraced its capability.  
During this VIP day demonstration, it quickly became apparent that the unit had 
successfully navigated the chasm.  The soldiers spoke highly of the system during 
the demonstration, and the Battalion Commander, LTC W.W. Prior, announced that 
he wanted his unit to take the LW Systems to combat (Cummings, 2008, July 17). 
7. 2007 
There were several important events that took place in 2007.  First, the PM 
LW, TRAC WSMR, ATEC and TCM Solider worked to finalize the results of the initial 
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DOTMLPF assessment as well as the LUT.22  These results were key to the 
finalization of the LW MS C LRIP decision scheduled for 2nd Quarter, FY 2007.  
Second, 4-9 Infantry made final preparations for deployment to Iraq.  The PM LW 
assisted the unit by preparing for LW-specific logistics support.  This included final 
system preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS), as well as the 
compiling of spare parts.  The PM also worked diligently to establish the support 
team that would deploy with 4-9 Infantry. 
In early FY 2007, however, the LW Program was officially terminated by the 
Army.  This was due in large part to a view by congressional and senior Army 
leadership that the program suffered from poor system performance, unscheduled 
cost and schedule overruns and the fact that after over a decade of work, nothing 
had been fielded in any great quantity.  However, a report to Congress by the 
Department of Defense Director of Operational Test and Evaluation assessed LW 
System being fielded to the 4-9 Infantry, as “on track” to be operationally effective 
and suitable (US Senate, 2007). 
At this point, because the LW System was terminated, the PM only had what 
remained of the money intended for the LW DOTMLPF assessment and LUT.  This 
gave him a very limited budget to perform any fixes to the system and a small 
logistics support package to sustain LW—especially in combat.  Regardless, he 
persisted and built his deployment support plan with what he had.  Included in his 
deployment package was a twenty-one man support element that included USIs, 
FSRs, and GDC4S CLS personnel.23  Even though he had to improvise, the flip side 
was that he no longer had a lot of oversight by outside elements.  This allowed him 
to focus on supporting the 4-9 Infantry the best he could while still managing a 
terminated program (Cummings, 2008, July 17). 
                                            
22  The DOTMLPF assessment continued during the 4-9 Infantry deployment in order to capture 
future LW TTPs. 
23See Appendix L for the PM LW Support Plan. 
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To support the system and the unit, the PM sent every spare part and system 
he had to Iraq in Military Vans (MILVANs) to a centralized forward operating base 
(FOB) in Taji, Iraq, where the entire battalion was deployed.  After several months, 
some of 4-9 Infantry’s companies were re-task organized to other units throughout 
Iraq.  To continue the logistics support to the detached companies, the PM LW 
trained “master warriors” within the companies and sent spare parts forward with 
them.  He also sent USIs and FSRs forward with the unit to address system needs 
and soldier issues.  Master warriors were soldiers identified within the unit to be LW 
savvy.  They received more in-depth blocks of instruction on maintenance and repair 
of the LW System and components in an effort to be self-sustaining (Cummings, 
2008, July 17). 
The unit and PM LW pressed ahead with the 15-month deployment to Iraq.  
The aforementioned PM LW support package that deployed with the unit followed 
the soldiers from Kuwait into Iraq.   One of each support person (FSR, CLS, USI) 
was deployed with each company in the battalion.  Unlike their USI counterparts, the 
FSRs and the CLSs did not integrate into the unit, but instead focused on fixing LW 
technical issues at the battalion level (Cummings, 2008, July 17).  In order to 
properly capture and implement recommended soldier-driven system improvements 
during the deployment, the PM continued both the USI concept and the Top-Ten 
Process. 
To facilitate the communications and improvements with GDC4S while 
deployed, the PM rotated his USIs back to the Continental United States (CONUS) 
every three months from Iraq.  The process was simple.  First, he provided the Top-
Ten List to GDC4S by e-mail.  He followed up his e-mail with re-deploying USIs 
working face-to-face with GDC4S to translate operational requirements into materiel 
solutions.  Once USIs arrived at the GD facility in Scottsdale, Arizona, they worked 
with GDC4S lab engineers to incorporate feedback from Iraq into improvements that 
could be quickly turned back around and given to the unit.  The USIs’ translation of 
recommendations to GDC4S engineers was noted as vital to getting changes made 
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properly and expeditiously.  USIs ensured understanding between what the 4-9 
Infantry soldiers wanted and what the GDC4S engineers could provide (Augustine, 
2008a). 
Most changes came in the way of software upgrades and small hardware 
fixes.  Not all of the changes could be implemented because of time and cost, but all 
of the recommended changes were archived for potential follow-on changes to the 
LW System (Wood, 2008).  Some of the recommendations taken back to GDC4S by 
the USIs were incorporated using the GDC4S’s EDGE facility.  This facility enabled 
quick material upgrades and integration with other emerging technologies24 
(Cummings, 2008, July 17). 
The USIs did not have contractual authority to make the changes to the LW 
System with GDC4S on behalf of the PM LW.  Because of this, the PM still had to 
approve the changes.  He did this once technical feasibility was determined by 
GDC4S, and he had evaluated cost impacts.  The PM LW only funded changes that 
would directly support 4-9 Infantry in Iraq.  If the changes or upgrades could not get 
back to the unit in time to be verified in Iraq, they were not prioritized.  In addition to 
minor form, fit and function upgrades, GDC4S used IR&D funds to continue more 
costly improvements and longer-lead item changes to the LW System in the 
anticipation of future Army interest in the program (Cummings, 2008, July 17).  
These efforts proved valuable to GDC4S and the PM LW when 5th Brigade, 2nd 
                                            
24 The EDGE facility, originally opened in November 2006, is capable of developing and testing new 
capabilities and technologies.  It is a facility formed out of a joint venture of academia, US 
Government and industry and is, to date, credited with supporting more than ten technology initiatives 
since it opened.  The facility is free to users and is sponsored by the US Government and academic 
institutions (White, 2007).  The EDGE is characterized as a one-stop-shop for soldier modernization 
programs and is described as a catalogue for tactical systems, accessories, software and 
components (2007).  The EDGE provides an operating process that will bring cutting-edge technology 
to the tactical edge of the battlespace faster, by aligning the innovations of EDGE members with 
requests and feedback from warfighters and warfighting programs; PMs can deliver capabilities 
quickly that are relevant, interoperable and responsive (2007).  The EDGE facility’s common 
architecture allows customers to access a “plug-and-play” capability—making quick adaptation of new 
or emerging technologies and incorporation of the needs of the soldier possible (2007). 
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Infantry, Stryker Brigade Combat Team (5-2 SBCT) submitted an ONS for the LW 
System in late 2007. 
F. Future Planned Upgrades 
The 5-2 SBCT’s ONS was approved by Congress in May of 2008.  In 
anticipation of this ONS-driven fielding, several upgrades to the “LW Next 
Generation” (LW NextGen) System are being worked by both GDC4S and the PM at 
the time of this writing.  Many of these upgrades are based on 4-9 Infantry’s 
recommendations that previously could not be implemented due to time and cost 
constraints. 
The evolution of the LW NextGen System is planned to meet or exceed the 
minimum capabilities of the Army’s future soldier system, the GSE.  The LW 
NextGen will concentrate on improvements in reducing its size and weight and on 
reducing its power requirements.  The LW NextGen System will be more 
configurable, enable mission tailoring, and will include 15 of the 32 recommended 
improvements made by 4-9 Infantry soldiers during their deployment.  The LW 
NextGen System will be 30% lighter (reducing its weight from 15.4 pounds to 10.4 
pounds), 31% smaller (reducing the overall size of the system from 413 to 285 cubic 
inches), and will cost 23% less than current systems—allowing the Army to equip 
more soldiers.  The upgraded system will have open interfaces that will allow 
multiple options for technology insertions and additional accessories for the soldier.  
In addition, to better assist the PM, one of the ways GDC4S is reducing costs (as 
well as cycle-time) is by moving personnel who are aiding in the development and 
testing of the software code to the GDC4S facility at Scottsdale, Arizona.  GDC4S, 
PM SWAR and TCM Soldier continue to collaborate through weekly meetings, 
ensuring that the ability to rapidly meet the needs of the 5-2 SBCT is accomplished 
(General Dynamics, 2007). 
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To better support the 5-2 SBCT, the PM plans to implement changes from his 
previous approach with 4-9 Infantry.  To increase cooperation in meeting the needs 
of the unit, an USI will now be placed at the brigade level to work in concert with 
both the battalion and company USIs (see Figure 11 below).  The brigade USI will 
be responsible for interacting daily with the brigade command team and S3 
operations officer to ensure top-down integration is achieved.  In addition, the 
brigade-level USI will actively assist the PM LW and GDC4S engineers in the 
development, integration, and acceptance testing of new LW equipment.  The 
brigade USI will be the main liaison between with PM and the unit.  He will prioritize 
lessons learned and assist in the coordination of providing improvements to current 
LW capabilities.  The brigade-level USI will be responsible for the coordination of all 
lower-level USIs and LW support personnel, ensuring the unit’s needs and concerns 
are addressed in a timely manner (Augustine, 2008a).  The intent is not to usurp the 
PM’s role, but rather to augment his ability to close the gap between the materiel 
developer and the unit. 
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G. Lessons Learned 
There were several lessons learned by the PM LW and GDC4S prior to, 
during and after 4-9 Infantry’s deployment.  There were several things noted as vital 
to unit-system integration: soldier acceptance, unity of effort among system 
integrators, and the PM’s ability to work with GDC4S responsively.  These LW-
specific tenets proved to be effective and, if implemented, could assist other materiel 
developers within the Army. 
First, the PM had to find a way to bridge the chasm between the LW System’s 
early adapters and the unit.  The initial idea of conducting a standard LW NET that 
only focused on the technical aspects of the system failed to get necessary user 
buy-in because it was not focused on incorporating LW into the unit’s standard 
operations.  In order to gain a foothold in user acceptance, the PM first leveraged his 
unit “Points of Light” concept.  This was focused on establishing acceptance from 
within the ranks in hopes of influencing other soldiers within the unit.  This was an 
initial attempt at bridging the chasm between early adapters and the early majority.  
In addition to the points of light concept, the PM’s implementation of the USI concept 
and the careful matching of the right USI with the right unit quickly bridged the 
communication gap between the PM and the unit and built a level of acceptance and 
confidence that proliferated throughout the unit. Through these innovative concepts, 
the PM was able to create unit buy-in and ultimately prove that the LW System could 
enhance 4-9 Infantry’s standard operations. 
To manage the process of human-centered, soldier-driven design 
improvements, the PM LW implemented the Top-Ten Process.  This prioritized list—
coupled with the PM’s analysis of feasibility with respect to cost, schedule and 
performance—enabled effective communication between the PM, the unit and 
GDC4S engineers.  This list communicated the unit’s vision of what changes needed 
to be made to the system and aligned them with the PM’s overall plan.  System 
software improvements and human-centered design changes were completed 
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quickly by the PM LW and GDC4S and returned to the unit.  This flexibility with 
respect to soldier-driven improvements enhanced soldier acceptance and 
confidence and showed them that their concerns were being addressed in a 
responsive manner. 
Last, and perhaps most interesting, the PM was able to implement these 
visionary concepts and methods in large part because the LW Program was 
terminated.  He had very little oversight once the program was terminated; however, 
he had “top cover” support from the PEO Soldier.  This essential top cover gave the 
PM LW the flexibility to make changes to the system based upon soldier input 
gathered from their lessons learned and recommendations.  Changes that normally 
would have taken months, maybe even years, to implement using traditional 
acquisition methods, took only weeks. 
In sum, the PEO Soldier, PM LW and GDC4S believed in the LW System’s 
capabilities and went to extraordinary lengths to ensure that 4-9 Infantry soldiers 
were supported and set-up for success.  The result is a testament to their 
collaborative approach and unwavering persistence. These ingredients of 
collaboration and persistence, as well as other aforementioned methods, should be 
considered by other PMs in the future. 
H. Conclusions 
Some of the lessons learned from the materiel developers’ perspective with 
LW can be generalized and applied to the management of other programs within the 
DoD acquisition community.  First, user acceptance and support must be present for 
a program to succeed.  While a new warfighting system may close a capability gap 
or fulfill a requirement, without user support for a materiel solution, the program may 
be doomed.  Next, the PM should be given the top cover and flexibility to adapt his 
acquisition strategy to user-driven requirements.  To do this, the PM must have a 
firm understanding of the potential implications to his program’s cost, schedule, 
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performance and myriad other factors (e.g., training support packages, test and 
evaluation master plan, etc.). 
When introducing a new system or system innovation, it is important for a PM 
to cross the chasm between the early adapters and the early majority in any 
marketplace as soon as possible.  Bridging this chasm early in the acceptance 
process will encourage early buy-in—thus fostering stronger overall confidence in 
the product.  Next, the ability of PMs to gather, prioritize and rapidly respond to 
customer feedback is essential.  It breeds a perception of responsiveness that 
increases end-user satisfaction and overall confidence in the acquisition process.  
Successful managers must also pay attention to the concept of product advocacy.  
With this in mind, beachheads should be established early and should be carefully 
leveraged to influence a greater population.  Furthermore, while unique, the 
environment that LW found itself in once the program was terminated was, in the 
end, conducive to its success.  PM persistence to support the warfighter despite 
programmatic challenges is a vital ingredient to getting the warfighters what they 
need.  In the end, PMs must do the best with what they have; this persistence, 
coupled with top cover, contributes to program success. 
From a strategic perspective, two fundamental takeaways should also be 
considered.  First, the assumption that commercial-like technologies can be easily 
adapted to meet military requirements will likely lead to program cost and schedule 
increases.  LW experienced this early on with the LW Consortium and, while a good 
idea at the time, this assumption created cost and schedule increases early in the 
program’s history.  This led to a prolonged timeline, increased frustration by both the 
PM and the user and an increase in cost that only compounded the problem.  
Second, the introduction of technology demonstrations early in the program to 
showcase system potential and to sell it to the stakeholders—i.e., Congress, Office 
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), etc.—can backfire if done too early.  This was 
evident at Fort Lewis, Washington, during the first VIP day; the LW was terminated 
while the user was just becoming familiar with the system and embracing its 
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benefits.  Other PMs must be careful to temper their approach at marketing their 
products with respect to the underlying and constant “drum beat” of the PPBES 
process (J. Yakovac, personal communication, September 18, 2008). 
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IV. The LW Users’ Perspectives  
This system [Land Warrior] is as significant and important as rifled barrels 
once were over smooth bore barrels. It will change the way we fight. 
(Department of the Army Press, 2007, p. 1) 
Based on assessment results, it looks like we will deploy with the new Land 
Warrior Systems. (Program Executive Office Soldier, 2006) 
The Manchu Battalion, 4-9 Infantry, has dominated the enemy in dismounted 
operations in Iraq with the help of Land Warrior.  The combat information 
available to leaders through the system helps us to decide and act faster than 
the insurgents can match.  Land Warrior could, with some improvements, 
provide the same advantages to the entire US Infantry force.  Our national 
priorities should demand no less and our national treasure—our Soldiers—
deserves no less. (Prior, 2008, p. 13) 
A. Introduction 
The above quotes capture the words of two of the most important leaders in 
the recent history of the LW Program.  The first, COL Ernie Forrest, was the TCM 
Soldier25 during a majority of the time prior to when the second, the warfighter, 4-9 
Infantry’s Battalion Commander, LTC Bill Prior, endorsed the system and asked to 
take it to combat.  COL Forrest was a visionary and staunch advocate for the LW 
System and dug his heels in to keep the LW effort alive during a majority of its 
tumultuous times from 2003 to 2006.  As the warfighter’s advocate, he felt it was his 
duty; as a visionary, he was compelled to support the system by his faith in LW’s 
ability to change how the dismounted soldier fights.  Once the LW System was 
delivered to LTC Prior’s Battalion, the warfighters got their vote.  His soldiers put it to 
the test and initially despised it, but eventually became its staunchest advocates.  
                                            
25 The TRADOC Systems Manager (TSM) Soldier was re-designated the TRADOC Capability 
Manager (TCM) Soldier by TRADOC in 2006.  This was done in an effort to focus the title on 
capabilities instead of systems.  For consistency, we use TCM Soldier throughout this case study.  
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The true users of any combat system are the soldiers, marines, airmen and 
sailors who employ it during training and combat operations.  They provide the 
requirements or needs for new combat systems and equipment through their 
determination of gaps in their existing capabilities.  By defining the gap(s) in their 
capabilities and stating their requirement(s), they start the DOTMLPF process that is 
designed to determine whether or not a materiel solution is required, or if changes in 
existing DOTMLPF are adequate to fulfill the requirement.  If a materiel solution is 
necessary, the acquisition process is initiated, and the road to materiel development 
begins. 
Once the materiel development of new combat systems starts, the true users, 
or warfighters, are normally busy operating within their operational roles.  Because 
they are busy preparing for or conducting operations, they are unable to focus their 
attention on the systems’ acquisition processes. Instead, they expect a new combat 
system or piece of equipment to be fielded to them that meets their requirement(s) 
and closes their capability gap(s).  They deserve a system or piece of equipment 
that has been adequately developed, put through its paces, thoroughly tested and is 
ready for employment.  To ensure this, an informed, effective user representative is 
required when the materiel development process begins to advocate the warfighters’ 
needs and serve as the Army’s conscience.  The TCM Soldier fulfills this role for 
soldier-related materiel acquisition.  He must be the honest broker between the 
warfighter and the materiel developer.  The current TCM Soldier, Colonel Jim Riley, 
sums it up well: 
It is important that he remember that he is the users’ representative when 
they [the warfighters] can’t speak for themselves.  He should try to facilitate 
as much as possible a direct link by the real users and the PM.  As the 
conscience of the Army, he has to tell the rest of the army the information 
[about the program].  If everybody else isn’t keeping track of what is going on 
or isn’t aware of what is going on, it [the information about the program] gets 
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As mentioned in Chapter II, the users for LW were the first unit equipped, the 
4-9 Infantry “Manchus.”  Prior to receiving LW, however, the TRADOC Capability 
Manager, Soldier (TCM Soldier), served as the user representative and oversaw the 
system’s development from concept through to its fielding to the Manchus.  This 
chapter briefly describes Army TRADOC Capability Managers (TCMs).  It provides 
details about the TCM for LW, the TCM Soldier.  It describes the TCM Soldier’s role 
during the LW System’s development, fielding and deployment.  Furthermore, it 
touches upon 4-9 Infantry’s experience with LW and provides initial results from the 
post-deployment survey administered by ATEC in May 2008.  The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of lessons learned from the users’ perspectives and 
generalizes those lessons for the DoD Acquisition community. 
B. Army TRADOC Capability Managers (TCMs) 
As mentioned previously, throughout the systems acquisition process, Army 
warfighters require an advocate for their needs.  To respond to this requirement, 
TRADOC established TCMs to provide user representation during the development 
of major systems.  TCMs are normally considered for establishment between 
Milestones A and B, at the end of concept exploration, or when a concept is 
approved.  TCMs are normally O-6/Colonel duty positions.26  Programs must meet 
the following criteria for establishment of a TCM: 
 Program must be an ACAT I, ACAT II, or other high-priority materiel 
system as determined by the CG, TRADOC. 
 Program must be a program manager/program executive officer-
managed program. 
 Workload must be such that the program cannot be managed within the 
resources and structure available to the proponent. 
                                            
26 For a description of the duties and responsibilities of a TCM, see TRADOC Regulation 71-12, 
dated 1 March 2002. 
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 Workload or uniqueness of the program must be such that an existing 
TCM cannot assume the program.  Intent of this regulation is not to 
preclude combining of individual system responsibilities in one TCM. 
 Program must be higher priority or have greater need for a TCM than 
existing TCM-managed programs (Training and Doctrine Command, 
2002). 
C. TCM Soldier 
The LW System resides within the purview of the TCM Soldier at the 
Maneuver Center of Excellence27 (MCoE) at Fort Benning, Georgia.  The TCM 
Soldier performs as the conscience of the Army and the MCoE for the soldier—all 
soldiers: core, mounted, ground and air soldiers—within Army formations.  TCM 
Soldier is the Army’s centralized manager, user representative and integrator of 
DOTMLPF for soldier capabilities within Army formations to ensure success on the 
battlefield.  TCM Soldier provides intensive management of everything worn, 
consumed or carried for individual soldier use in a tactical environment to maximize 
lethality, command and control, survivability, sustainment and mobility.  For systems 
and subsystems that comprise or impact the SaaS, TCM Soldier directs and 
approves those components which concern only the individual soldier; approves 
those which concern additional soldier equipment; coordinates with those which 
concern tables of organizational equipment and common tables of allowances; 
consults on those which concern Army facilities and equipment; and, is informed 
about components which constitute Army systems (Berger, 2008). 
The TCM Soldier is the user advocate and counterpart to the materiel 
developer, PEO Soldier.28 TCM Soldier coordinates with other TCMs within 
TRADOC and works through the Director of Capabilities Development and 
Integration, MCoE, to accomplish assigned tasks.  In coordination with appropriate 
                                            
27United States Army Infantry Center (USAIC) was re-designated the Maneuver Center of Excellence 
(MCoE) in FY 2007.  
28 PM Soldier was re-designated PEO Soldier on 7 June 2002 (Berger, 2008). 
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proponents, other TCMs, PEO Soldier, and PMs, the TCM Soldier ensures 
associated deliverables are developed along timelines to meet Army milestones.  
The TCM Soldier manages all facets of user activities but must ultimately ensure all 
aspects of training are synchronized with the fielding of assigned capabilities 
(Berger, 2008). 
D. TCM Soldier & LW Development 
The TCM Soldier’s role in the development of LW can be described as one of 
unwavering support for the Army soldier given the status of technology, fiscal 
constraints, Department of the Army (DA) guidance and concurrent operational 
events.  This support, coupled with both cooperative materiel developers and Army 
and Congressional decision-makers, has contributed to LW’s many successes and, 
in some cases, its setbacks.  By the current TCM Soldier’s own admission, there are 
things that the TCM Soldier could have done better, but at the end of the day, his 
office and their predecessors have done their best to assist the soldier (Riley, 2008). 
Evidence of TCM Soldier’s involvement in the LW Program goes back to the 
early 1990s before LW was even a formal program.  When the LW ORD was 
approved in April 1994, the TCM Soldier was designated as its user representative 
(Berger, 2008).  Once LW was officially a POR in 1996, TCM Soldier’s involvement 
has continued in parallel with the program’s timeline and continues to this day.29 
                                            
29 It is important to note here that the TCM Soldier does not just manage the LW Program.  His/her 
responsibilities include all other programs that affect what the soldier carries and consumes.  This 
includes major end-items, SaaS, the Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI) and other programs.  Given their 
small organization, it has been very challenging for them to manage all of these efforts as well as LW, 
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E. Early TCM Soldier LW Involvement 
From 1994 to 1998, TCM Soldier’s focus was the LW, MW and Air Warrior 
(AW) Programs.  TCM Soldier managed LW from Fort Benning, MW from Fort Knox, 
Kentucky, and AW from Fort Rucker, Alabama.  At Fort Benning, TCM Soldier’s 
concerns for LW revolved around how to employ the LW System, as well as its 
impact on Army DOTMLPF.  TCM Soldier worked closely with PM Soldier and 
Hughes Aircraft (now Raytheon) during the prototyping of the first LW System 
(Berger, 2008). During that time, TCM Soldier was also working with TRAC-WSMR 
for LW-related analysis that included both modeling and simulation of the LW 
System’s capabilities (Augustine, 2008a). 
In 1998, the LW ORD, originally approved in 1994, was revised by the USAIC 
in an effort to bring it into compliance with ACAT I Material Acquisition Program 
reference requirements.  As the user representative, TCM Soldier led this revision 
effort, guiding the effort through its nearly four-year approval process. Changes in 
Army vision from 1999 to 2002 had to be considered; these catalyzed numerous 
changes that had to be incorporated into the original LW ORD in order to link it to the 
Objective Force Concept.  In addition, as described in previous chapters, the PM 
Soldier restructured the LW Program in 1998 in an effort to move away from 
proprietary development and towards an innovative approach that maximized the 
use of COTS components and technologies and incorporated GFE (Berger, 2008).  
This change increased the TCM Soldier’s involvement; he also had to keep up with 
multiple vendors—versus a single prime contractor. 
In 1999, when the LW Consortium took the lead with LW development, the 
TCM Soldier provided a user representative to the team, SFC Chris Augustine.  His 
job was to guide the LW Consortium and the PM on what the warfighter needed in a 
soldier system.  He did this through constant presence at all of the LW Consortium’s 
facilities.  With a seasoned infantryman’s perspective and a background in analysis, 
he was empowered by the TCM to work with the PM and the LW Consortium to 
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assist with the development of LW v0.6.  Augustine focused on human-centered 
form, fit and function by translating user requirements to engineers (Augustine, 
2008a).  His efforts paid off when, in September 2000, the resulting prototype LW 
v0.6 Systems were favorably evaluated at the JCF-AWE by warfighters from the 82nd 
Airborne.  This favorable evaluation was the direct result of the TCM Soldier’s work 
with the materiel developers.  Also vital to the effort were several weeks of LW 
training and preparation conducted by the TCM Soldier at Fort Benning with the 
soldiers from the 82nd Airborne.  Soldiers were equipped, trained and well-practiced 
on the LW Systems prior to the event (Berger, 2008). 
After the JCF-AWE, the TCM Soldier continued to work on revising the LW 
ORD.  During 2001, substantial work was done on the LW ORD to restructure its 
requirements and put them into a new format that attempted to link it to the FCS-
enabled Objective Force Concept (Berger, 2008).  This push was based upon 
guidance from the SECDEF, The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld, and the Chief of Staff 
of the Army (CSA), General Eric Shinseki, that directed transformation of the Army 
into a modular force focused on the future (J. Yakovac, personal communication, 
September 18, 2008).  TCM Soldier worked to scope LW in light of the Objective 
Force Concept and, hand-in-hand with PM Soldier and the Director of Combat 
Developments (DCD), USAIC, rewrote the O&O. The revised ORD was approved by 
TRADOC on 31 October 2001 and forwarded to Headquarters, Department of the 
Army (Berger, 2008). 
In 2002, LW evolved from the v0.6 to the LW-IC (Block I).  During this 
evolution, the TCM Soldier continued to work closely with the PM Soldier (re-
designated PEO Soldier on 7 June 2002).  The year 2002 was filled with 
developmental testing (DT)—to include safety testing, immersion testing, and 
reliability testing—at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, all of which the TCM 
Soldier monitored for the user.  Soldiers from the 82nd Airborne conducted the 
ATEC-run assessments.  The PM LW at the time, LTC Dave Gallop, contends that 
the soldiers were properly trained for the assessments (D. Gallop, personal 
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communication, November 3, 2008).  The testing at Aberdeen Proving Ground 
brought forth some serious issues with LW-IC (Block I) reliability.  Testers from 
ATEC that conducted the functional assessments concluded that LW-IC capabilities 
were not ready and probably would never be ready (J. Moran, personal 
communication, October 27, 2008). 
Regardless of materiel development challenges in 2002, the TCM Soldier and 
the USAIC worked dilligently to revise the LW ORD to match Objective Force 
Concept requirements.  The revised LW ORD was finally approved by the Chief of 
Staff of the Army in November 2002, and the LW Program was redesignated an 
ACAT IC Program on 17 December 2002.30  From the TCM Soldier’s perspective, 
the key to success for the ORD approval was a close working relationship with all 
agencies involved.  The relationship cannot be an “us versus them.”  “All parties 
have to be synchronized and work together to get the job done” (Berger, 2008). 
In 2003, the TCM Soldier started the year by participating in another early 
functional assessment of LW-IC (Block I)—this time with the first intended end-user, 
the 75th Ranger Regiment.  The PM LW at the time, LTC Dave Gallop, reported that 
the Rangers were trained on the LW Systems prior to their assessment (D. Gallop, 
personal communication, November 3, 2008).  However, a member of the TCM 
Soldier staff at the time, SFC Chris Augustine, stated that there was not a very good 
train-up.  He contended that “they [TCM Soldier] only went to the test and got the 
results” (Augustine, 2008a).  He argued that their lack of familiarization and training 
proved to be detrimental to the Rangers’ perspective on the system; consequently, 
the Ranger’s found the LW System unsuitable (2008a). 
                                            
30It took the Department of the Army almost a full year to approve the revised LW ORD due to an 
evolution in Army vision.  First, in 2001, the GWOT started.  Second, the Army moved to an Objective 
Force Concept, with FCS as its central effort.  The revised LW ORD had to incorporate FCS into its 
requirements, which were still in concept refinement during 2002. 
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Regardless of whether or not the Rangers were trained, the results were 
similar to the assessments conducted by the 82nd Airborne soldiers at Aberdeen 
Proving Ground the previous year.  Concerns surrounding reliability and fightability 
were shared by both the Rangers and, as the user advocate, the TCM Soldier.  The 
materiel developer echoed these concerns as well.  As a result, LW was assessed 
as being behind schedule and not meeting entrance criteria for OT.  Subsequently, 
the decision to dissolve the OTA with the LW Consortium for the development of 
LW-IC (Block I) Systems was made by the PEO Soldier (J. Moran, personal 
communication, October 27, 2008).  TCM Soldier supported this decision along with 
the Commander, USAIC (Berger, 2008). 
The decisions to dissolve the OTA and end the LW Consortium’s 
developmental efforts were critical events in the LW’s developmental history, as they 
re-focused both the TCM Soldier and the PM LW on the DBCS.31  They also created 
misperceptions in several key players.  These misperceptions festered over time and 
created a divide between the user representative and the materiel developer. 
From the TCM Soldier’s perspective, the reason behind not going and training 
the Rangers on the system was that the PEO Soldier at the time felt like LW: 
needed to stand on its own.  If the TCM Soldier and the PM LW had to go and 
show them how to use the LW System, then there was something obviously 
wrong.  It was a calculated move to show LW was a failure and bring DBCS 
forward because DBCS was what the PEO Soldier, BG Moran, believed in; he 
thought that DBCS was the right [materiel] solution.  He did not believe in LW 
as the right solution—he never thought it would work.  He didn’t think soldiers 
would ever accept it and didn’t think there was any value added. (Augustine, 
2008a) 
The flaw in the approach used with the Rangers’ assessment was described 
with the following analogy. 
                                            
31 The Dismounted Battle Command System (DBCS) is described in Appendix E. 
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It would be like back in the thirties, if you just showed up to a division and 
said, “Here’s a hundred tanks; here’s how you turn them on and put gas in 
them; now we are leaving”—no doctrinal changes, no warfare or strategic 
implications, nothing, just: here’s your tanks.  Of course, when you have a 
unit who are doing their standard missions, and they don’t make any changes 
or adapt their TTPs to reflect new capabilities, their response is, “There is no 
value added”—which is exactly what they [PEO Soldier] wanted to hear. 
(Augustine, 2008a) 
At the time, the PEO Soldier and his PM LW had completely different 
perspectives.  From the PEO’s perspective, he had to develop a dismounted 
situational awareness capability whether it was a handheld, tablet device (DBCS) or 
a soldier ensemble with an eye-piece (LW).  He was impartial to either materiel 
solution.  Furthermore, his PM LW had two functional assessments that both pointed 
to serious reliability issues (J. Moran, personal communication, October 27, 2008).  
The PM LW conducted these two assessments as risk-reduction mechanisms and 
as determinations of what he had from a functional perspective prior to contract 
award for LW Block II.  Complicating matters were LW-IC (Block I) cost concerns 
and difficulties that he encountered with the TCM Soldier when trying to trade 
functionality for cost.  Specifically, the TCM Soldier was adamant about keeping the 
lethality capability that the LW System provided through the weapon subsystem 
(WSS). Also, the TCM Soldier wanted the BOI to include every dismounted soldier 
instead of just key leaders.  The TCM Soldier’s vision was that a BOI to every soldier 
would create a synergistic effect that boosted the potential of its capbilities.  These 
issues, when combined, drove cost per unit to nearly $32,000 per system.  Last, but 
not least, “the LW-IC (Block I) commericial-based architecture was not robust 
enough for the soldier’s environment and could not provide connectivity to the LTI” 
(D. Gallop, personal communication, November 3, 2008).  This was a key capability 
that the materiel solution had to have to be interoperable with FBCB2 and Blue 
Force Tracker (BFT). 
These issues were not new during late 2002 and early 2003.  Rather, they 
were noted by HQDA and Congress earlier in 2002; consequently, the PEO Soldier 
was directed to compete the LW Block II effort.  He also noted that he had to do this 
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because LW was an ACAT I program, and an OTA was not authorized.  “You cannot 
do a major development under an OTA” (J. Moran, personal communication, 
October 27, 2008).  Last, the former PEO Soldier emphasized that the DBCS was 
not a substitute program to replace the LW.  Instead, it was offered as an option to 
the LW because it was having so many difficulties.  He had to look for alternative 
technical solutions to fill dismounted soldier capability gaps, and the DBCS was 
already under development (J. Moran, personal communication, October 27, 2008). 
Regardless of the intentions, it is clear that LW survived to become what it is 
today because of the decision to dissolve the LW Consortium and compete the LW 
Block II efforts.  Openly competing the contract for LW Block II and subsequent 
program decisions outlined in Chapter III contributed to its later successes.  From 
the user representative’s perspective, however, the events of late 2002 and early 
2003 set the stage for subsequent disagreements over the determination of the right 
materiel solution.  In the end, the disagreements served the program well as they 
polished the materiel solution so it could be placed into the hands of soldiers. 
F. Recent TCM Soldier LW Involvement 
At about the same time the Rangers finished the early functional assessment 
of LW-IC (Block I), on 30 January 2003, GDC4S was awarded a competitive contract 
for the design and production of LW Block II Systems. This, coupled with the PEO 
Soldier’s decision to dissolve the LW Consortium, made for a busy 2003 for the TCM 
Soldier office.  The TCM Soldier worked with PEO Soldier’s PM Soldier Warrior 
(SWAR) and PM LW to lay out the plan for LW Block II.32  In July, TCM Soldier 
participated in the preliminary design review (PDR) with GDC4S and PM LW.  Later 
in the fall, the TCM Soldier worked with PM LW, PM SWAR, PM FBCB2, and TCM 
                                            
32 The PM Soldier Warrior (PM SWAR) is the Program Manager (O-6/Colonel) that the LW Product 
Manager (O-5/Lieutenant Colonel) is a part of organizationally.  The PM SWAR provides managerial 
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FBCB2 on a memorandum of agreement (MOA).  This MOA was intended to 
establish formal collaboration in support of LW’s connectivity to the FBCB2 with the 
DBCS and the Commander’s Digital Assistant (CDA).  This was in response to the 
need to tie the LW System into the Lower Tactical Internet (LTI) (Berger, 2008). 
The TCM Soldier advised and consulted with GDC4S on developing the LW 
System that would evolve over the following three years into the LW-SI (Block II).  
From the very beginning of 2003, when GDC4S was awarded the contract for LW 
Block II, TCM Soldier knew that it was important to be involved.  Based on the 
successful experience with Augustine and the LW Consortium and LW v0.6, the 
TCM Soldier managed his office to maximize its ability to stay abreast of the materiel 
developers.  By being involved with translating requirements into materiel with 
GDC4S engineers, form, fit and function issues could be resolved in a collaborative 
manner.  This was intended to reduce schedule and performance risk.  This close 
relationship that TCM Soldier fostered with GDC4S early in the materiel acquisition 
process was noted by both the GDC4S PM and the TCM Soldier as a crucial aspect 
of the LW System’s successful evolution—despite funding constraints and early 
warfighter acceptance issues (M. Showah, personal communication, August 8, 
2008). 
Also in 2003, TCM Soldier (in conjuction with PM SWAR) made efforts to 
conform to the recently implemented JCIDS process.  In November, the Joint 
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) briefing was submitted to HQDA, together 
with the updated LW ORD.  Following that submission, late in November, a Force 
Applications Working Group (FAWG) briefing was conducted.  At the FAWG, two 
major potential issues were raised.  First, there was no J6-interoperability 
certification for LW and second, the LW, AoA had yet to be completed.  These two 
issues were discussed in early December at a Functional Capabilities Board (FCB) 
briefing.  The result of this briefing was a recommendation by the FCB that the LW 
ORD not proceed to the Joint Capabilities Board (JCB) (scheduled for 10 December 
2003) or to the JROC (scheduled for 18 December 2003).  While TCM Soldier’s role 
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in the J6 certification proved to be minimal (it was approved 30 days after the 
FAWG), its role in the LW AoA with TRADOC Analysis Center White Sands, New 
Mexico (TRAC WSMR), consumed much of the following two years (Berger, 2008). 
In 2004, TCM Soldier worked with GDC4S and PM LW on the LW Critical 
Design Review (CDR).  This was completed in late May 2004.  During the summer, 
TCM Soldier, along with GDC4S and PM SWAR, were also involved with the 
development of the DBCS and CDA.  These efforts were directed by the PEO 
Soldier based on Army guidance to refocus procurement on emerging SA/C2 
capabilities to the current force (DBCS & CDA) due to the loss of faith in LW-IC 
(Block I) reliabilty in 2003 (Berger, 2008). 
While funding and focus was withdrawn from LW, it still remained the 
USAIC’s number one priority (Berger, 2008).  In light of this continued emphasis, the 
TCM Soldier directed Major Paul Mazure, Assistant TCM Soldier, to lead a side-by-
side demonstration of the LW-SI (Block II) at Fort Benning, Georgia.  The goal was 
to provide a side-by-side comparison of a LW-equipped infantry squad and a 
conventionally equipped infantry squad.  The purpose was to determine the 
difference in the squad’s lethality, mobility and battle command and then to tie the 
findings into the LW AoA.  Major Mazure and the TCM Soldier/PM LW team worked 
to equip, train and prepare the squads participating in the demonstration (P. Mazure, 
personal communication, September 13, 2008). 
The side-by-side that the TCM Soldier orchestrated was a huge success for 
the LW Program.  Much like the JCF AWE, the TCM Soldier fully prepared the 
soldiers that participated.  The squad that was conventionally equipped was trained 
on the tasks that they needed to complete during the demonstration.  The squad 
using LW was trained on both LW equipment familiarization and LW employment 
TTPs.  The side-by-side results helped to inform key decision-makers—specifically 
the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General Cody, whose support helped to revive 
LW from its major funding setbacks.  His support spurred much of what was to 
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become TCM Soldier’s focus for the next three years: the equipping of one Stryker 
Battalion with LW capabilities (Augustine, 2008a). 
In February 2005, the Army Acquisition Executive (AAE) issued an ADM 
directing the PM LW to refocus his acquisition strategy to provide DBCS to leaders 
of up to 30 BCTs as well as to support the VCSA decision to equip one Stryker 
Battalion with LW-SI Systems.  TRADOC followed the ADM with a directive to 
conduct a DOTMLPF assessment of a LW-equipped Stryker Battalion.33. Following 
this direction, the TCM Soldier hosted a meeting to start the process of planning for 
the DOTMLPF assessment of the Stryker Battalion.  Participants included TRAC-
WSMR, PM LW, PM SWAR, Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC), the 
Infantry Forces Research Unit of the Army Research Institute (ARI), the Soldier 
Division of the DCD, USAIC, and the Systems Division of the Directorate of 
Operations and Training (DOT), USAIC.  This TCM Soldier-led effort resulted in a 
finalization of the recommended DOTMLPF study issues submitted to the CG, 
USAIC and TRADOC.  The study issues surrounded LW BOI considerations.34  The 
two considerations were a LW BOI down to every soldier or an issue only to leaders, 
team leader level and above (Wainer, 2006). 
Preceeding this effort was a Phase I LW AoA gap analysis led by TCM 
Soldier and supported by the USAIC and TRAC WSMR.  The results of the Phase I 
AoA identified the 19 small unit capability gaps shown below in Figure 13.  These 
capability gaps were derived from a Functional Needs Analysis (FNA) and 
Functional Solutions Analysis (FSA).  The gaps in capability that required a materiel 
solution (18 of 19) put into focus the study issues that the LW DOTMLPF 
assessment needed to address (Wainer, 2006).  Figure 13 below outlines the results 
of the FSA and shows both the 19 small unit capability gaps and the assessment on 
                                            
33 See Appendix G for the original TRADOC Memorandum directing the DOTMLPF assessment. 
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whether or not a material solution was required.  The table also identifies the extent 
to which the LW Block II filled or mitigated the gaps.  Gaps in red were noted as 
highly critical to mission success, yellow as moderately critical to mission success, 
and green as less critical to mission success. 
 
Figure 12. FSA Results from LW Phase I AoA 
(Wainer, 2006, p. 5) 
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Figure 13. FSA Results from LW Phase I AoA  
(Wainer, 2006, p. 6) 
During August 2005, the TCM Soldier was also involved with conducting a 
DBCS operational event (OE) with ATEC, PM LW and the 10th Mountain Division at 
Fort Drum, New York.  Unlike the JCF AWE and side-by-side events, the TCM 
Soldier was not extensively involved.  Due to a shortage in TCM Soldier personnel, 
only one officer went to Fort Drum prior to the event to familiarize, train and help with 
TTPs.  This proved to be insufficient, as the lightfighters at Fort Drum lacked even 
the most basic of digital battlefield capabilities.  Not suprisingly, the warfighters at 
10th Mountain found the DBCS unsuitable for light infantry operations (Augustine, 
2008a).  This failed OE marked the end of the DBCS and, accordingly, TCM Soldier 
re-focused on getting prepared for the DOTMLPF assessment with the Stryker 
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Battalion35 chosen by the Army, the 1st Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment (later 
redesignated 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry). 
G. TCM Soldier, LW and 4-9 Infantry 
The fall of 2005 was extremely busy for both 4-9 Infantry and TCM Soldier.  
Preparations for the equipping, new equipment training and DOTMLPF assessment 
with the 4-9 Infantry were underway.  4-9 Infantry was organizing and only had a 
handful of Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) and Officers in its ranks.  Soldiers to 
fill the companies and platoons would not be on board for several months (Pitch, 
2008).  In September 2005, an additional task was picked up by the TCM Soldier 
and PM LW when the 4th Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division Commander, COL Lear 
agreed to do a LUT in conjunction with the DOTMLPF assessment.  This added yet 
another event to plan in conjunction with  the unit and ATEC (Berger, 2008). 
The first event for the equipping of 4-9 Infantry was a Master Training Course 
(MTC), which was put together by the TCM Soldier, Omega Training Group and the 
PM LW.  This course was designed to provide in-depth training to senior leaders 
within 4-9 Infantry so that when the rest of the battalion was equipped, the process 
would be rehearsed and, therefore, smoother.  In addition, it would help the TCM 
Soldier, Omega Training Group and the PM LW assess the adequacy and feasibility 
of the training program that the entire unit would end up receiving in the spring 
(Augustine, 2008a). 
The MTC was successfully executed in December of 2005 and marked the 
first major event for the TCM Soldier, LW PM and 4-9 Infantry at Fort Lewis, 
Washington.  Other events were also planned for 4-9 Infantry.  A phased, equipping 
and subsequent NET for each unit within 4-9 Infantry was to be executed in the late 
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Spring and early Summer of 2006.  After NET was completed for each company, a 
DOTMLPF assessment was to take place concurrently with unit train-up for 
deployment.  In September, an ATEC-led LUT was to take place with one rifle 
company from 4-9 Infantry.  See Figure 14 for a pictoral description of the LW 
DOTMLPF assessment team and Figure 15 for both the DOTMLPF assessment and 
LUT plan. 
 
Figure 14. DOTMLPF Assessment Task Organization 
(Wainer, 2007, p. 3) 
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Figure 15. DOTMLPF Assessment & LUT Plan 
(Wainer, 2007, p. 9) 
In early 2006, TCM Soldier, in conjunction with the PM LW and Omega 
Training Group, executed 4-9 Infantry’s NET.  The 4-9 Infantry was equipped with 
LW by May and completed with NET by the end of June.  During this timeframe, the 
TCM Soldier was also fully engaged with staffing the Ground Soldier Systems 
Capabilities Development Document (GSS CDD), other SaaS-related issues and 
myriad other tasks.  While the LW equipping and NET with 4-9 Infantry was the TCM 
Soldier’s main effort, there were only six officers and two NCOs available to task for 
all of the office’s responsibilities.  Consequently, only two officers and two NCOs 
were dedicated to the mission full-time.  One officer was dedicated to the DOTMLPF 
assessment, and the other to the LUT.  The three others, including the TCM himself, 
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were only partially involved (Qualls, 2008).  This small footprint made integration 
with the entire battalion virtually impossible from the beginning.  Consequently, from 
the time NET took place until August (approximately three months), TCM Soldier 
integration with the unit was limited.  Likewise, the PM only had one person who was 
dedicated to unit-integration efforts.  Consequently, unit emphasis on incorporating 
LW into its training suffered.  This lack of incorporation led to a dip in battalion-wide 
confidence in the system (Cummings, 2008, July 17). 
Following NET, TCM Soldier, in coordination with 4-9 Infantry, GDC4S and 
PM LW, facilitated the first VIP day in July 2006.  The TCM Soldier, GDC4S and PM 
LW planned and conducted the VIP day with 4-9 Infantry’s Scout Platoon.  Based on 
negative soldier feedback at the VIP day (during a candid question-and-answer 
session with decision-makers), the LW System was viewed as a failure by many 
attendees.  Noted by the soldiers were issues with the LW System’s weight, space 
requirements on their outer tactical vest, daylight video sight (DVS—part of the 
WSS), cabling requirements and unreliable communications.  The Scout Platoon’s 
frustration with the LW System was not the only thing of note during this timeframe: 
a unit-wide dip in LW System confidence was occurring as well.  This can be 
attributed to: 1) an insufficient NET that solely focused on the technical aspects of 
the system, 2) the lack of incorporation of the LW-enhancing tasks into unit training, 
and, 3) the failure to incorporate ergonomic, soldier-driven upgrades by this point in 
the program.  By the time the unit went to its first collective training event in August 
2006, unit confidence was at an all-time low.  This was when the aforementioned 
USI concept was devised by the PM LW, and soldier-driven design started to 
become reality.  Subsequently, unit confidence started to rise (Augustine, 2008a). 
With unit confidence growing, TCM Soldier—in coordination with TRAC 
WSMR—led the DOTMLPF assessment throughout the end of the summer and 
early fall of 2006.  In September, the TCM Soldier supported the ATEC-led LUT that 
was conducted with B Company, 4-9 Infantry, as well as planned and executed a 
second VIP day with the Battalion leadership and C Company, 4-9 Infantry (Qualls, 
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2008).  The second VIP day was a huge success, and the battalion commander, 
LTC Bill Prior, announced to the Army that he wanted to take LW with his battalion to 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) (Berger, 2008).  
As the Manchus trained in their LW Systems, they realized that if they were 
going to take it to combat, they wanted some improvements.  This desire, coupled 
with the PM LW’s methodology that later evolved into the previously described “Top-
Ten Process,” started with a few of the unit’s key leaders.  These leaders, who were 
identified by the PM LW and his staff early in the equipping process as unit “points of 
light,” saw the value of the LW System but did not necessarily like how it was 
configured.  Once given the opportunity to re-configure it, and when their ideas 
became reality, these key leaders realized that they were supported by the PM LW; 
he was willing to tailor the LW System to meet their needs.  This encouraged 
members of 4-9 Infantry to come up with ideas for improving the system.  When they 
got their ideas together, they put them into a Top-Ten List that they submitted to the 
PM LW.  The PM LW and 4-9 Infantry leadership then prioritized the improvements 
and worked them with GDC4S.  These human-centered, ergonomic improvements 
proved to be vital to unit confidence in the system, and in the end, to their ownership 
of it (Griffith, 2008). 
This unit “ownership” marked a shift in the TCM Soldier’s role in the LW 
Program.  As the warfighters embraced the LW System, they became their own 
advocates for system improvement.  This allowed the TCM Soldier to streamline his 
already overloaded staff and truly focus them on the DOTMLPF and LUT efforts.  He 
also engaged his information operations campaign to get the word out that LW’s 
success was growing with 4-9 Infantry (Berger, 2008). 
In late 2006 and early 2007, TCM Soldier worked diligently with TRAC WSMR 
and PM LW to synergize the results of the DOTMLPF assessment, LUT and soldier 
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feedback.36  The purpose was twofold.  First, results of these assessments needed 
to be finalized for the LW MS C LRIP decision scheduled for late Spring 2007.  
Second, while the initial results of the DOTMLPF assessment at Fort Lewis were 
useful, it was determined that further assessments were needed in a combat 
environment.  In order to know what to focus on during the deployment, gaps in 
information had to be determined so that TCM Soldier personnel could focus on 
collecting the right data while in Iraq (Berger, 2008).  Parallel to these efforts, TCM 
Soldier also began the tedious process of documenting the many TTPs that 4-9 
Infantry had developed as they employed LW and incorporated it into their day-to-
day operations (Qualls, 2008). 
H. TCM Soldier, LW and 4-9 Infantry In Iraq 
Personnel from TCM Soldier deployed with 4-9 Infantry to combat in late April 
2007.37  The deployment lasted fifteen months, and the TCM Soldier worked hand-
in-hand with the unit to continue the LW DOTMLPF assessment, capture lessons 
learned and develop LW TTPs. During the deployment, the TCM Soldier rotated a 
team consisting of one officer and one NCO to reside with the PM and the unit.  
These teams provided weekly reports focused on combat-related DOTMLPF 
assessment issues.  They also worked with the 4-9 Infantry on developing LW-
specific TTPs.  This data was sent back to Fort Benning, TRADOC and PEO Soldier 
to transmit LW-related lessons learned to the Army as well as to inform decision-
makers working on the development of the future GSS.  The Manchus continued to 
provide recommendations for LW System improvements and TTPs to the PM LW 
throughout their 15-month deployment38 (Pitch, 2008). 
                                            
36 For a detailed description of the results of the DOTMLPF assessment and LUT results, see 
Appendix N. 
37 For a detailed description of the TCM Soldier deployment assessment plan, see Appendix O. 
38 For a detailed description of the evolution of the LW-SI (Block II) to the LW Manchu and 4-9 
Infantry’s improvements, see Appendix P. 
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While deployed, LW-equipped soldiers and leaders in 4-9 Infantry embraced 
the LW Systems capabilities and took it to levels that went beyond the vision of its 
developers. 
Honestly, it’s one piece of equipment that we won’t leave the FOB without. 
Because it provides you [information about] where you are, where your fellow 
units are and as long as you are keeping contact with the enemy and 
populating via situational report or “tactical chemlights,” you are going to 
[have] a good idea of where the enemy is at as well. Moreover, those three 
things give you the facts when having to maneuver forces against an 
objective. The Land Warrior is a giant plus, in my opinion, and it is going to 
have to be one of those things that every unit in the Army is at least exposed 
to so they can see the benefits of it. (Griffith, 2008) 
ATEC conducted a post-combat survey with the unit once they redeployed.  It 
reflects its members’ opinion of using LW in combat.  Captured below in Figure 16 
are its preliminary, sanitized results. 
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While 4-9 Infantry was in Iraq, its success was monitored by other units both 
in-theater and stateside.  Based on the LW System success in the hands of 4-9 
Infantry, on 11 September 2007, 5th Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division (5-2 SBCT) 
submitted an ONS for LW.  Funding for the ONS was approved in May 2008, and 
the TCM Soldier is continuing its work with PM LW and Fort Lewis in preparation for 
equipping the 5-2 SBCT.  The 4-9 Infantry re-deployed from OIF in late Spring 2008 
and has started preparing for its next deployment at a date to be determined 
(Berger, 2008). 
Currently, the TCM Soldier is in the process of refining LW lessons learned 
and assisting the PEO Soldier with the requisite documentation and implementation 
of lessons learned that will inform the newly termed GSE Program.  In parallel, TCM 
Soldier is also working with the Future Force Integration Division (FFID) at Fort Bliss, 
Texas, for further evaluation of a few LW Systems.  This work will pave the way for 
the incorporation of the dismounted soldier into the FCS SoS39 (Berger, 2008). 
I. Lessons Learned 
There were several lessons that resulted from TCM Soldier’s experience in 
the early 2000s through to the equipping and assessment of 4-9 Infantry at Fort 
Lewis, Washington, and deployment to OIF.  Synchronization of efforts, up-front unit 
integration, TCM flexibility, PM flexibility for incorporation of unit improvements and 
sensitivity to unit confidence/acceptance all have been noted as important aspects 
from the users’ representative and the warfighters’ perspectives. 
First, while the TCM Soldier, the PM LW and the warfighter all had different 
responsibilities, the entire team had to work towards the same goal (Riley, 2008).  
Unsynchronized individual responsibilities caused lots of frustration and did not help 
                                            
39 The final results of the LW DOTMLPF are authorized for distribution to DoD and US DoD 
contractors only (as of 24 October 2008).  For a compilation of the LW lessons learned from both Fort 
Lewis, Washington, and Iraq, contact TRADOC Capabilities Manager, Soldier. 
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to efficiently achieve the overall goals of developing LW, equipping 4-9 Infantry with 
LW, assessing LW and preparing 4-9 Infantry for combat.  For example, and rightly 
so, 4-9 Infantry’s unit training plans were focused on preparing its soldiers for their 
combat deployment.  This focus was not initially synchronized very well with LW 
training and assessment goals.  This was due to an intense focus on preparation for 
combat training by the Battalion Commander, Command Sergeant Major and S-3, 
and a general lack of support for employing the LW System in scenarios that 
exercised its utility.  Instead of conducting collective training that exercised its 
situational awareness or battle-command capabilities, their training plans were 
focused on close quarters battle skills like “shoot houses” and battle drills.  This 
focus was probably right for the battalion at the time because they were trying to get 
their newly formed unit ready for combat, but proved to be not very helpful to what 
the PM LW or TCM Soldier needed to accomplish (Augustine, 2008a). 
The lesson here is that all participants in a fielding and/or assessment effort 
must be focused on the same thing.  While there will always be differing subordinate 
goals and responsibilities, it is important that all efforts are synchronized to 
accomplish the overarching mission.  This overarching mission has to be determined 
early in the process, communicated and supported throughout all organizations 
involved. 
Next, the TCM Soldier was short-staffed and had myriad other responsibilities 
during the 2006 timeframe (Berger, 2008).  As a result, during the equipping, 
DOTMLPF assessment and train-up for combat, the office staff was not as 
integrated with the unit as it could have been during the NET and subsequent 
DOTMLPF assessment.  This resulted in challenges with focused data collection, 
unit-scheduling conflicts and lack of soldier acceptance of the LW System 
(Augustine, 2008a).  These challenges were eventually overcome by the LW PM’s 
USI plan that was described in detail in Chapter III. 
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There is a management issue here that drives home an important lesson for 
any resource-constrained organization.  The lesson is that it is important to do a 
“troops-to-task” analysis early in the planning process to determine where gaps in 
resources exist.  These gaps must be addressed early rather than later, otherwise a 
situation will arise like the one experienced by the LW team in the summer of 2006.  
The need to go back and close resourcing gaps can impact cost and schedule, but 
more importantly, may stifle crucial momentum that is required when fielding an item 
that requires user acceptance.  This management issue is not just the TCM’s burden 
to bear.  It involves the PM, the unit commander and leaders of supporting agencies. 
This relationship brings forth another related issue: unity of command.  Many times, 
the TCM outranks the PM or vice versa. In a perfect world, a clear chain of 
command should be established to deal with these issues.  In most cases, as in this 
one, a memorandum of agreement (MOA) should be considered as well. 
From a strategic perspective, the TCM has to be very careful about how firmly 
to dig in his/her heels and how aggressively to “sell” the system.  “The USAIC and all 
TCMs can fall into this trap of having a reputation of holding their ground, and it is all 
or nothing” (Riley, 2008).  The TCM Soldier embraced this mentality when he tried to 
make the case for LW to naysayers during the early days of the program.  At first, 
when the rest of the Army was told about LW, the WSS of the LW was emphasized 
repeatedly as a key component to the system’s lethality.  Among many claims, the 
one that stuck was that that it would enable soldiers to shoot around corners.  In the 
end, this capability proved to be not very important and actually disliked by the 
warfighter.  “The TCM Soldier’s focus on this capability almost caused the loss of the 
entire program and in fact, some say created a naysayer out of General 
Schoomaker, the CSA at the time of the LW’s termination” (Riley, 2008). 
This situation illustrates two broader lessons that all user representatives 
should consider.  First, trade-offs are going to happen with any system throughout 
the early part of the acquisition process.  The key is to identify what is important to 
the warfighters, prioritize their requirements and conduct consequent trade-offs.  
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This requires talking to the warfighters—not just the combat developer and 
acquisition communities.  It requires understanding the current and future fight and 
prioritizing capabilities in a manner that will address gaps in capability accordingly.  It 
also indicates a fundamental and endemic shortcoming with the requirements 
process.  Analysis is done at the “front-end” to determine capability gaps.  However, 
that cannot be the end of the story.  Some agency is needed to continue to track 
requirements and to make adaptations as necessary.  As described, this is one of 
the primary purposes of TCMs.  Second, it is important to identify what attributes are 
the “selling points” of the item and then take great care to communicate those 
attributes in a manner the end-user can relate to.  If this is not done, support for any 
system is difficult to garner—a key to getting “buy-in” for any system that significantly 
affects standard operations.  Obtaining buy-in is always going to be difficult for the 
TCM Soldier, as the community with which he primarily interacts is often split.  The 
Infantry community has different needs because it has several sub-communities—
light, heavy, airborne and SOF.  Rarely do these communities all speak with one 
voice.  This fact makes getting buy-in from the Infantry community as a whole 
infinitely harder (J. Yakovac, personal communication, September 18, 2008). 
In line with the notion of fostering buy-in was the flawed emphasis 
communicated to the Army on the LW capabilities of situational awareness and 
planning; what should have been emphasized was battle command. 
Panning is about visualization.  Situational awareness is about visualization.  
Battle command is about seeing and directing and describing.  That is the 
action.  That is how you convey.  That is how you make things happen.  Not 
by visualizing.  You can visualize all you want.  But the power comes from 
your ability to describe when the guy can’t see and isn’t standing next to you.  
LW is about battle command. (Riley, 2008) 
If this capability had been emphasized  and better understood by the Army 
prior to having to equip a unit, test it out and deploy it to combat, it might have saved 
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This situation further reinforces the aforementioned lesson about 
communicating the right “selling points” of a system.  Without a good strategic 
communications plan, support suffers until proof of concept is provided.  Users have 
to rely on the hope that the system will do all that its developers and advocates say it 
will do.  In the case of multi-million dollar items, hope is probably not the best course 
of action.  For now, TRADOC relies on credibility as a key characteristic for any 
TCM.  In line with that, TRADOC appoints TCMs from the operational community at 
the rank of O-6/Colonel.  He is usually a “warfighter” with broad tactical, operational 
and some strategic experience.  This credibility empowers his position and allows 
him to be an effective user representative.  However, given the LW experience, 
another characteristic for all TCMs should potentially be considered by TRADOC.  
Perhaps TCMs should have some marketing experience or training as a prerequisite 
for selection as a user representative.  This will allow him to leverage marketing 
techniques, coupled with credibility to create “buy-in” from the warfighting 
community.  Regardless, it is important that he complement the materiel developer’s 
focus on cost, schedule and performance, by focusing on the requirements (J. 
Dillard, personal communication, November 5, 2008). 
Planning for system familiarization and suggestions for improvements from 
the unit proved to be important when decision-makers were projecting how the unit 
would accept the system and how it would assess its readiness for deployment to 
combat.  “We have to accept that we [TCMs] are going to get it wrong or we are 
going to get it incomplete” (Riley, 2008).  “Not until a collective group of warfighters 
gets their hands on a system, works with it, improves it and incorporates it into their 
daily operations, will they embrace the system and make it their own” (Augustine, 
2008a).  The “unit confidence” curve depicted in Figure 17 below depicts 4-9 
Infantry’s acceptance of the system during 2006. 
The curve below is an applicable depiction of how unit confidence flows 
during fielding situations involving revolutionary, unproven capabilities.  Unit 
confidence starts rather high as the end-users are initially exposed to the system or 
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item during NET.  This is because they are being told what the system does and 
what it could potentially do by its advocates.  Unless intervention takes place to 
incorporate the new item into the unit’s operations, confidence decreases as the 
responsibility for integration becomes solely borne by the end-user.  There has to be 
a forcing function that makes the unit integrate the new capabilities into its normal 
operations, or confidence may never be achieved.  If a knowledgeable, credible 
advocate does not facilitate this “incorporation,” confidence will continue to dive.  In 
some cases, an advocate within the unit that sees the broader potential of the 
system might garner support.  In others, an emphasis on unit incorporation of the 
system might be driven by the chain of command.  A method for reversing this 
digression that was employed by the PM LW was the use of Unit System Integrators 
(USIs).  The USI concept encouraged the incorporation of LW into unit standard 
operations.  In addition, the PM LW provided the unit with the flexibility to tailor the 
system to meet its members’ needs.  This method showed the operational military 
unit that the PM was responsive to its needs.  These two important decisions started 
in August 2006 and are depicted below as the rise in unit confidence.  If the flexibility 
exists to leverage these techniques, unit confidence should increase faster than it 
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Figure 17. LW Unit Confidence Curve 
(Qualls, 2008) 
Unit confidence and “ownership” proved to be probably the most important 
contributor to LW’s success with 4-9 Infantry at Fort Lewis and then later in Iraq.  As 
described in Chapter III, from early on, several “points of light” in the unit were 
identified by the PM.  These individuals became the advocates for the system.  
These leaders within the unit were instrumental to the improvement of the LW 
System.  Leveraging the aforementioned Top-Ten Process, the LW evolved from a 
LW-SI (Block II) designed by PM, TCM Soldier, and GDC4S to a soldier-designed 
LW Manchu.  As described in Chapter II, the LW Manchu is an improvement on the 
LW-SI (Block II) that was originally issued to 4-9 Infantry in the spring of 2006.  It 
was then re-designed by soldiers for soldiers during their training as well as 
deployment (Augustine, 2008a).  Key to their confidence and ownership of the LW 
Manchu was their ability to re-configure the system, ask for improved capabilities 
and see measured improvements based on their inputs.  “If every other program in 
the Army did it like that…it would be awesome” (Pitch, 2008). 
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The broader lesson applicable to other programs is the idea of giving a 
product to the users and then giving them the latitude to tailor the design to their 
needs.  This technique is bold, and while not always applicable, can be effective.  To 
do this, a PM should conduct a detailed risk analysis to determine cost and schedule 
impacts as well as technical feasibility.  The PM must consider whether or not it is 
supportable and what impacts it may have to BOI, training packages, logistics 
support, testing, and many other issues.  In addition, he should implement a 
structured approach that facilitates the improvement process.  Without a structured 
approach that involves the unit, the program management team and the 
contractor(s), synchronization issues could arise and become disastrous.  The PM 
also has to take into account where in the equipping process he is.  This may affect 
whether or not he loses momentum with the unit in terms of acceptance.  If the 
process is not synchronized well and executed quickly, soldiers may become too 
negative and potentially lose confidence in the product.  It is also important to 
consider availability of the user organization.  With the Army’s current operational 
tempo (OPTEMPO), it is difficult to find time between deployment cycles to allow for 
new product evaluations that require system improvements and upgrades.  
Fortunately for the FCS Program, the Army has recently created an evaluation unit, 
the 5th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, Army Evaluation Task Force 
(AETF) at Fort Bliss, Texas, for this very purpose.40 
                                            
40 The AETF enables the Army to thoroughly evaluate materiel and to develop tactics, techniques 
and procedures, as well as the means to train and develop leaders. This will maximize the FCS 
Program's value to not just the Army, but to combatant commanders who will employ these combat 
formations. It will help the Army "get it right the first time" with FCS by identifying any potential flaws 
or improvements early so the Army can rapidly deliver the best equipment for our Soldiers. The AETF 
will allow the Army to integrate and field the enablers for achieving technology and training 
superiority, which are the necessary ingredients to future operational success (US Army Training and 
Doctirine Command, 2008). 
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J. Conclusions 
Some of the lessons learned from the users’ experience with LW can be 
generalized and applied to other programs.  First, it is important to communicate a 
new capability or system in terms that the warfighter can relate to.  The ability of the 
warfighters to visualize the implications of new capabilities on their operations is 
essential for fostering their support early in a program’s lifecycle.  Second, forward-
thinking management in a resource-constrained situation is a pre-requisite for 
success.  A thorough task analysis must be completed with all organizations 
involved prior to the beginning of any major event to determine gaps in resources.  
For TCMs, this comes down to balancing staffing with requirements.  Adequate 
staffing is essential for any major program—be it a tank, helicopter or any major 
weapon system.  The key here is to identify requirements, prioritize them and 
determine deficiencies up-front and early.  If more personnel are required, 
leadership must identify where they are going to come from, who is going to pay for 
them and how they are going to fit into the near- and long-term program plan.  In 
most cases across the Army, TCMs are understaffed due to constrained uniformed 
acquisition personnel resources.  To remedy this, TRADOC and the Army 
acquisition community should consider filling TCMs with uniformed personnel based 
upon Army program prioritization and requirements.  Third, unit “points of light,” or 
system/item advocates, should be identified by a PM that is fielding a new system to 
a unit.  These advocates are the PM’s “beachhead” in the unit that will strengthen 
the product credibility and boost confidence of the users, who may otherwise be 
naysayers.  Fourth, if it is possible to conduct soldier-driven, human-centered, 
ergonomic improvements to a product(s), a PM should do so.  Not only do such 
inclusions improve unit confidence when its members see a PM respond to their 
needs, but they tailor the product to what the warfighters want and, thus, increase 
their sense of ownership.  This technique is not without risk, however.  Careful 
consideration should be given to its feasibility.  Supportability, technical feasibility, 
cost and schedule implications have to be analyzed to determine if the benefits 
outweigh the risks. 
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From a strategic perspective, two essential takeaways are apparent.  First, 
the soldier is the most difficult “system” to interface to.  One size never fits all, and 
everyone has an opinion as to what is best.  What is acceptable to one group of 
users is unlikely to be acceptable to all, and because no two users think alike, they 
cannot normally agree to what is good enough.  Second, although TRADOC is the 
requirements generator for the Army, it may or may not be able to accurately reflect 
the needs of the Army.  Up-front warfighter involvement is necessary to get Army 
requirements right.  Involvement of Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) at the 
beginning of the acquisition process may address this Army-level issue (J. Yakovac, 
personal communication, September 18, 2008). 
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V. Budget Decisions Affecting the LW Program 
A. Introduction 
This chapter outlines the budget allocated for the Army’s LW Soldier System.  
It details, by FY, the Army’s acquisition strategy, any House and/or Senate report 
language that impacted the LW Program’s budget appropriation(s) and the 
appropriation conference reports.  We first introduce the basic procedures in the 
federal budget process.  Next, we provide an analysis of each FY’s budget 
pertaining to the LW Soldier System since it became a POR in 1996.  Last, we 
provide a summary of the key budget decisions that affected the LW Program to 
date.  A detailed view of each FY’s budget breakdown, by budget activity, starting in 
1996 through 2009, is in Appendix Q.  
B. Basic Concepts of the Federal Budget Process 
The defense budget is not a single document or process.  It is defined in 
terms of budget authority, obligations and outlays.  Congress provides the 
Department of Defense (DoD) funds in the form of budget authority.  Budget 
authority is allocated to individual agencies within the DoD.  These individual 
agencies obligate the funds that lead to outlays.  Outlays are made on specific 
contracts by each agency (Tyszkiewicz & Dagget, 1998).  An outlay represents the 
actual expenditure of funds through the form of a check, cash or electronic funds 
transfer (Keith, 2008). 
The DoD prepares its budget using the Planning, Programming, Budgeting 
and Execution System (PPBES).  The PPBES assists in developing budget policy 
and meeting the demands of the Services’ budget activities.  The purpose of the 
PPBES process is to provide a structured approach to the allocation of resources in 
support of the National Military Strategy (NMS) and provide the best mix of forces 
and equipment within a constrained budget environment.  The PPBES has four very 
 =
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 116 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
distinct phases: the planning phase, programming phase, budgeting phase and 
budget execution phase (Jones & McCaffery, 2008). 
The planning phase begins at the executive branch level with the National 
Security Strategy (NSS).  The NSS identifies threats to the country in an effort to 
develop an overall plan to counter them.  Part of this phase also includes the 
issuance of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) and the Future Years’ Defense 
Plan (FYDP).  The DPG provides the Services guidance for the development of the 
Services’ Program Objective Memorandums (POM) during the programming phase 
of PPBES.  The FYDP is a six-year projection of Service-wide force structure 
requirements (Jones & McCaffery, 2008). 
During the programming phase, the Services produce a POM that addresses 
how they will allocate their budget funds over a six-year period and how their plans 
support the DPG.  Once completed, the Services' POMs are reviewed by the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff to ensure they are compliant with the National Military Strategy 
Document (NMSD) and the DPG. 
The budgeting phase begins with the identification of approved programs in 
each Service POM.  Each Service “costs out” each of its programs that support the 
POM and submits those numbers as part of the budget estimate submission (BES) 
(Jones & McCaffery, 2008).  The military budgets are then reviewed—first by the 
DoD comptroller and then ultimately by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF).  The 
SECDEF review ensures compliance with the DPG and the NSS.  Changes to the 
Services’ POMs are submitted through program decision memoranda (PDM).  
Program budget decisions (PBD) may change the budget before becoming a part of 
the President’s final budget.  Both the POMs and the budgets are reviewed in 
tandem; the POM by the Program Analysis and Evaluation Office (PA&E), the 
budget by the comptroller.  Once the President’s budget is completed, Congress 
reviews it and considers it in its development of the defense authorization and 
appropriation acts (Jones & McCaffery, 2008). 
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During the execution phase of the PPBES, the DoD gains approval to spend 
the appropriations approved by Congress.  Appropriations are laws enacted by 
Congress that provide the DoD the authority to incur obligations and provide the 
Treasury the authority to make payments.  Citing that budget authority, the DoD 
obligates the Government to make payments for goods and services (P. Candreva, 
personal communication, October 7, 2008).  Appropriated funds are normally 
obligated during the first fiscal year for which they are provided, or else they expire 
(Tyszkiewicz & Dagget, 1998).  Through outlays, appropriated funds are distributed 
to the Services and allocated to specific contracts or programs.  This is done through 
an “allotment process,” which requires the DoD to show Congress how it will spend 
what has been appropriated.  The DoD breaks its planned spending down by month, 
quarter or, as in the case of the LW Program, by FY (Jones & McCaffery, 2008). 
In full-funding scenarios, when Congress appropriates funds for defense 
programs, it provides all of the costs of the programs’ activities up front for one fiscal 
year (Tyszkiewicz & Dagget, 1998).  This allows for full visibility of the true cost of 
the program, but does not guarantee that the program will be completed with the 
amount of money budgeted or within the time allotted due to unplanned cost over-
runs, design changes, technological uncertainties and/or changes in inflation.  Some 
of these contingencies were experienced in the LW Program and are described later 
in the chapter. 
C. LW Acquisition Strategies and Congressional Budget 
Decisions 
1. FY 1996 
a. Acquisition Strategy for FY 1996 
The LW Program was created as a result of the FY 1996 Congressional 
direction to consolidate previous soldier system efforts into a Program of Record 
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(POR).  As a POR, the LW Program was intended to address critical Army needs to 
enhance the performance, lethality, survivability, and sustainment of the individual 
ground soldier.  This consolidation brought S&T funding and non-S&T funding 
together under one project (Office of the Secretary of the Army, DoD, 1997a). 
In FY 1996, the LW acquisition strategy was based solely upon RDT&E, with 
an emphasis on the aforementioned ground soldier enhancements by focusing on 
LW-unique capabilities and components.  To support this strategy, in FY 1996, the 
Army requested and was appropriated $30.5 million in RDT&E, Advanced 
Technology Development (ATD) and Logistics Advanced Technology (Office of the 
Secretary of the Army, DoD, 1997b). 
2. FY 1997 
a. Acquisition Strategy for FY 1997 
The acquisition strategy for 1997 continued with a focus on LW RDT&E.  
RDT&E was to focus on continued enhancements in the areas of performance, 
lethality, survivability and sustainment of the individual soldier.  To continue this 
effort, the Army requested, and was appropriated, $15.9 million for LW in the areas 
of RDT&E, ATD and Logistics Advanced Technology, with additional funding 
requested for the out years.  Also identified in the FY 1997’s budget was a change 
summary explanation, in which funds were reprogrammed to cover both increases in 
program restructures as well as an urban operations testing site for LW (Office of the 
Secretary of the Army, DoD, 1997b). 
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3. FY 1998 
a. Acquisition Strategy for FY 1998 
The acquisition strategy during FY 1998 was focused on technology 
insertions to the LW functional baseline.  The plan was to perform risk reductions 
aimed at providing technologies that offered improvements in weight as well as 
capabilities.  Efforts to develop the helmet-mounted display, digital voice 
communications, a voice-activated radio and a radio relay package were all part of 
these technologies.  The strategy included an Integrated Product Team (IPT) 
approach to determine which technologies from the LW S&T program would be 
integrated into the LW POR (Office of the Secretary of the Army, DoD, 1997a). 
To support this strategy, the Army requested $33 million under Engineering 
and Manufacturing Development (EMD), Combat Feeding, Clothing and Equipment 
in direct support of the LW POR.  Embedded in this funding request were smaller 
programs that directly supported LW’s work under the budget activity, Weapons and 
Tracked Combat Vehicles (WTCV) under the title M-4 Carbine Modifications and M-
16 rifle Modifications.  The M-4 Carbine Modifications and M-16 rifle Modifications 
program were appropriated for $2.1 million and $7.6 million respectively (US House 
of Representatives, 1998).  In addition, in the House Report 105-206, 
(accompanying the Defense Authorization Bill), the House Armed Services 
Committee (HASC) added a $9.3 million earmark for continued testing and 
development of the LW System (Office of the Secretary of the Army, DoD, 1997b).  
The LW Program was appropriated all requested funding for the program in the 
appropriation conference report.  
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4. FY 1999 
a. Acquisition Strategy for FY 1999 
This fiscal year’s strategy focused on near-term technology insertions—
including enhanced weapon mounted sensor interfaces, increased reliability, 
reductions in weight, increased usability and navigation system improvement.  The 
strategy focused on completing a competitive production contract to be awarded 
upon completion of a successful Milestone C production decision during the first 
quarter of FY 2000.  The LW Systems being planned for procurement would enable 
dismounted forces to share situational data with each other and with other battlefield 
weapons platforms (Office of the Secretary of the Army, DoD, 1998a). 
To support near-term technology insertions, the Army requested $39.9 million 
for RDT&E, EMD, Combat Feeding, Clothing and Equipment and $9.3 million for 
RDT&E, ATD, with additional funding requests for small business innovation 
research and small business technology transfer programs to enhance competition 
on LW technologies and capabilities (Office of the Secretary of the Army, DoD, 
1998b). 
The House appropriations report recommended an increase in RDT&E 
funding of $5.6 million and a reduction of $5.6 million in LW future technology 
development from the requested $9.3 million.  The committee recommended an 
increase of $20 million to continue the development and testing of the LW System, 
stating:  
although the Army views the LW as a successful program, the committee is 
concerned with a number of technical issues which the Army must resolve 
before the system is fielded.  The weight and power management are two 
major areas of concern that continue to put risk in the program.  As a result of 
these concerns, the yet to be completed IOT&E that was scheduled for fiscal 
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It was noted in the report that the Army reported a 9% cost growth due to cost 
overruns, additional program requirements and technology maturation issues. 
Concerned that the program schedule had slipped because of technology 
concerns, the committee recommended additional RDT&E funding to resolve LW’s 
technical issues and recommended that it was premature to move towards 
procurement.  The Senate echoed the House’s concerns about technological issues 
and recommended an overall reduction of $4.7 million for LW RDT&E based on 
“significant technical difficulties in hardware/software integration and schedule slip” 
(US Senate, 1999a).  The appropriations conference report increased the LW 
Program by $10 million instead of the recommended increase of $20 million to 
continue RDT&E (US House of Representatives, 1998c). 
5. FY 2000 
a. Acquisition Strategy for FY 2000  
The acquisition strategy for FY 2000 represented a significant change from 
previous years, shifting from a solely RDT&E focus to procurement.  A procurement 
objective was established to deliver a total of 34,000 systems.  This number included 
an initial LRIP quantity of 18,000 systems to establish a production base for the 
system.  Embedded in the LRIP was an option to annually provide an additional 
4,155 systems from the prime contractor to allow time for the Government to release 
the LW request for proposal (RFP), evaluate potential proposals and hardware and 
award the production contract (Office of the Secretary of the Army, DoD, 1999a.).  
This option would allow the selected contractor to set up its production line, produce 
the first batch of LW Systems and undergo first article testing (FAT). 
To support this strategy, the Army requested $86.6 million under RDT&E, 
EMD, Combat Feeding, Clothing and Equipment and $6.3 million in RDT&E, ATD, 
Warfighter Advanced Technology.  The House appropriations report recommended 
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a $26 million decrease in funding for LW EMD.  No explanation was given in the 
report for the recommended decrease, but, based the upon previous years’ 
congressional concerns, an assumption can be made that there was a continuation 
of technology challenges in the LW Program.  Challenges with LW’s size, weight and 
power capabilities and difficulties in both hardware and software integration could be 
attributed to a failure to utilize an acquisition open-architecture approach (US House 
of Representatives, 1999a).  The Senate recommended decreasing LW EMD by 
$26.5 million.  This recommendation was based on previous proposed Senate 
reductions and concerns about the Program’s technical difficulties in hardware- and 
software-integration issues (US Senate, 1999a). The appropriation conference 
report decreased the LW EMD by $50 million instead of the recommended $26.5 
million (US House of Representatives, 1999b). 
6. FY 2001 
a. Acquisition Strategy for FY 2001 
Due to technical challenges of some of LW’s unique subsystems, for FY 
2001, the acquisition strategy changed from an incremental acquisition approach 
(utilizing LW unique hardware, software and stove-pipe technologies) to an 
evolutionary approach.  This approach aimed at taking advantage of components 
available from other Government agencies as well as Commercial Off-the-shelf 
(COTS) components and technologies; it also used a more OSA approach.  This 
approach intended to increase the program manager’s flexibility as well as his ability 
to incorporate technology.  In addition, this was meant to reduce proprietary issues, 
reduce costs and allow integration to be performed by the Government with products 
supplied by multiple contractors.  The goal of this strategy was to enable the PM to 
negotiate a sole-source contract for LRIP, with the option to move towards full-rate 
production (Office of the Secretary of the Army, DoD, 2000a). 
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To support the LW evolutionary approach, the Army requested $60.1 million 
in RDT&E, EMD, Combat Feeding, Clothing and Equipment, and $6.3 million in 
RDT&E, ATD, Warfighter Advanced Technology for the Future Warrior Technology 
Integration (FWTI) (Office of the Secretary of the Army, DoD, 2000b).  FWTI was an 
ACTD designed to develop and demonstrate technology improvements of the LW 
baseline system for Pre-planned Product Improvements (P3I).  FWTI was merged 
with the LW Program to assist in addressing critical technical issues of LW’s size, 
weight, power, fightability, and cost.  In addition, once merged, FWTI was to focus 
on the maturation of the integrated navigation, system voice control, combat 
identification and on the development of tethered hardware and software interfaces 
among LW-specific systems (Office of the Secretary of the Army, DoD, 2000b).  The 
Army’s request for funding of LW RDT&E was appropriated with no increases or 
decreases. 
7. FY 2002  
a. Acquisition Strategy for FY 2002 
Out of concern for potential LW Program reversion to LW-unique hardware 
and software, Congress directed the LW Program to use an open system 
architecture approach.  This approach called for minimizing LW-unique hardware 
and software and was intended to minimize LW-unique technology challenges and 
shortfalls.  The LW Program used OTAs as the procurement method in an effort to 
increase the level of commercial involvement and, hopefully, address the program’s 
technology challenges.  An OTA is a transaction agreement characterized by 
enhanced flexibility and reduced administrative burden when compared with typical 
Government procurement contracts (Department of the Army, 2008, October 3).  
Follow-on procurement for the LW was required to utilize the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR)-based full and open competition standards.  This was a shift in 
strategy from previous years, which had been based upon a sole-source contracting 
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approach.  The Army increased the LW total procurement objective to 47,245 
units—an increase of 13,245 systems from the earlier procurement objective in FY 
2000 (Office of the Secretary of the Army, DoD, 2001). 
The Army requested $61.7 million in RDT&E, EMD and $35.5 million in 
RDT&E, ATD, Warfighter Advanced Technology for the newly merged FWTI ACTD.  
The strategy during FY 2002 was to continue the FY 2001 vision of leveraging the 
FWTI to assist LW Program in addressing size, weight, power and cost concerns, as 
well as to further the maturation of LW integrated navigation, system voice control, 
combat identification and the development of tethered hardware and software 
interfaces (Office of the Secretary of the Army, DoD, 2002).  The appropriations 
report approved the Army’s requested budget for LW RDT&E with no increases or 
decreases annotated in the appropriations report. 
8. FY 2003 
a. Acquisition Strategy for FY 2003 
The acquisition strategy for FY 2003 was the same as the previous two years: 
leverage COTS and Government components and capabilities to minimize LW-
unique hardware and software components, and utilize an OSA approach and OTA 
procurement method.  A change of 1,556 LW Systems in FY 2003 increased the 
Army’s planned LW procurement to 48,801 units (Office of the Secretary of the 
Army, DoD, 2002). 
To continue supporting this, the Army requested $60.3 million for RDT&E, 
EMD to incorporate software and hardware upgrades, begin development of LW 
Block II, conduct IOT&E, and provide contractor support during DT and IOT&E.  The 
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9. FY 2004 
a. Acquisition Strategy for FY 2004   
The program continued with an evolutionary acquisition strategy in FY 2004.  
The Program moved to a production contract to procure the LW-IC. This 
procurement was targeted at outfitting Army Rangers with LW-IC (LW Block I 
Systems), as well as one SBCT with LW-Stryker Interoperable (LW-SI) systems.  
This procurement strategy was intended to produce an integrated soldier system in 
late FY 2004 (Office of the Secretary of the Army, DoD, 2003). 
To support this new procurement objective, the Army requested $94.8 million 
for LW, Other Procurement, Army (OPA), for 2,425 systems and shifted RDT&E to 
System Development and Demonstration (SDD) (Department of the Army, 2003).  
The Army requested $49.2 million in RDT&E, SDD, to enable the fielding of LW-IC to 
the Army Rangers.  This procurement of the LW-IC was intended to form the 
foundation for the procurement of future warrior systems. 
The House appropriations report noted that the failed LW DT in February 
2003 resulted in the re-structuring of the program’s funding.  The report noted 
concerns about the program’s design instability and continued troubled history with 
size, weight and power.  Because of these ongoing issues, the House recommended 
shifting $58.5 million from OPA to RDT&E to continue to develop LW capabilities.  
The committee directed the Secretary of the Army to provide a report to the 
congressional defense committees no later than 31 January 2004.  This report was 
required to identify LW’s Key Performance Parameters (KPPs), an assessment of 
how the program’s objectives and KPPs changed, and how costs could adjust under 
the revised LW Program.  Also required was a comparison of the revised 
development and fielding schedule as compared to the previous acquisition program 
baseline (US House of Representatives, 2004b).  The Senate recommended a 
complete reduction of OPA funds of $94.8 million, with $32.7 million of the $94.8 
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million moved to LW RDT&E.  This recommendation was based upon the failed DT 
with the Army Rangers in February 2003 (US Senate, 2003a). 
The Senate’s National Defense Authorization Report also took note of the 
failed DT in 2003 due to subsystem reliability issues; however, it also recognized 
that the system met user functionality requirements in situational awareness, 
survivability and enhanced communications.  The report acknowledged measures by 
the Army to capture feedback from the failed DT and steps the Army was taking to 
improve subsystem reliability through risk mitigation.  In the same report, a note was 
made of the Army’s request for funding to be moved from OPA to LW RDT&E to 
fund a risk-mitigation study to improve subsystem reliability.  The report also noted 
there was no funding for the Integrated Battlefield Combat Situational Awareness 
System (IB-CSAS), a system with capabilities for improved positioning, location, 
tracking and small, lightweight soldier sensors for laser-based combat identification 
systems.  The IB-CSAS could ensure that technology could be included as a P3I for 
transition to fielded LW Systems.  The issues noted in this SASC report impacted 
the Senate’s recommendation of transferring $73.5 million from LW Procurement to 
LW Development, of which $15 million was to be used for furthering IB-CSAS’s 
development. This recommendation would increase the total LW RDT&E budget to 
$122.7 million and eliminate $21.3 million for OPA (US Senate, 2003b). 
The appropriation conference report reduced the LW procurement budget 
from $94.8 million to $1.6 million.  It shifted $32.7 million of the $94.8 million from 
OPA to LW RDT&E for continued work on the IB-CSAS and risk-mitigation 
measures for LW subsystems.  Lastly, it eliminated $62.1 million overall from the LW 
Program (US House of Representatives, 2004a). 
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10. FY 2005 
a. Acquisition Strategy for FY 2005 
FY 2005 represented a change from the planned procurement of the LW 
System.  Instead of focusing procurement on Army Rangers, the procurement 
strategy was re-focused to incorporate emerging technologies found in the DBCS 
into SBCTs.  The LW total procurement objective increased by 10,099 systems, to a 
total procurement objective of 58,900 LW units (Office of the Secretary of the Army, 
DoD, 2004a). 
In FY 2005, the LW Program suffered one of its biggest setbacks.  In a 
memorandum for the LW Program dated 03 November 2004, Mr. Claude M. Bolton 
Jr., the AAE, directed the program to “refocus the LW Acquisition strategy by 
restructuring the LW-Stryker Interoperable (LW-SI) to provide the Dismounted Battle 
Command System (DBCS) capability to leaders for up to 30 Brigade Combat Teams 
to include Stryker Brigade Combat Teams.”  This memorandum directed the PM to 
“make the required contractual modifications with the system integrator, General 
Dynamics, to conserve resources, re-orient effort and support this memorandum” 
(Bolton, 2004).  In essence, this memorandum caused the Army to reduce funding 
for the LW Program and reallocate it to the DBCS as the materiel solution for 
enhancing the capabilities of the dismounted ground soldier. 
The DBCS had two different systems, the Commander’s Digital Assistant 
(CDA) and the Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS) MicroLight 
Radio waveform, both tied into the LTI and carrying standard Joint Variable 
Message Format digital messages to users across the network.  The DBCS was 
viewed as being more technically capable and more ready to use than the LW 
System.  The decision to reduce funding of the LW Program, based upon the failed 
DT of 2003, and the move towards the DBCS materiel solution brought the LW 
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Program to a halt and stifled any efforts to move forward with FY 2004-planned 
RDT&E risk-mitigation measures. 
For FY 2005, the Army requested $91.3 million for RDT&E, SDD.  The 
request was justified based on the Program’s acknowledgement that LW-IC (Block 
I), the system configuration for the Army Rangers, was not ready to enter LRIP.  
Because of the inability to enter LRIP, LW-SI (Block II) development started as part 
of the ASARC approved LW baselining activity (Office of the Secretary of the Army, 
DoD, 2005b). 
The House Defense sub-committee expressed concerns about the LW’s 
failures in DT and the overall instability in the design of the system.  The committee 
noted there were two similar programs underway during the same time, LW and 
FFW.  The committee recommended merging these programs and combining their 
resources.  Because of this recommendation, the committee reduced the RDT&E 
funding request by $20 million and directed the Army to merge the funding and 
management of the LW and FFW Programs (US House of Representatives, 2004a). 
The Senate, however, was most concerned that the LW Program had been in 
existence as a POR for ten years and had not yet fielded an acceptable system.  On 
the other hand, the committee members were pleased that the LW Program was 
transferred to the management of PEO Soldier.  They felt that PEO Soldier’s 
management would enable the Army to dedicate enough resources and attention to 
technologies that would make the Program much more achievable, as well as re-
focus it on soldiers.  They were also concerned that the FFW and the LW Programs 
were on separate paths that were not acting in concert for the benefit of the soldier.  
Therefore, they directed the Army to “submit to the congressional defense 
committees a plan to consolidate both programs into a single program, taking 
advantage of both programs’ capabilities” (US Senate, 2004a).  The committee 
recommended a reduction of $15 million to the FFW program in anticipation of the 
programs merger.  In its final guidance, the committee further recommended the LW 
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Program refocus its procurement strategy with emerging technologies found in 
DBCS into SBCTs (US Senate, 2004b). 
In the report to accompany the National Defense Authorization Report, the 
Senate noted the Army’s request for $91.3 million for LW development and an 
increase of $2.5 million to continue IB-CSAS development (US Senate, 2004b).  The 
appropriations conference report reduced the LW/ FFW RDT&E by a total of $20 
million in anticipation of the two programs consolidating and concurred with 
recommendations that the program re-focus its procurement strategy with emerging 
technologies found in the DBCS into SBCTs (US House of Representatives, 2004b). 
11. FY 2006 
a. Acquisition Strategy for FY 2006 
The FY 2006 acquisition strategy complied with congressional intent to 
leverage successes from proven LW components.  It refocused the LW Program to 
spiral-out DBCS capabilities for soldiers in the near-term.  The LW integrated 
ensemble systems, to include applicable long-lead items, were to be produced for an 
SBCT for evaluation purposes.  The LW Program and FFW ATD made progress in 
consolidating in accordance with the FY 2005 congressional recommendations.  As 
a continuing effort to develop the future of LW, the Army began planning 
development of the GSS.  The GSS was intended to be the future dismounted 
soldier system.  The idea was to leverage technological advancements from the S&T 
community, including FFW, into the integrated modular soldier system of the future 
(Office of the Secretary of the Army, DoD, 2005). 
In an effort to comply with congressional intent, the Army moved funding from 
SDD, Combat Feeding, Clothing and Equipment to SDD, Soldier Systems-Warrior 
Demonstration and Evaluation.  This move intended to focus on spiraling successful, 
developed LW technologies (mainly the DBCS capabilities) into LW-SI (LW Block II), 
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for a near-term solution.  The intent was to accelerate components that addressed 
the dismounted soldier of the FCS System-of-systems (FCS-SoS).  To achieve this, 
the Army requested $50.2 million for LW RDT&E and $35.7 for LW Procurement. 
In both the Senate and House Appropriations Reports, the committees 
supported the $35.7 million for OPA, which included procurement of DBCS 
capabilities (US Senate, 2005).  The appropriations conference report approved 
$35.7 million for OPA and appropriated the Army $50.2 million for RDT&E under 
Soldier Systems-Warrior Demonstration and Evaluation for LW (US House of 
Representatives, 2005). 
12. FY 2007  
a. Acquisition Strategy for FY 2007 
In FY 2005, the Army was directed to perform a DOTMLPF assessment and 
LUT to determine which Army capability gaps the LW and MW Systems could fill.  
As previously discussed, these assessments were carried out beginning in FY 2006 
and ending in FY 2007.  To accomplish these assessments, the Army equipped the 
Stryker-equipped 4-9 Infantry Battalion with both LW and MW Systems in FY 2006.  
The intent of these evaluations was to support a LW Milestone C LRIP decision by 
the AAE. 
In FY 2007, funding shifted, and the LW Program budget lines changed.  The 
new budget line was changed to include both the LW and MW Programs.  The 
justification for this consolidation was that the two Programs complemented each 
other.  “The Mounted Warrior Soldier System provides the dismounted and mounted 
soldiers increased capabilities to conduct offensive and defensive operations 
through uninterrupted viewing of their platform and dismounted soldiers” (Office of 
the Secretary of the Army, DoD, 2006).  The Army requested $27.5 million for the 
LW/MW Program RDT&E, SDD, Soldier Systems-Warrior Demonstration and 
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Evaluation, and $9.3 million under OPA, Soldier Enhancement, for the procurement 
of 127 LW units for continued Army SBCT LW/MW evaluation. 
The Senate recommended a plus-up of $4 million (from an original $4 million, 
to a total of $8 million) for Soldier Enhancement, OPA, for the fielding of the LW 
Systems to an SBCT for evaluation.  The $4 million plus-up for LW OPA was a result 
of the Army decision to cancel the DBCS in favor of the LW materiel solution.  In 
addition, since the FFW and LW Programs were merged in FY 2006, the Senate 
recommended a reduction in FFW funding by $5 million (US Senate, 2006).  The 
appropriation conference report appropriated the additional $4 million from DBCS to 
LW Soldier Enhancement for a total of $8 million for OPA (US House of 
Representatives, 2006). 
13. FY 2008 
a. Acquisition Strategy for FY 2008 
In FY 2008, the Army officially terminated the LW Program, and LW 
capabilities transitioned to the Army’s new GSE Program (formerly termed GSS).  
The GSE Program’s strategy is to integrate multiple LW sub-components and 
leverage emerging technologies for the dismounted soldier.  The LW Program 
strategy continued, however, focusing on procuring additional LW Systems to field to 
the remaining two battalions of the SBCT at Fort Lewis, Washington (Office of the 
Secretary of the Army, DoD, 2007). 
What is important to note during this budget year is that in the report 
accompanying the Senate National Defense Authorization Bill, the Senate added 
$80 million to restore funding for the LW Program despite its termination.  This was 
to ensure that enough LW Systems were available to field and sustain two remaining 
SBCTs at Fort Lewis.  The restoration was based on the many successes of the LW-
equipped 4-9 Infantry, in combat, in Iraq.  Despite the Senate’s opinion that the LW 
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Program suffered from poor management, poor system performance and from 
unscheduled cost and schedule overruns, they recognized that the then-current 
system configuration provided increased capabilities for the dismounted soldier 
(enhanced situational awareness, command-and-control, voice and data radio, 
Global Positioning System capabilities, a computer subsystem, and a control card 
for identity management). 
The report included a statement that: 
the Department of Defense Director of Operational Test and Evaluation 
assessed LW with the 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry, a Stryker unit preparing to 
deploy, and in a letter to this committee, determined that the system was “on 
track” to be operationally effective, and suitable, even though it has not 
completed Initial Operational Testing. (US Senate, 2007) 
The report noted that the Army intended to take the LW System to a 
Milestone C production decision to begin LRIP but did not intend to fund the LRIP.  
The Senate also voiced concern that that Army terminated the program and wrote: 
The committee believes that such a decision may be short-sighted and urges 
the Army to review the decision to terminate the LW Program.  The committee 
recommends an addition of $30.4 million for SDD, Soldier Systems-Warrior 
Demonstration and Evaluation and $49.5 million in OPA to continue 
development of the LW Program and to procure LRIP items of equipment to 
field the remaining two battalions of the Stryker Brigade Combat Team 
currently equipped with LW. (US Senate, 2007) 
It is important to note here that the Army included in its FY 2008 supplemental 
appropriation request sufficient funding to outfit an additional SBCT (in addition to 
the other two battalions previously described) at Fort Lewis with LW capabilities.  
This is important because this was a direct result of an ONS submitted by the 5th 
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14. FY 2009 
In FY 2009, the Senate defense authorization report observed that: 
The Army’s budget request did not include any funds in OPA for LW.  The 
committee remains concerned that the Army has terminated this program 
despite significant investment, its promising test results, and its performance 
in combat.  In FY 2008, the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation 
indicated that the system’s test items could deploy to Iraq with the 4th 
Battalion, 9th Infantry, the Army approved the plan, and the battalion is 
currently using the system effectively today.  In testimony to the committee 
this year, the Army indicated that it would move forward with the LW Program 
based on the test results and feedback from the soldiers of the 4th Battalion, 
9th Infantry.” (US Senate, 2008)  
The Senate said that it was encouraged by the Army’s additional supplemental 
funding request in FY 2008 and recommended accelerating the procurement of the 
LW System for the 5-2 SBCT preparing to deploy (US Senate, 2008). Based on this 
support, the FY 2008 supplemental funding request was approved.  This 
commitment of support to a terminated program reflects the value that both the Army 
and lawmakers place on the LW Program. 
In 2008, the 5-2 SBCT was training on LW Systems used by 4-9 Infantry in 
preparation for its deployment.  New, improved LW Systems are in the production 
process, and a plan is in place to field them to the 5-2 SBCT prior to its deployment.  
D. Summary of Key LW Budget Decisions 
This chapter identified several key decision points that affected the LW 
Program throughout the course of its acquisition.  In retrospect, these congressional 
budget decisions affected the LW Program’s ability to move forward in the 
acquisition process.  Some decisions were beneficial, while others were detrimental. 
First, in both FY 1999 and FY 2000, the Army was premature in its decision to 
attempt to move to procurement despite the inadequate technological readiness 
level of the prototype LW Systems.  The Army intended for this decision to 
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accelerate the LW Program; instead, it caused Congressional funding concerns and 
appeared overly ambitious.  Next in FY 2001, the LW Program changed its 
acquisition strategy to an evolutionary approach.  This was important because it 
reduced technological risk and cost and allowed the program to focus on RDT&E 
versus procurement.  This change in strategy allowed the program to mature and the 
system to evolve from an unacceptable form factor to a soldier-focused, human-
centered design system.  Despite this focus, a user-accepted form factor was 
delayed in its development until FY 2006.  In FY 2003, LW-IC (Block I) was rejected 
by both the 82nd Airborne and the Army Rangers during DT.  These rejections, 
coupled with the Army decision in FY 2004 to focus on a more affordable DBCS, 
were a combination that proved initially devastating to the LW Program.  Because 
the program experienced a significant reduction in funding in the FY 2004 budget, 
the LW Program lost nearly two calendar years of progress and extended its 
tumultuous history in the eyes of naysayers. 
Returned to the tech base for technology maturation in FY 2004 and then 
given a second chance in FY 2006, the LW System was finally deployed.  4-9 
Infantry warfighters saved the LW Program during their successful DOTMLPF 
assessment and LUT.  These events would never been possible if the program had 
not been competed and re-designed by GDC4S.  This timeframe was not without 
challenges.  During the summer of FY 2006, the first VIP day (planned and executed 
to coincide with the Army’s budget cycle) proved devastating when 4-9 Infantry 
soldiers expressed a premature and extreme dissatisfaction to key decision-makers.  
This dissatisfaction led these same decision-makers to terminate the program in the 
FY 2007 budget.  In hindsight, this decision proved to be a hasty one; once the unit 
actually trained, it embraced the system from late FY 2006 through FY 2008.  As a 
result, in FY 2008, the Senate provided $80 million to restore funding to the 
terminated LW Program. 
In FY 2009, funds were provided to field enhanced LW Systems to additional 
SBCTs.  This additional fielding of LW Systems reinforces the intent of the Army and 
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Congress to continue the pursuit of soldier systems in the future (despite not having 
a Milestone C LRIP decision).  In fact, all of this effort has paved the way for the 
recent establishment of the next generation soldier system program, the GSE. 
VI. Case Study Summary, Conclusions and 
Recommendations 
In this business [Army Acquisition], any case study that is done right requires 
an understanding of the need and the context within which it was derived and 
evolved (J. Yakovac, personal communication, September 18, 2008) 
A. Summary 
This case study suggests that the LW Program has experienced a rocky road.  
This is not surprising given the many changes in the defense environment since the 
early 1990s when the LW Program started.  From the end of the Cold War, to the 
DoD emphasis on transformation and net-centricity, and now to the GWOT, it is 
clear that the context within which the requirement for soldier systems was derived 
and evolved has played a big role in LW’s successes and failures.  Likewise, LW’s 
materiel developers have contributed to the program’s setbacks and its 
achievements.  Their efforts can be characterized as pushing the limits of technology 
to meet the users’ needs, while at the same time dealing with funding instability, 
conflicting priorities and perspectives as well as a user community that was difficult 
to satisfy.  The users and their representatives were difficult to appease, as they had 
their share of challenges of trying to decide on a “one-size-fits-all” system for a 
community that was not homogenous.  These challenges were often exacerbated by 
varying levels of buy-in that resulted from the discontinuous innovation that the 
revolutionary LW System proved to be.  Finally, and from a fiscal perspective, 
depending upon the year, Army and congressional budget decisions proved to be 
both detrimental and beneficial to the LW Program. 
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We organize this case study’s conclusions by synthesizing previous chapters’ 
analyses and highlighting key lessons learned.  The purpose of these syntheses is 
to bring together several “stove-piped” views of some of the components of LW’s 
acquisition (historical context, materiel developers, user representatives, warfighters 
and funding), draw conclusions and develop recommendations for potential ways 
ahead for the acquisition of similar items.  Furthermore, we tie some of the lessons 
that were learned into the strategic perspective for DoD acquisition and some issues 
that should be considered as the LW Program transitions to the GSE Program in FY 
2009.  Lastly, as this is the first case study on LW, we provide several 
recommendations for further research. 
From our perspective, there were four key turning points during the LW 
Program’s history.  The first was in 2000 when the Army attempted to accelerate its 
acquisition strategy by trying to move LW from the tech base to procurement 
prematurely.  This sent a signal to lawmakers and naysayers that the acquisition 
strategy was potentially too ambitious.  The second happened in late 2002 and early 
2003 when the LW-IC (Block I) System failed its early functional assessments with 
the 82nd Airborne at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, and the Rangers at 
Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia.  These negative results further empowered naysayers 
and discouraged the continuation of the LW effort for nearly two years—despite a 
contract award to GDC4S for LW Block II.  The third happened in FY 2006 when 
senior Army leadership made the decision to give LW another chance with 4-9 
Infantry at Fort Lewis, Washington.  This decision proved to breathe life back into the 
program.  The most recent turning point was the 4-9 Infantry’s tremendous, but 
tumultuous incorporation of LW into its unit’s standard operating procedures during 
both 2006 at Fort Lewis, Washington, and 2007-2008 in combat in Iraq.  The Fort 
Lewis experience proved initially devastating to the LW Program, but in the end, 
paved the way for what became perhaps the most important turning point for the 
future of soldier systems. 
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By 2000, the Army had embraced the Network Centric Warfare (NCW) 
Strategy for platforms and was in the throes of detailing the Objective Force 
Concept.  Budgets were tight, and the GWOT had not yet been initiated by the 9/11 
attacks against the US homeland.  Four years of development had taken place with 
Hughes Aircraft, the LW Consortium and the Objective Force Warrior ATD, and a 
materiel solution for the networked dismounted soldier was just completing its first 
warfighter evaluation at the JCF AWE.  For the PM LW and the TCM Soldier, LW 
prototyping and testing were progressing well.  Despite this progress, in 2000, the 
Army’s ambitious move from an RDT&E focus to procurement sent the LW Program 
down a difficult path that would not conclude for almost five years. 
The PM’s original intent was to respond to a seemingly satisfied user 
community that was happy with the LW v0.6 after its successful experience at the 
JCF AWE and place some capability into the hands of military users.  Instead, 
however, a number of technical- and human-factor-related issues (as well as 
requirements that incorporated the newly conceived FCS concept) derailed his plan.  
Users liked the LW concept, but in the end, the LW v0.6 did not meet their needs in 
size, weight, power, form, fit or function requirements.  These reasons—coupled with 
a difficult user community that had trouble speaking with one voice—empowered 
naysayers and discouraged innovators.  In addition, failure by the materiel developer 
to effectively utilize a modular open systems approach and over-reliance on LW-
unique hardware and software caused an increase in overall cost and schedule.  
These shortcomings resulted in inflexibility when attempts were made to adapt to 
increasing interoperability requirements dictated by the Army-driven Objective Force 
Concept and in an FCS that was, at the time, little more than “PowerPoint deep.”  
Consequently, because of these missteps and lack of user “buy-in,” Congress chose 
to increase LW RDT&E funding and temper procurement expectations for the near-
term.  This sent a signal that there was still faith in the LW concept, but a hesitancy 
to endorse its completion. 
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By 2003, urgency for acquiring improved dismounted soldier capabilities was 
growing, as the GWOT was underway in Afghanistan.  Dismounted soldiers in the 
mountains were predominantly waging the fight.  It quickly became apparent that 
they had little in the way of command-and-control, situational awareness and battle 
command capabilities when compared to platform-centric forces.  Companies raced 
to the fight to provide COTS handheld situational awareness tools.  Connectivity to 
FBCB2 and BFT remained the challenge.  Furthermore, preparations were being 
made for the invasion of Iraq.  RDT&E efforts focused on maturing technology 
continued under the PM LW and the LW Consortium over the three years since the 
JCF AWE.  Their efforts to improve form, fit and function were driven by program 
management personnel and the TCM Soldier.  While well represented by several 
user representatives, focus on command-and-control, situational awareness and 
communications interoperability remained divided by conflicting views.  These views 
stemmed from an early focus on designing LW to meet leaders’ requirements rather 
than on junior soldier and leader usability.  This focus remained uncorrected—
despite the Army’s experience on the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq, where the 
fight was being prosecuted by companies, platoons and squads.  These issues 
became apparent when, in late 2002 and early 2003, the 82nd Airborne at Aberdeen 
and the Rangers at Hunter Army Airfield conducted functional assessments of the 
LW-IC (Block I) System.  Their rejections of the system, coupled with its less-than-
robust commercial architecture that did not connect to the lower tactical internet, was 
disturbing.  While the assessments gave the PM LW a functional baseline as he 
moved to LW Block II development, they also created concerns and framed 
mindsets that were, in the end, difficult to overcome.  These concerns about the 
program by both the PEO Soldier and the TCM Soldier led to the dissolution of the 
LW Consortium and the end of Block I development.  A shift in focus from LW to the 
DBCS resulted.  This shift in focus created a loss in momentum for the program that 
was not revived for almost two years.  At about the same time, GDC4S was awarded 
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In 2003, the Army’s need for networked dismounted soldier capability did not 
die with LW’s termination.  Instead, the materiel developer and user representative 
were directed to shift focus to the less-expensive, less capable DBCS.  HQDA and 
Congress directed the shift due to unit cost concerns and the urgent need to get 
command-and-control and situational awareness capabilities to the dismounted 
force.  After nearly two years in Iraq and four in Afghanistan, the need for affordable 
dismounted soldier situational awareness, command-and-control and battle 
command capabilities was more than solidified.  It was very apparent that platform-
oriented forces operating in dense, unfamiliar terrain needed a tool once they got out 
of their vehicles that provided the same type of capabilities as vehicle-mounted 
enablers (like FBCB2).  While the need was clear and efforts were underway to get a 
good solution, after nearly one and one-half years, the DBCS efforts failed to satisfy 
the warfighter. 
Clearly, a number of efforts were undertaken to close this capability gap; 
despite the DBCS failure, the Army persisted in seeking a solution.  However, during 
this same timeframe, congressional confidence waned.  Consequently, the LW 
Program took a significant budget cut in 2004.  Despite budget cuts and parallel 
efforts, the LW Block II was on contract with GDC4S and prototyped by late 2004.  
By 2005, it was demonstrated during a side-by-side event at Fort Benning, Georgia, 
that shed light on its potential.  Subsequently, LW was revived by the AAE when, in 
FY 2005, he directed a DOTMLPF assessment with a Stryker-equipped unit.  After 
the failure with DBCS, the PM shifted his efforts to back to LW and the AAE-directed 
assessments scheduled for 2006. 
The DOTMLPF assessment started in FY 2006 proved tenuous, but vital to 
the LW effort.  While it was ambitious for the PM LW to plan the assessment and 
follow-on LUT with a newly formed unit preparing for combat, his efforts and those of 
his team paid tremendous dividends to the future of soldier systems.  The perceived 
momentum during the early stages of the experience at Fort Lewis—during the 
equipping and subsequent NET and the decision to synchronize a VIP day with the 
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budget cycle—proved to be hasty.  While the budget had not yet been decided, key 
decision-makers that would influence it in the coming months honed in on the 
premature negative unit feedback and made their decision to terminate the program 
for good.  This event lost precious momentum with unit acceptance, and during the 
process, their confidence spiraled downward.   
The 4-9 Infantry had its share of difficulties, as well.  Its leaders were 
preparing their newly formed battalion for deployment and combat, and the LW 
System was not their first priority.  Lack of confidence and conflicting priorities paired 
with lack of incorporation and poor integration proved to be a recipe for disaster.  
Over a decade of work was seemingly for naught until the PM LW, LTC Cummings, 
devised and implemented the USI concept.  This concept was just in time, as the 
ATEC-run LUT began.  The PM LW made another bold decision during this 
timeframe.  He provided the unit with the capability to influence LW System design.  
The 4-9 Infantry embraced this opportunity through a series of soldier-identified, 
ergonomic and technological improvements.  It tailored the system to meet its 
needs; subsequently, its members’ sense of ownership increased.  The PM did not 
stop there.  Despite the first VIP day’s perceived failure, he directed another VIP day 
that was set-up by the TCM Soldier, GDC4S and his program management office, 
but was run by the unit and its leadership.  LTC (P) W.W. Prior and his Manchus 
gave the system their vote of confidence and asked to take LW to combat with them 
in late September.  In hindsight, this proved to be a little late considering the 
program’s subsequent termination in November 2006. 
Once the Manchus embraced the LW System and incorporated it into training 
events that exercised its capabilities, they grew dependent upon it.  The ATEC’s 
LUT results showed an increase in capability, and the LW DOTMLPF initial results 
were promising.  However, the Army’s decision to terminate the program did not 
reflect this enthusiasm.  Rather, it reflected the prematurity of the first VIP day.  
Regardless, the PM LW, GDC4S and TCM Soldier persisted.  They worked together 
with what money they had left and did their best to support the Manchus during their 
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deployment to OIF.  Once deployed, the Manchus found utility in the LW System that 
even the staunchest of its advocates never perceived.  Their incorporation of the 
system’s capabilities into their combat operations provided much more than proof of 
principle.  Their acceptance proliferated throughout the Stryker community and 
caught the attention of Army leadership and policy-makers.  Consequently, faith in 
the soldier system concept was restored, and the chasm was crossed from early 
adaptors to the early majority. 
The future of soldier systems seems to be solidified.  Despite two 
terminations of the LW Program, its resulting innovations and capabilities have 
survived.  At the time of this report, the 5-2 SBCT is being equipped with new and 
improved LW Systems—LW NextGen, which incorporates many of the 
improvements recommended by 4-9 Infantry soldiers.  Furthermore, the GSE 
Program is beginning (launched by a program new-start), and the budget reflects 
Army and congressional faith in its future.  Clearly, these newfound successes have 
not come without difficulties.  Many more obstacles will surely be encountered as the 
GSE is incorporated into the controversial and technology-challenged FCS Program.  
The FCS chasm has yet to be crossed, and while this introduces some risk to future 
soldier systems, persistence and proven soldier-driven design should pave the way 
for warfighter acceptance.  In addition, technology is maturing at a tremendous rate.  
Size, weight and power issues will continue to be addressed, leveraging the hard, 
expensive lessons that the LW Program has learned.  For the acquisition 
community, the end-state remains paramount.  That is: provide the warfighter with 
the best capabilities that technology and affordability allow so that overmatch is 
achieved, and our enemies are decisively defeated.  In the words of LTC(P) Prior, 
“our national priorities should demand no less, and our national treasure—our 
Soldiers—deserve no less” (Prior, 2008, p. 14). 
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B. Conclusions 
Based on our research, we offer several conclusions.  The LW was 
unsuccessful initially due to the misalignment of three interrelated and supporting 
components: 1) technical immaturity, 2) poor user acceptance, and 3) lack of senior 
leadership support. Successes that are more recent can be attributed to: 1) soldier-
driven design, 2) improved technical maturity, and 3) proven employment of the 
system in combat with warfighters. 
First, the perceived success of the LW v0.6 System during the JCF AWE 
caused its advocates to attempt to move from RDT&E to a procurement strategy too 
quickly.  LW-unique systems and subsystems had technology issues that had not 
matured, and issues with size, weight and power that had been inadequately 
addressed in user requirements documents.  The attempt to move to procurement 
was stymied by a deliberate budget decision by Congress that reflected its 
reluctance to expeditiously procure dismounted soldier capabilities.  We attribute this 
decision to the pre-GWOT historical context and lack of a unified user community 
that did not speak with one voice.   
Second, the LW Program did not set the proper conditions during 
preparations for the early functional assessments with the 82nd Airborne and the 
Rangers in late 2002/early 2003.  A lack of unified focus on the required capabilities 
that the system must provide and at what level of command and control the system 
would be employed set the stage for rejection.  Compounding these issues was a 
commercial-based architecture that was not robust enough for the soldier’s 
environment and that could not provide connectivity to the LTI.  Additionally, some 
have the opinion that the PM and TCM Soldier did not properly prepare the Rangers 
by training them and integrating the LW into their operations prior to their 
assessment of the system.  In the opinions of the PM and TCM Soldier, the poor 
design, coupled with the lack of integration, resulted in a loss in user acceptance 
and a loss of support by senior leadership.  Regardless of conflicting viewpoints and 
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the LW’s problems at the time, there was still an urgent need to get enhanced battle 
command and soldier situational awareness capabilities to the Army’s operational 
units engaged in combat.  This rush to field capabilities in an affordable form factor 
with a reduced BOI pushed the DBCS to the forefront and caused decision-makers 
to return LW to the tech base to be further matured. 
After DBCS failed its early OT with the 10th Mountain Division in 2004, the LW 
was back to the forefront, and the program took a new direction.  While early efforts 
with 4-9 Infantry empowered naysayers and highlighted continued technical issues 
and lack of user acceptance, the introduction of soldier-driven design and unit-
system integration reinvigorated the program.  Soldier-driven design and innovative 
system integration techniques also spurred technical maturity.  While not without 
risk, the flexibility to tailor the LW to warfighters’ needs and the PM’s responsiveness 
to their inputs empowered the 4-9 Infantry and ultimately led to its soldiers’ 
becoming advocates of LW.  Their advocacy and willingness to incorporate LW into 
their operations in combat pushed the technology to new heights and solidified the 
soldier system concept.  This has established a beachhead from which soldier 
system incorporation into the future force can flourish. 
C. Recommendations 
Follow-on soldier system programs should utilize an integrated modular open 
systems approach (MOSA) that will encourage the use of COTS and GOTS 
components from the outset.  Future systems must have a reliable architecture that 
is robust enough to survive the combat environment.  This approach allows for risk 
reduction as technology matures and upgrades are required; it also reduces overall 
lifecycle costs.  Included in this recommendation is the premise that the warfighter 
community is involved in the form, fit and function design of any system.  Integration 
of the user community early in the program’s life enhances the PM’s ability to gain 
acceptance of the system and its potential capabilities.  This also ensures that 
improvements are made that are focused at the right level and on the right needs.  
 =
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 144 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Attention to affordability and BOI should be at the forefront of program management 
and user representative efforts, as well.  If not, cost per unit “sticker shock” will 
surely inhibit acceptance of materiel solutions—no matter how effective they are.  
The combination of these approaches should create essential senior leader buy-in—
a necessity for any expensive acquisition program. 
After initial testing, the PM, in coordination with the warfighters, should 
continue to refine requirements.  Based upon continuously refined requirements, he 
should make every effort to improve the system in a responsive manner.  Likewise, 
PMs should be careful about appearing overly ambitious when planning to move 
from SDD to a procurement decision.  A thorough analysis of technical maturity, user 
acceptance and senior leader buy-in should be conducted prior to attempting a 
Milestone C production decision.  At the same time, these efforts must not lag.  
Follow-on efforts must capitalize on LW’s momentum.  If follow-on programs drag 
out for more than a decade (as has LW), they will surely lose steam.  Two to three 
years is about the most time that follow-on efforts have to get an increment of 
improved military capability out to the force that is affordable and reliable. 
When introducing a new system or innovation, it is important for a PM to 
cross the chasm between the early adapters and the early majority in any 
marketplace as soon as possible.  Bridging this chasm early in the acceptance 
process will allow for greater potential for early buy-in—thus fostering stronger 
overall confidence in the product.  As mentioned, soldier systems have probably 
crossed the chasm, but their interoperability with other programs that may not be 
accepted introduces some risk.  Successful managers must also pay attention to the 
concept of product advocacy.  With this in mind, a “points of light” system 
established early and then carefully leveraged will influence a greater population.   
Prior to the introduction of any new capability, proper integration with users 
should be program management’s priority.  Proper integration enables users to 
become comfortable with new technologies and allows them to integrate the new 
 =
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 145 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
capability into their standard operations.  Given that, users should not get new 
capabilities without some ideas of how that new capability will change operations.  A 
mechanism should be in place to ease this transition and build unit confidence early 
in the NET process.  If done properly, this transition will also provide the opportunity 
for the unit to make informed judgments on the value of the capabilities and 
knowledgeable recommendations for their application, as well as on improvements. 
If a PM has the opportunity and resources to provide flexibility for soldier-
driven design, then he should make every effort to do it.  To be effective, a PM 
should establish clear lines of communication with the warfighter.  This will allow a 
managed approach to gathering feedback so that educated, informed decisions 
about changes are made responsively to soldier needs.  Furthermore, to do this, a 
PM must evaluate the amount of top cover that he has from his superiors.  This top 
cover is essential when a PM is adapting an acquisition strategy to user-driven 
requirements.  To do this, the PM must have a thorough risk-mitigation plan and a 
firm understanding of the potential implications to his program’s cost, schedule, 
performance and myriad other factors (e.g., training support packages, test and 
evaluation master plan, etc.).  In the end, a PM’s ability to facilitate user-driven 
change breeds a perception of responsiveness that increases end-user satisfaction 
and overall confidence in the acquisition process. 
When challenges in a program occur, a PM should be the optimistic leader 
that remains persistent.  If the warfighter requires a capability, the materiel developer 
has to make every effort within reason to acquire a solution for that need.  PM 
persistence to support the warfighter despite programmatic challenges is essential to 
getting the warfighters what they need.  In the end, the combination of doing the best 
with what is available and top cover should contribute to program success. 
From a strategic perspective, there are several key takeaways to consider: 
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 Assuming commercial-like technologies can be easily adapted to meet 
military requirements, they could lead to program cost and schedule 
increases. 
 Introducing technology demonstrations too early in the program to 
showcase its potential and sell it to the stakeholders (i.e., Congress, 
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), etc.) can backfire if done too 
early.  PMs should be careful to temper their approach at marketing 
their products with respect to the underlying and constant “drum beat” 
of the PPBES process.  There are a few times during the budgeting 
cycle when PMs should pay particular attention.  For example, during 
the Spring timeframe, budgets are being built, during the Summer 
discussed and during the Fall solidified.  If influencing a budget 
decision is desired, a PM should consider the budget process and 
tailor the timing of his marketing plan accordingly.  
 PMs tasked with building systems that interface with soldiers should 
keep in mind that the soldier is the most difficult “system” with which to 
interface.  One size never fits all, and everyone has an opinion as to 
what is best.  What is acceptable to one group of users is not 
acceptable to all, and because no two users think alike, they cannot 
normally agree to what is good enough. 
 Although TRADOC is the requirements generator for the Army, it may 
or may not be able to accurately reflect the needs of the Army.  Up-
front warfighter involvement is necessary if a PM is to get Army 
requirements right. 
D. Path Forward 
The value of LW capabilities to the Army has been proven by 4-9 Infantry.  
Consequently, soldier systems have crossed the chasm from early adapters of a 
disruptive technology to the early majority.  Soldier systems are on a crucial path; 
they are soon to be continuous innovations or “accepted” products that do not 
require behavioral change and only require normal upgrades.  In fact, many other 
countries have developed soldier systems similar in capability to LW.41  NATO 
                                            
41 For a detailed description of international soldier system efforts, see Appendix R. 
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partners and others have their own variants, and it will not be long before they begin 
employing them to close their dismounted soldier capability gaps. 
For the US, the long-term vision for the GSE Program calls for integration into 
the FCS Program.  This presents some opportunities for both programs, but also 
introduces risk.  One of the significant opportunities involves providing a great 
number of networked, soldier capabilities to the FCS-equipped force.  The synergy 
that will surely result from putting an entire system-of-systems together that includes 
both soldiers and platforms will be something with which to contend.  The risk is that 
the FCS Program has yet to cross the chasm.  Fortunately, by adding this proven 
soldier system capability, the bridge across the chasm has started with a strong 
foundation. 
In order to maintain momentum, there are some key considerations as the 
transition to the GSE Program takes place sometime in FY 2009.  This is not an all-
inclusive list; rather, it is one that everyone should consider.  In line with our 
recommendations above, aforementioned supported research and our studies at the 
Naval Postgraduate School, considerations include: 
Near-term 
 Continue quality support to 5-2 SBCT LW NextGen fielding. 
 Focus on incremental improvements to the current functional baseline 
(LW-SI) using lessons learned. 
 Field what is technologically ready now, and integrate other follow-on 
efforts (when they are ready) later. 
 Make system improvements by soldier-driven, human-centered design, 
and focus on getting the dismounted soldier into the FCS network.  
Work with the FCS team and warfighters at the Army Evaluation Task 
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 Consider improvements in reliability and robustness with focused 
improvements in size, weight, power and cost.  GSE must be an 
affordable system at a cost of $10,000 or less per system and with a 
BOI that is at the leader level. 
 Synchronize program efforts with IBCT modernization.  IBCTs are the 
least capable force and lack a robust communications structure. 
 Introduce competition early in the GSE Program to get innovative 
solutions and drive down costs. 
 Build training packages that are affordable and effective.  A train-the-
trainer approach will breed self-sufficiency. 
 Apply risk management continuously throughout all phases of the 
program. 
 Consider a Performance-based Logistics approach to provide 
overarching logistical support with cost savings. 
 Develop and vigorously execute a comprehensive Information 
Operations plan. 
E. Recommendations for Further Research 
As this is the first case study on the LW System, numerous questions remain 
unanswered and provide a point of departure for recommended further research and 
study. 
First, and relatively time sensitive, is an in-depth analysis of the challenges 
associated with providing dismounted, networked soldier system capability to the 
Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT).  This will most likely prove to be one of the 
biggest hurdles for future soldier systems, as the IBCT lacks a robust 
communications backbone and platforms from which to host network enablers.  This 
will be timely in that the IBCT is currently the least capable of all Army formations, 
yet it is at the tip of the spear in the mountains of Afghanistan and elsewhere. 
Second, due to the Army’s current posture in the GWOT, the DoD acquisition 
community has found itself in a unique situation.  Not only has rapid fielding become 
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almost second nature, but support to forward-deployed forces has become a 
requirement for most PEOs.  An in-depth analysis that explores the acquisition 
community’s support to forward-deployed units would be beneficial to PMs that find 
themselves in a situation similar to the one described in this study.  Rather than 
having to create a support package from scratch, react to emerging requirements 
and employ creative techniques, PMs with access to research in this area could 
utilize a compilation of lessons learned and recommendations to consider. 
Last, the notion of leveraging soldier-driven, human-centered design was 
detailed in this case study.  Recently, the Army created an evaluation unit, the 5th 
Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, Army Evaluation Task Force (AETF) at 
Fort Bliss, Texas, for this very purpose.  It would be beneficial to the Army to study 
its methods, successes and challenges as it provides support to TRADOC and the 
FCS Program.  This work could inform the DoD acquisition community with respect 
to risk-reduction, human-centered design and TTP development.  Lessons learned 
and recommendations could prove vital to decision-makers as they face increasing 
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Appendix A. The Soldier as a System Initiative  
“If we are really good, and we are, the soldier of 2025 will be as 
effective as the tank of 1995” (Carey, 1999). 
Just as Desert Storm ended, the 1991 Army Science Board Summer Study 
identified a need for the Army to manage the Soldier-as-a-System (SaaS).  Shortly 
thereafter, the SIPE ATD verified this need.  In 1993, following the SIPE ATD, the 
Land Warrior program was formed. It focused on providing a soldier-system 
approach to infantry-based forces.   Its mission needs were approved by the 
Department of the Army on 8 September 1993 and identified needed improvements 
for individual dismounted soldiers in the capability categories of: command-and-
control, lethality, survivability, mobility, and sustainment (US Information Center, 
2001).  The follow-on March 1997 Land Warrior Early Operational Experiment 
Report confirmed the fact that a systems approach to soldier requirements would 
provide greater payoffs in lethality, survivability, mobility and situational awareness—
for both the individual and the unit (Jones, 2006).  Developmental efforts continued 
through the late 1990s, and in 2000, Land Warrior Version 0.6 was successfully 
tested by soldiers at Fort Polk, Louisiana, at the Joint Contingency Forces Advanced 
Warfighting Experiment (JCF AWE).  As further enhancements were made to Land 
Warrior, Army transformation efforts were in full swing.  Platforms were receiving 
significant attention; however, soldier modernization efforts were lacking structure.  
At the time, over 300 separate requirements documents were driving the acquisition 
process for Soldier equipment.  In order to get his arms around soldier requirements, 
in July 2003, General Kevin P. Byrnes (the Commanding General of TRADOC) 
directed a series of briefings (Liberstat, 2004).  These briefings resulted in the 
consolidation of soldier requirements into six soldier capability documents (CDDs): 
Core Soldier, Ground Soldier, Air Soldier, Mounted Soldier, Maneuver Support 
Soldier and Maneuver Sustainment Soldier. 
The new SaaS process was a paradigm shift from the old way of developing 
requirements.  The Core Soldier CDD captures the requirements for all soldiers all of 
the time and establishes the foundation for Ground, Air, Mounted, Maneuver Support 
and Maneuver Sustainment soldiers (Liberstat, 2004).  Soldier programs are then 
consolidated and aligned into each of the four CDDs, ensuring soldier requirements 
are aligned and integrated.42  In addition to aligning required capabilities, a 
proponent lead for each requirement is established, and soldier equipment is 
consolidated.  Lastly, cross-walks among the four CDDs reduce duplication of effort 
and identify capability gaps not yet captured (see Figure 18 below).   
                                            
42 Core soldier CDD was consolidated.  It now encompasses both Maneuver support and Maneuver 
sustainment CDD; that is why this number went from six to four. 
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Figure 18. SaaS Requirements Development Strategy and Methodology 
(Copeland, 2006) 
A secondary benefit of the SaaS approach is the consolidation of all soldier 
equipment-funding lines (Liberstat, 2004).  Historically, soldier programs competed 
as much with each other for funding as they did with other weapon systems (2004).  
This resulted in under-funded soldier programs and equipment whose funding 
became an easy target for other weapon systems or programs.  By consolidating 
program management and funding the entire system, much like the Future Combat 
Systems and Stryker programs, the SaaS concept protects soldier programs during 
the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process. 
The SaaS concept will enhance individual soldier’s capabilities to protect and 
defend themselves.  In doing so, the collective efforts of this modernization program 
will provide a more efficient and effective future force. 
The Army’s senior leadership recognizes the soldier is the single most 
important asset in the Army.  It is soldiers, with their intelligence, flexibility, and 
adaptability, who ultimately accomplish the Army’s missions and functions.  The 
soldier must operate both the simple and complex equipment and weapon systems 
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the Army uses.  As Army equipment and weapon systems become even more 
sophisticated and complex, the soldier’s intelligence, training, flexibility, and 
adaptability become increasingly important.  
The intent of the SaaS concept is to provide all individual soldiers with 
superior capabilities to accomplish assigned tasks and conduct missions against any 
opponent, based on a holistic approach to modernization.  This includes a full 
DOTMLPF analyses approach to resolve issues and address soldiers’ needs (see 
Figure 19 below). 
 
Figure 19. SaaS Capability Development Strategy 
(Jones, 2006) 
System Description: In September 2005, the Joint Requirements Oversight 
Council (JROC) validated the SaaS Initial Capabilities Document (ICD).  This ICD 
documents a systematic approach to optimize soldier effectiveness and 
demonstrates the need to adjust soldier DOTMLPF solutions with fully integrated, 
modular capabilities to improve the responsiveness, deployability, agility, versatility, 
lethality, survivability, sustainability, and interoperability of the future force.  The 
intent of the SaaS program is to capture all those items of equipment that the soldier 
wears, carries, or consumes to accomplish any mission from garrison to full-scale 
war.  The SaaS program addresses equipping the soldier as an integrated fighting 
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system, just as any combat vehicle or aircraft.  This provides soldiers with solutions 
that meet their needs within the boundaries and norms of common human 
performance. It also provides a fully integrated system-of-systems approach to 
increase the capabilities of all soldiers to perform individual and collective tasks. 
The program cornerstone is a Soldier Capabilities Framework consisting of 
four Army Requirements Oversight Council (AROC)-validated Capability 
Development Documents (CDDs) (Core, Ground, Air and Mounted) intended to 
capture all Soldier capabilities (see Figure 20 below).  These documents use a 
DOTMLPF capability development assessment of lethality, survivability, mobility, 
sustainability, and battle command and situational awareness in terms of 
performance, power, weight, volume, cost, training, and criticality of need (the 
metrics).  They address the need to improve soldier-machine interface to enhance 
the performance of present and future combat platforms; they also establish 
integrated baseline capabilities from which to derive Soldier modernization efforts.  
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The following four Soldier requirements documents are AROC-validated and 
working through Joint Staffing for JROC approval; estimated completion was 
summer 2006: Capability Development Document for Core Soldier System, AROC 
validated 7 November 2005; Capability Production Document for Air Soldier System, 
AROC validated 15 December 2005; Capability Development Document for Ground 
Soldier System, AROC Validated 24 January 2006 (now in final staffing with JROC);  
Capability Development Document for Mounted Soldier System, AROC validated 8 
March 2006. 
Core Soldier System (CSS): The CSS provides the materiel required by all 
soldiers to execute Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills and to perform basic soldier 
functions.  These items encompass those capabilities necessary for all soldiers to be 
able to shoot, move and communicate.  CSS serves as the basis for the Ground, Air 
and Mounted Systems. 
Ground Soldier System (GSS): GSS integrates multiple soldier systems and 
components and leverages emerging technologies to provide overmatching 
operational capabilities to all ground combatant soldiers, their attachments and small 
units.  These capabilities include increased Battle Command (BC), Situational 
Awareness and Situational Understanding (SA/SU), Embedded Training (ET), 
lethality, mobility, force protection, and sustainability.  The scope is all dismounted 
warfighters in FYs 2010-2020.  The GSS begins with improvements over the LW 
Increment II capabilities and then builds upon the GSS capabilities to meet the 
needs of all Soldiers who conduct close combat on the ground in the Future Force. 
Air Soldier System (Air SS): Air SS is an integrated, modular, mission-
tailorable Aviation Life Support Equipment (ALSE) and protective ensemble for 
aircrew soldiers.  The Air SS is intended for aircrews of select manned aircraft in 
maneuver, maneuver support and maneuver sustainment roles involved in missions 
ranging from Major Combat Operations, Stability Operations, Homeland Security, 
and Strategic Deterrence.  These aircrew soldiers include: pilots, crew chiefs, flight 
engineers, flight medics, door gunners, and flight surgeons.  Air SS provides the 
future requirements for soldiers who will man the FCS BCT aviation elements. 
Mounted Soldier (MSS): MSS consists of lightweight, modular, mission 
tailorable, integrated equipment and Command, Control, Communications and 
Computers (C4) devices, worn, carried, or used by mounted soldiers when 
conducting tactical operations from their assigned platforms/vehicles.  Components 
include: an improved Combat Vehicle Crewmember Helmet (CVCH) with Heads-up 
Display and an Un-tethered Communications System.  Other components include 
the Mounted Soldier’s over-garment, gloves, footwear, and ballistic protection; CB 
protective mask, CB protective over-garment, CB protective gloves and footwear; 
individual equipment-carrying capability, ballistic/laser, sun, wind, and dust eye 
protection, and individual weapon.  The MSS contains the requirements for the FCS 
2-man MGV common crew and other crews. 
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All SaaS documents are cross-walked with the FCS ORD in order to ensure 
that mutually supporting capabilities between the SaaS and FCS capabilities are 
identified and captured.   
In future warfare, more than ever before, technology will increase man-
machine requirements for the soldier.  The individual soldier will remain the Army’s 
center of gravity.  The successful identification and validation of SaaS requirements 
are critical in the establishment of better DOTMLPF that will enable soldiers to do 
their jobs more efficiently and effectively.  This integration concept will enhance 
soldier capabilities and provide for the efficient and effective use of soldier funding in 
support of the Army’s vision of the future force (Castillo, 2008). 
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Appendix B. Land Warrior Description, Mission 
Needs Statement and Evolution 
Provided by Pat Berger, Deputy TCM Soldier 
General Description of Operational Capability. 
1.1  Mission Need.  A need exists to integrate multiple soldier components 
and rapidly leverage emerging technology to enable increased small unit lethality, 
command and control, mobility, survivability, and sustainment.  The evolution of the 
soldier as a system concept originated from the Mission Needs Statement for The 
Enhanced Integrated Soldier System – Dismounted (TEISS-D), approved 8 
September 1993.  The soldier as a system concept that provides an integrated 
system’s approach to increasing soldier and small unit capability is the Land Warrior 
(LW) Program.   
1.2  Overall Mission Area.  The core mission of task organized infantry 
soldiers equipped with the LW System regardless of employment (light force, Interim 
Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), Airborne, etc) is to close with the enemy by means of 
fires and maneuver to destroy or capture him, or repel his assault by fire, close 
combat, and counterattack.  The enhanced capability of the LW System will better 
enable mission performance of the following Army Universal Task List Tactical 
Actions, Missions and Operations.  LW-equipped soldiers will support Army Tactical 
Mission (ATM) 1.0-Conduct Offensive Actions, Army Tactical Mission 2.0-Conduct 
Defensive Missions, Army Tactical Mission 3.0-Conduct Stability Actions, and more 
specifically, Army Tactical Mission 5.0-Conduct Tactical Mission Tasks.  Although no 
requirements are specifically derived from Army Tactical Mission 4.0-Conduct 
Support Operations, the enhanced command and control (C2) capability would 
enable small unit efficiency and local situational awareness.   
1.3  Capstone Requirements Document (CRD).  Not applicable. 
1.4  Proposed System Description.   
        1.4.1  The LW System will be issued for the purpose of enhancing 
Infantry team combat power, rather than only individual Infantryman.  The system 
develops and integrates of an assortment of systems, components and technologies 
into a cohesive and combat effective system.  In the context of overall soldier load 
management, the LW System integrates weapon subsystem components into the 
soldier system, providing visual and acoustic access to computer and sensor 
information, integrating soldier and weapons based night vision capability, providing 
accurate position location, establishing voice and data transmit/receive capability for 
critical information exchange requirements, determining soldier location data for 
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navigation, enhancing individual soldier nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) and 
ballistic protection, and integrating upgraded soldier load carrying equipment.  The 
result of successful development and integration of these capabilities will be small 
units able to better pre-arrange the conditions of the fight prior to contact and strike 
with decisive maneuver once contact is decided upon.  With increased C2 capability 
of LW, small units will be more efficient and better able to apply METT-C to better 
reduce soldier’s load.  LW-equipped soldiers in squads and teams will primarily 
utilize the system design to close with and destroy the enemy, whether fighting 
dismounted enabled by mounted, mounted enabled by dismounted, or dismounted.  
LW equipped leaders will rely more heavily on the command and control capability 
and functions that establish a common operating picture.  As the echelon of leaders 
increases, weapons function reliance will decrease while command and control 
requirements increase.   
        1.4.2  Requirements are blocked into three sections.  Block I 
(“Threshold” system) establishes basic fighting and command and control capability 
for the light infantry company and below.  Block II expands system capability to 
interoperate with the mounted interim force.  Block III (full capability system) 
provides an evolutionary link to the Objective Force Warrior.   
1.5  Supporting Analysis 
1.6  Description of Missions: The LW equipped unit will be employed as part 
of a task organized, combined arms team.  The LW System will provide the means 
to enhance organizational combat power across the spectrum of tactical actions, 
missions, and operations.  Infantry unit design enables the force to achieve 
dominance across the full scale of contingencies from Stability and Support 
Operation (SASO), Small Scale Contingency (SSC) to a Major Theater of War 
(MTW).  Tasks associated with these mission areas require a system that enables 
success in close combat.  Two critical conditions invariably influence success in 
close combat.  The first is the dismounted force’s ability to pre-arrange the 
conditions of the fight to friendly advantage.  The second is the ability to strike the 
enemy with decisive maneuver while limiting the enemy’s ability to effectively 
engage friendly forces. 
 1.6.1  Pre-arranging the Condition of the Fight. 
  1.6.1.1.  Friendly forces must be able to develop the situation out of 
contact prior to making physical or visual contact with the enemy.  To do so, every 
tactical formation down to the individual level must have access to real time 
information on the terrain, obstacle, and the composition and disposition and 
intentions of relevant enemy and friendly units.  The threshold LW system will enable 
squad, platoon and company synergist effect through an enhanced ability to acquire 
and distribute knowledge.  Enemy disposition will be derived via soldier reporting 
and leader synchronization.  LW equipped leaders will be provided the means to 
establish and maintain a common operating picture that will assist in rapid 
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adjustments to the tactical plan, more robust combat power synchronization, and an 
overall higher unit operational tempo. 
  1.6.1.2. While out of contact, LW equipped forces continue to have 
access to timely information.  This is enabled through efficiently receiving and 
disseminating critical information at the appropriate level of command.  LW equipped 
units will maintain freedom of action and rapid tempo by receiving situational 
awareness and displaying this information in such a manner that allows leaders to 
rapidly make adjustments to the maneuver plan.  Sensor equipment (day, thermal 
sights, lasers, etc.) integrated onto the soldier’s primary weapon provide the small 
unit the inherent ability to generate and immediately distribute situational 
understanding information in order to provide the force enhanced situational 
understanding.  A modular soldier load capability, integrated soldier load 
management, and ergonomically correct placement of LW components on the 
soldier’s body combine to reduce fatigue and directly preserve combat power for the 
dismounted close fight.  The threshold system, supported by a LW equipped 
Battalion Staff, more accurately assesses enemy disposition and is better enabled to 
support the commander’s intent in the close fight by maneuvering to a position of 
advantage out of contact.  
  1.6.2.  Strike the Enemy with Decisive Maneuver. 
   1.6.2.1.  The Infantry battalion applies its combat power to 
produce overmatching effects at the decisive time and place to defeat the enemy 
and accomplish its mission.  Subordinate units are employed as the primary 
elements of the battalion’s combat power against specific decisive points, key 
forces, and capabilities within the battalion.  Within the scope of battalion operations, 
companies, platoons, and squads must maximize their ability to choose decisive 
engagement from positions of advantage, employing and synchronizing fire and 
maneuver that culminates in tactical assault to finish the engagement followed by a 
rapid transition to exploitation and pursuit.  LW units will be expected to execute the 
traditional forms of maneuver of penetration, frontal attack, envelopment, turning 
movement, and infiltration.  A LW equipped small unit will be better enabled to rely 
on forms of maneuver requiring greater precision while avoiding engagements such 
as the frontal attack that are characterized by minimal maneuver precision and 
marginal situational understanding of enemy disposition and intent.  
   1.6.2.2. As a component of a higher command achieving 
superior knowledge, the LW unit chooses the time and location of decisive 
engagement.  These attacks are originated by continuing maneuver from 
established positions of advantage.  Once forces are decisively engaged, the 
primary purpose of any infantry based force is to close with and destroy the enemy.  
The threshold system will enable teams and their leaders to leverage information to 
rapidly seize and retain the initiative as a distinguishing characteristic.  Leaders will 
make better decisions more quickly than their enemies.  The intent of Objective 
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Force (block III) equipped soldiers is to maximize the small unit’s ability to see first, 
have far better situational awareness, understand first so that they may act first from 
a position of advantage, and finish decisively as part of combined arms team.  
Exploiting situational understanding, leaders will better synchronize maneuver and 
provide accurate supporting fires.  The LW capability will minimize the difference in 
day and night operational tempo by providing soldier and unit maneuver control 
unprecedented in typical limited visibility tactical assaults.  The LW equipped soldier 
will be more survivable in the close fight through the ability to fire his weapon from a 
reduced exposure position.  The soldier’s sight picture is transmitted to remote 
display, thereby reducing head and shoulder exposure during the direct fire 
engagement.  The LW soldier will also integrate survivability improvements such as 
improved body armor and chemical protective over-garments. 
1.7  Operational and Organizational (O&O) Description.  The LW System will 
enable Infantry small units, under the control of maneuver companies and battalions, 
to dominate conventional and asymmetrical threats, in close combat through 
improved lethality, survivability, mobility, and sustainment.  The LW System will also 
provide small units, individual combatants, and leaders improved tactical (situational) 
awareness, understanding, and command and control.  LW enables small units and 
leaders within digitized or non-digitized forces to conduct distributed operations as 
they close with and destroy enemy forces.  Small units become an integrated system 
of systems (weapons, sensors and communications).  LW equipped units begin an 
evolutionary process that will mature towards full capability equipped small units 
capable of providing sensor to shooter linkages, electronic exchange of terrain data 
(i.e., building diagrams, city maps, key utilities, restricted, compartmented terrain, 
etc.) as well as integration with Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) 
assets.  Units equipped with LW will have the capabilities to share communications 
vertically and horizontally, monitor the movements of small unit combatants, 
accurately control organic and supporting fires, and fight dispersed.  As a result of 
greatly improved tactical awareness, the LW equipped small unit will be able to know 
where each unit/combatant is, and will have greater knowledge of the enemy 
situation.  LW equipped leaders will leverage system capability to enhance troop 
leading procedures, solve tactical dilemmas, and direct effective combat action.  As 
small unit network security issues are resolved, these units and combatants will 
receive information from other sensor subsystems and external sources in support of 
the close fight.  Infantry Airborne, Air Assault, IBCT, Light, Mechanized, and Ranger 
maneuver battalion small units (platoons, squads, and fire teams), and those 
soldiers in direct support of LW equipped units (i.e., Combat Engineers, Forward 
Observers, Fire Support Teams, and Combat Medics) will be equipped with LW.  
The U.S. Marine Corps (USMC), Cavalry Scouts, and Special Operations Forces 
(SOF) may also employ LW.  The LW equipped Infantry force will be employed 
across the full spectrum of military operations.  LW is first and foremost a close 
combat fighting system; it will provide organizational enhancements to all types of 
Infantry units in lethality, survivability, tactical awareness, mobility, sustainability, and 
training.  As the distribution of LW expands into platoon, company, and key battalion 
 =
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 171 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
staff, LW weapons integration is of less importance than the ability to effectively 
command and control subordinate formations.  The threshold system will enable 
leaders to conduct troop leading procedures as well as visualize, describe, and 
direct subordinate elements. Infantry maneuver battalion and company organizations 
perform command and staff functions and are structured in accordance with each 
type of Infantry organization.  Companies are composed of platoons and support 
elements.  Both battalions and companies may be supplemented by attachments or 
task organized into task forces. 
  1.7.1  Force Benefit.  The LW System provides units of action critically 
needed capabilities in legacy and initial/interim forces to accomplish assigned 
combat tasks.  LW, beginning at the small unit level, provides: 
   1.7.1.1 A common operational picture of the close fight; 
enhanced leader control in the close fight between maneuver and support elements, 
and between dismounted and mounted elements; accurate and timely sharing of 
voice, data, and graphical information, and mutual tracking of individual locations, 
enabling tactical understanding at all levels, which in turn, enables full 
synchronization of maneuver and fires, intra-small unit cooperative engagements, 
fire distribution and fire control.  
   1.7.1.2 Increased survivability of units through enhanced 
situational understanding, individual (body armor) and collective force protection 
(unit dispersion in the close fight, protected or reduced fire engagement, individual 
locations and tracking), and reduced incidences of fratricide. 
   1.7.1.3  The ability to generate  and maintain reliable combat 
power through engineering design of a robust electronics system.  System built in 
diagnostics and fault isolation reduces the need to evacuate total systems but 
focuses on fault identification at the small unit level enhanced by rapid reporting of 
repair needs;  providing the means to detect and repair problems at the lowest level, 
increasing the availability to the end-user. 
   1.7.1.4  Increased small unit lethality through controlled, efficient 
maneuver combined with a greater ability to mass combat power (direct and indirect) 
at the proper point and time. 
   1.7.1.5  Increased movement efficiency through accurate 
visualization of the battlespace at all levels, integrated navigation, load reduction, 
and thermal and image intensification sensors, which enables units to move farther, 
faster, and fight longer. 
                         1.7.1.6 Increased leadership and command enhancements at 
the small tactical level, by providing leaders the means to fully understand the 
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  1.7.2 Employment.  The Dismounted soldiers fighting within a task 
organized infantry company will employ the threshold LW System.  Battalion 
command elements and primary staff will employ LW to the extent that these 
soldiers will be dismounted and separated from their main command post or other 
assets that can host and transport other digital command and control capability 
(“light digital tactical operations center (TOC)”).  The threshold capability is targeted 
to provide operational effectiveness improvement to the dismounted squad, platoon, 
and company.  LW equipped Infantry maneuver companies and small units will 
conduct offensive, defensive, and stability and support missions across the full 
spectrum of military operations.  As system capability matures, LW will be employed 
within the interim force.  By providing interoperability with the interim force this 
fielding, enables dismounted enabled by mounted or mounted enabled by 
dismounted. 
   1.7.2.1 Offensive operations seek to seize, retain, and exploit 
the initiative to defeat the enemy decisively.  Battles may be linear or nonlinear and 
conducted in contiguous or noncontiguous areas of operations.  Infantry forces 
(companies, platoons and below) will utilize the LW objective system capability 
within the LW to evolve small unit tactics from deliberate operations designed to find 
the enemy; react to contact and seize objectives to an operational environment of 
developing the situation largely out of contact; maneuver to positions of advantage 
out of contact while retaining freedom of maneuver; and conclude by conducting 
decisive combat at the time and place of friendly force choosing. 
   1.7.2.1.1 LW equipped units are more capable of developing the 
situation out of contact through access to timely information to build situational 
awareness.  A common operational picture provides the information required in a 
tactical unit to ensure soldiers in the force know where they are, know where their 
unit members are, and as information is acquired or disseminated from a higher 
command, where the enemy is located.  The primary requirements that will drive 
enhanced capability are a networked small unit information infrastructure that 
generates and routes critical information to soldiers and leaders combined with a 
near real time visual friendly and enemy common operating picture that provides key 
leaders the means to determine required adjustments to the tactical plan.  LW key 
leaders located at the battalion staff will review and update the enemy common 
operating picture.  LW leaders will also update a friendly common picture scaled to 
their area of operations.  The LW equipped soldier observes his sector and provides 
activity reports.  Subsequent blocks of the LW program evolve system capability 
towards full ABCS interoperability across the IBCT force structure and further set a 
process to evolve toward the Objective Force Warrior.  Some critical characteristics 
of this capability will be automatic blue tracking, dissemination of relevant enemy 
force analysis products in near or real time and reporting, updates from other forces 
and assets within the organization. 
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    1.7.2.1.2 LW equipped forces are better enabled to maneuver to 
positions of advantage out of contact while retaining freedom of maneuver through 
the enhanced capability of soldiers and leaders having near real time access to a 
tailored friendly and enemy common operating picture.  Enemy locations either 
become known prior to contact or once contact is made.  Leaders can choose 
alternative schemes of maneuver that do not rely on significant forces to fix an 
enemy prior to unit movement to destroy the enemy.  Given a broader tactical 
perspective that generates situational understanding, leaders will have the option of 
retaining freedom of maneuver and protecting the force to attack more dangerous 
targets first rather than simply react to contact en-route to an ultimate objective.  
Maneuver units will be able to more effectively identify assailable flanks and 
positions of advantage through knowledge of the enemy’s dispositions and posture.  
Commanders will have greater insight into and control over the most effective time to 
conduct maneuver.  Better knowledge further permits commanders to choose the 
best routes to the objective area with respect to stealth, speed, and momentum.  
Through the confidence built by knowing the locations of friendly force in day or 
night, small unit agility is enhanced.  More complex movements can be 
accomplished to gain positions of advantage with the distinct force protection 
improvement of being able to rapidly synchronize shifts in the maneuver plan with 
adjustments to supporting fires.   
    1.7.2.1.3 Decisive operations are ultimately based on tactical 
success in close combat.  LW-equipped units must be effective in closing with and 
destroying the enemy and seizing and controlling key terrain.  The key aspect of 
close combat tactical actions will be the ability for LW equipped units of action to 
integrate firepower, maneuver, and assault to win the close combat fight wherever 
the enemy is found.  During contact, LW-equipped small units will maneuver to 
positions of advantage, initiate decisive contact at the chosen time and place while 
integrating fire and maneuver.  Through the integrated capability provided to LW 
soldiers in the close fight, small units will be able to employ speed, stealth, and 
deception to avoid detection, protect movement, retain freedom of action, engage 
enemy forces while en route, and build momentum.  The LW-equipped unit adapts 
on the move, adjusting routes and objectives based on changes to the situation, 
fighting the enemy, not the plan.  The LW tactical assault is characterized by highly 
precise and synchronized fire and maneuver.  Support by fire elements have exact 
personnel location and can place effective suppressive fire on distinct locations.  
Indirect fire assets are more precisely synchronized due to a clear visualization of all 
soldiers in the assault and knowledge of the enemy disposition and intent.  The net 
effect is that LW-equipped soldiers firing the most casualty producing weapons 
should use much less ammunition to achieve greater effect.  LW-equipped soldiers 
also have the option to seek greater cover and place effective small arms fire on 
targets through use of an indirect weapons viewing and aiming capability.  The LW-
equipped unit seeks to engage the enemy one time, denying him the opportunity to 
retreat and reconstitute.  This goal requires both close assault and finishing actions 
that continue contact with retreating forces to destroy them in detail. 
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   1.7.2.2 The purpose of defensive operations is to defeat enemy 
attacks with the desired end state to buy time, economize forces, and develop 
conditions favorable for resuming offensive operations.  Defending forces await the 
attackers blow and defeat the attack by successfully deflecting it.  All phases of 
defensive operations are enhanced through tactical awareness, providing a common 
tactical picture throughout the entire defense.  LW enables focusing and 
concentration of fires, fire control and distribution, proper commitment of reserves or 
execution of the counterattack, and execution of alternate and primary battle plans.  
Capability is enhanced in defensive preparation through collaborative planning within 
the unit and coordinated execution of available direct, indirect, and intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance elements enhances small unit lethality within 
depth of the battlespace.  LW capabilities provide a combat multiplier in the conduct 
of a defense, enabling early detection of the enemy force and rapid reporting and 
dissemination of information.  As the threat advances, it is attacked with precision 
from protected positions, through maneuver and indirect fire support, in support of 
the close fight.  The result is the disruption of the attacker’s tempo and 
synchronization with actions designed to prevent them from massing combat power.  
Tactical awareness and understanding, coupled with combat identification 
capabilities, enhances the LW equipped force ability to mass effects of 
overwhelming combat power within a wide variety of battlefield conditions.  A 
characteristic of defensive operations is that commanders accept risk in some areas 
to mass effects elsewhere.  The common operating picture containing both friendly 
and enemy situational awareness capability enables commanders to mitigate risk 
given the ability to better discern enemy disposition and intent.  Ultimately LW 
enables concentration of forces with enhanced C2 for fire control and distribution, 
commitment of reserves, timely occupation of battle positions and counter attacks. 
   1.7.2.3 Stability and Support Operations (SASO).  In 
accordance with U.S. national military strategy and as evidenced by current and 
recent military operations, the Army will continue to be involved in SASO.  Stability 
operations promote and protect U.S. national interests by influencing the threat, 
political, and information dimensions of the operational environment.  Support 
operations are usually non-linear and non-contiguous.  Commanders designate the 
decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations necessary for mission success.  In 
support operations the enemy is often diseased, hungry or the consequences of 
disaster.  Although the LW System was designed primarily as a combat system to 
provide Infantry maneuver battalion, companies, small units, and individual 
combatants an overmatch capability against enemy forces, it also provides flexibility 
for employment across the full spectrum of military operations. 
  1.7.3 Organizational Description.  There are six types of Infantry 
platoon organizations.  Each is organized similarly, but have some differences.  All 
have a platoon headquarters with a platoon leader, platoon sergeant, radiotelephone 
operator (RTO), an attached forward observer and a combat medic.  All have three 
rifle squads, and all have machine gun and/or anti-armor sections separate from the 
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rifle squads and under platoon leader control.  Differences among the platoons 
concern the numbers and locations of machine guns within the platoon, and the fact 
that the airborne and air assault platoons have a platoon level anti-armor section in 
the weapons squad.  The mechanized and IBCT platoon’s three rifle squads are 
transported in their respective vehicle assets and will fight either dismounted or 
remain mounted.  The light infantry organization is also characterized by two critical 
deficiencies; soldier mobility and logistics re-supply.  These will be discussed and 
the LW in paragraphs 1.7.3.3 and 1.7.3.4 below. 
   1.7.3.1 All rifle squads are identical.  All are authorized nine 
individual combatants: a squad leader and two identical fire teams consisting of a 
team leader, an automatic rifleman, a grenadier, and a rifleman.  Squad equipment 
may vary in accordance with the mission and parent organization requirements. 
   1.7.3.2 The fire team is the Infantry’s (and the Army’s) basic 
element of fire and movement, with one fire team providing a base of fire while the 
other team moves to a more advantageous position to accomplish assigned tasks. 
   1.7.3.3 Soldier loads traditionally are in excess of established 
human factors guidelines.  Components of a soldier’s carried load include those 
items needed to sustain the soldier while out of enemy contact (sustainment load) 
and a combat load.  The combat load is comprised on two subordinate loads.  The 
combat load “crosses the line of departure” with the soldier.  When contact in not 
likely, soldiers will march with this load. When contact is expected or planned via 
deliberate action, units will remove items required for immediate sustainment 
(approach march load) and conduct combat operations with items needed for the 
close fight (fighting load).  Without considering soldier basic clothing, helmet and 
other basic survivability items, a platoon’s total ammo and enhanced survivability 
capability generates a platoon weight of approximately 2,578 pounds (39 soldiers).  
This segment of weight alone can equal 66 pounds per soldier.  Personal gear (such 
as pack, clothing, helmet, load carrying equipment, mission specific equipment) will 
continue to exacerbate the problem.  The LW program design requirement begins to 
address this issue by establishing requirements control for the soldiers combat load.  
Addressed later in this document, the soldier’s combat load is based on human 
factors designs and is critical to preserving soldier combat power.  Addressing the 
other aspects of the platoon load required to conduct effective missions entails long 
term requirements design and a comprehensive review / modification of light force 
O&O’s. 
   1.7.3.4  Light force sustainment is also a significant challenge to 
generating and sustaining combat power.  Light forces have no vehicles at the 
company and below although the battalion support unit provides typically one cargo 
vehicle.  A typical light force re-supply event occurs with two logistics packages; 
once in the morning and once in the evening.  This process keeps units supported 
with basic classes of supply under normal operations with the exception of barrier 
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materials.  While the LW system is expected to eliminate the need for certain battery 
types, the LW power source is expected to increase unit logistics throughput 
requirements.  To better accommodate unit limitations in re-supply continued 
analysis based on actual developmental and operational tests is required.  Unit 
logistical impact assessment will potentially generate force structure changes to 
support the dismounted infantry force more effectively. 
  1.7.4 Other Systems to Interact with.  The threshold LW equipped 
soldier will initially interact within special operations and conventional forces of the 
combined arms team but will only share digital information with other similarly 
equipped soldiers.  As network security issues are resolved, future blocks of the LW 
Program will provide extensive interoperability to include sharing information with the 
Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) system and other ABCS 
devices as required.  Interoperability with current and future live, constructive and 
virtual simulations and simulators is to be defined and implemented at appropriate 
program phases, and documented in the program Simulation Support Plan (SSP).  
The LW equipped soldier, when a component of legacy or interim forces, will utilize 
the carrier vehicle for power sustainment and situational awareness linkages.  LW 
communications (i.e., Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN)) and advanced combat 
net radios (CNR) work in conjunction with legacy communications (e.g., Single 
Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS)) at the battalion and 
below level.  As security issues on mixed networks are resolved, interoperability 
requirements will be implemented and blocked to enable interface with existing and 
proposed command, control, computers, communications, intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems in primarily Army, joint and multinational 
activities (e.g., “FBCB2 like,” Tactical Internet, Army Battle Command Systems 
(ABCS), etc).  Interfaces will be echelon and situation dependent.  Tactical 
information to include intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities 
enable decentralized execution of operations, collaborative planning, 
synchronization, force protection, current mission execution, continued situation 
development, and mission planning for subsequent combat tasks among 
subordinate units and systems, peers, combat support, combat service support, and 
higher units. 
  1.7.5 Support Needed. 
   1.7.5.1 LW units will be supported logistically by both military 
and contract personnel using the most cost and operationally effective means 
available during peacetime with acceptable risk when in transition to wartime.  
   1.7.5.2 The LW System will be fielded to units and maintained 
under a field and sustainment support structure.  Field level maintenance—includes 
tasks such as preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS) by the operator 
in accordance with appropriate –10 series technical manuals, the conduct of built-in-
test (BIT) checks, fault identification and the replacement of inoperative components 
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and designated line replaceable units (LRUs).  LW equipped units must have limited 
stocks of operational spares.  Component repair will be performed by a sustainment 
maintenance activity.  Sustainment maintenance activities will repair and return LRU 
and subassembly repairable unit/shop replaceable unit (SRU) components back to 
the supply system. 
  1.7.6.  Command, Control, Communications, Computers, 
Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Intelligence (C4ISR).  The situational awareness 
and communications systems of the LW System/equipped unit must be capable of 
interfacing with existing and proposed C4ISR systems in primarily Army, joint and 
multinational activities (e.g., “FBCB2-like,” Tactical Internet, ABCS, etc).  As security 
issues with mixed networks are resolved, LW equipped Infantry maneuver battalions 
will have the ability to network (send and receive information, obtain information from 
databases) and interact with, and among, subordinate units and systems, peers, 
combat support, combat service support, and higher units.  Specific interfaces will be 
echelon and situation dependent.  The ability to network and collaboratively 
generate combat power creates an operational structure that is redundant and 
allows the combat battalion to maintain momentum of operations even if connectivity 
is temporarily lost during contact.   
  1.7.7 Inter-Service or Allied Cooperation.  The Infantry Center and the 
Project Manager – Soldier Systems are aware of, and are monitoring, the 
development of “LW-like” capabilities of other services, allies, and nations.  The 
potential exists for sharing, leveraging, or interfacing with these programs to support 
LW Program goals.  The U.S. Army Special Operations Command's SOF Personal 
Equipment Advanced Requirements (SPEAR) program is an effort to rapidly field 
successive lightweight and advanced SOF unique components of clothing and 
individual equipment while integrating them into a tailorable system.  The USMC is 
conducting a series of experiments to identify potential Marine Corps requirements 
that could be met by the LW Program.  The USMC is preparing a capstone 
requirements document for an integrated Infantry combat system, which will lay the 
framework for a formal leveraging of efforts between the U.S. Army and the USMC 
for the modernization of the infantryman.  Interoperability with NATO allies is 
desired.  There are a number of allied and other countries that are exploring an 
integrated soldier system.  Their efforts generally fall into two categories: 1) fielding 
a system that integrates everything worn, carried, or consumed for individual use on 
the battlefield; and 2) adaptation of current technology for military uses.   
  1.8 Time-phased Requirements in Support of Evolutionary Acquisition.  
LW requirements definition will implement evolutionary acquisition to first field a core 
capability with an open structure that provides for future increments in capability 
upgrades.  Land Warrior is dependent on communications, position location devices, 
sensors, range finding and direction determining capabilities and interface with 
organic weapons at the Infantry platoon and company level.  The first LW 
requirements definition is designed to build and field the minimum acceptable 
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system necessary to satisfy initial warfighting needs based on threat and mission 
requirements.  Subsequent blocks upgrade previous versions as well as introduce 
new capability oriented again on threat, mission requirements and unit type.  The 
LW requirements structure is specified in three blocks that conform to the Army 
Transformation plan.   
   1.8.1 Block I requirements are the minimum essential capabilities 
needed to prosecute the close fight and are primarily focused for light and special 
purpose units.  These requirements will enable the Land Warrior equipped unit to 
enter contact at a time and place of choosing, continue to overwhelm the enemy with 
fire and maneuver, and finish the enemy with tactical assault.  Key to these 
capabilities are the ability to provide LW leaders and units changes in orders 
(Fragmentary Orders), standard map products, essential graphics for the fight, 
friendly and enemy target locations, exchange of spot and situation reports,  position 
and orientation as well as the capability to engage the enemy at maximum effective 
range of the small arms direct fire weapon system.  Achieving this block depends 
upon the team radio communication as well as a longer range capability for leaders, 
position location devices, network management, approved data structures, laser 
range finder, heading reference capability, and proper interface with organic small 
arms weapons in the Infantry platoon and company.   
  1.8.2 Block II requirements are the minimum essential needed to 
provide capabilities to enable the Land Warrior soldier to execute the dismounted 
fight as a member of the Interim Force Vehicle enabled by platform capabilities.  
These requirements will enable Land Warrior equipped soldiers while moving 
mounted to effectively gain situational awareness while moving mounted from 
Brigade organic assets and give key leaders the ability to effectively communicate 
and update the tactical plan.  Furthermore these capabilities will permit combat 
operations either mounted enabled by dismounted, dismounted enabled by mounted 
or dismounted.  By utilizing the vehicle system as well as materiel decreases in 
soldier load, soldiers will achieve faster march rates and reduce energy expenditure.  
Improved power sources, combined with the ability to recharge from the Interim 
Force Vehicle will help reduce the soldier load, decrease the logistics footprint by not 
requiring as many batteries for re-supply, and reduced unit operations and support 
costs.  Achieving this block depends upon ABCS interoperability, reduced soldier 
load, and a recharging capability for the interim force vehicle with a Land Warrior 
interface. 
  1.8.3 The requirements in Block III will evolve into the Objective Force 
Warrior (OFW) that is the desired full capability system.  The Block III requirements 
will be defined after the Analysis of Alternatives and initial testing of the Block I 
system; the RFP for and LTI has recently been released.  The Objective Force O&O 
Concept and Operational Architecture will also contribute to the development of the 
Block III requirements.  Specific Block III requirements are premature but will be 
provided in accordance with TRADOC requirements development timelines.   
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Ultimately, Block III must provide the small units of combat soldiers to operate as a 
fully integrated team, and as part of a larger team whether fighting mounted enabled 
by dismounted, dismounted enable by mounted, or dismounted (Berger, 2008, 15 
July).  
Land Warrior Mission Needs Statement 
Mission Need Statement Summary   
As identified in the Mission Need Statement approved by the Department of 
the Army on 8 Sep 93, improvement is needed in the five specific capability 
categories of lethality, command and control, mobility, survivability, and sustainment.  
The soldier has a requirement to see better in order to locate and kill the enemy 
under all visibility conditions, increasing his lethality.  The C3I enhancements must 
allow the soldier to: send and receive secure voice communications; create, send, 
receive, and store information; display and transmit still frame video and thermal 
visual images, to include digital maps and graphics; and transmit and receive 
position location information and calls for fire.  The system must facilitate far target 
location, target hand-off and fire distribution.  Improvements in lethality, C3I, mobility 
and sustainment will implicitly enhance soldier survivability.  Land Warrior should 
provide the maximum protection that technology can afford (within the defined 
soldier load limits) from small arms direct fire, directed energy weapons, effects of 
nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC), and fragments resulting from indirect fire.  It 
must be compatible with mobility requirements for all types of dismounted soldiers.  
Vision enhancements are required which will substantially increase the soldiers 
mobility capability and target acquisition during adverse environmental conditions 
such as darkness, rain, fog, snow or intended/unintended battlefield smoke. 
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¾ Or Dismounted 
LW / DBCS Maximizes The Elements Of Combat Power
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Appendix C. Net-centric Warfare 
The Network-centric Warfare Strategy 
As the world enters a new millennium, our military simultaneously 
enters a new era in warfare—an era in which warfare is affected by a 
changing strategic environment and rapid technological change.  The 
United States and our multinational partners are experiencing a 
transition from the Industrial Age to the Information Age.  
Simultaneously, we are fully engaged in a global war on terrorism set 
in a new period of globalization.  These changes, as well as 
experiences gained during recent and ongoing military operations, 
have resulted in the current drive to transform the force with network-
centric warfare (NCW) as the centerpiece of this effort. (Cebrowski, 
2005, p. 3) 
Formally conceived in the mid-1990s, and proven during the Global War on 
Terror, NCW has served as a guiding principle for the development of soldier 
systems like Land Warrior.  LW has evolved to complement and enable NCW at the 
small-combat-unit, tactical and operational levels of war.  In hindsight, its beginnings 
were laced with forward-thinking, strategic goals that have become reality.  As the 
DoD moves towards increased reliance on network-centric operations, it is important 
for us to consider the long journey that was made to equip the first unit of infantry 
soldiers with these capabilities.  Perhaps through reflection, decision-makers can 
avoid the lengthy, bumpy road that LW and similar soldier systems have traveled. 
NCW is an emerging theory of war and constitutes the military’s response to 
the Information Age.  NCW broadly describes the combination of strategies, tactics, 
techniques, procedures, and organizations that a fully or even a partially networked 
force can employ to create a decisive warfighting advantage (Cebrowski, 2005).  
NCW is an information superiority-enabled concept of operations that describes the 
way US forces organize and fight in the Information Age (2005).  NCW generates 
increased combat power by networking sensors, decision-makers and shooters to 
achieve shared situational awareness, increased command-and-control, high 
operations tempo, greater networked lethality, increased survivability and a degree 
of self-synchronization (Cebrowski, 2003).  NCW translates information superiority 
into combat power by effectively linking friendly forces within the battlespace, 
providing improved shared awareness of the situation, and enabling more rapid, 
effective decision-making.  NCW has had a profound impact on the planning and 
conduct of war by allowing US forces to get inside an adversary’s decision cycle—
changing the rules of warfare and dictating the pace of military operations (2003).  
NCW provides an edge at all three levels of military operations—strategic, 
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operational and tactical.  At the strategic level, NCW selects a competitive space 
and determines the scope, pace and intensity of the competition.  At the operational 
level, it determines the key competitive attributes and applies and masters them.  At 
the tactical level, its synergistic effects are executed within the battlespace.  One of 
the first descriptions of NCW was published in a 1998 US Naval Institute 
Proceedings Article.  The authors compared the transformational impact of the levee 
en masse during the Napoleonic period with the potential impacts of NCW. 
NCW and all of its associated revolutions in military affairs grow out of and 
draw their power from the fundamental changes in American society.  These 
changes have been dominated by the co-evolution of economics, information 
technology, and business processes and organizations, and they are linked by three 
themes:  
 The shift in focus from the platform to the network; 
 The shift from viewing actors as independent to viewing them as part of 
a continuously adapting ecosystem; and 
 The importance of making strategic choices to adapt or even survive in 
such changing ecosystems (Cebrowski, 2005, p. 5). 
Cebrowski explains that these ideas have not just changed the nature of 
American business today—they have changed and will continue to change the way 
military operations are conducted (2005). 
Force transformation is frequently emphasized by national leadership as the 
heart of the US defense strategy, and NCW has a central role in it.  Transformation 
supports the four major defense policy goals: assuring allies and friends; dissuading 
future military competition; deterring threats and coercion against US interests; and, 
if deterrence fails, decisively defeating any adversary (Cebrowski, 2005).  Overall, 
the DoD’s transformation addresses three major areas: how we do business within 
the DoD, how we work with our interagency and multinational partners, and how we 
fight (2005).  NCW is transforming how we fight and, thus, remains at the very center 
of force transformation.  Force transformation includes new technologies, but also 
depends on the development of new operational concepts, organizational structures 
and relationships (2005).  The ongoing shift from platform-centric to network-centric 
thinking and NCW is vital to force transformation and to the conduct of joint warfare 
in the Information age. 
It is important to describe NCW with respect to force transformation, as Land 
Warrior and other soldier systems are designed to harness its tenets and principles 
in an effort to maintain a competitive advantage over potential adversaries—now 
and in the future.  Land Warrior resides within the four basic tenets of NCW and 
enables its governing principles.   
Forces that are networked outfight forces that are not, everything else being 
equal.  Evidence of the power of NCW, collected from a wide range of US military 
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activities (combat operations, training events, exercises, demonstrations) 
strengthens the four NCW tenets: 
 A robustly networked force improves information sharing. 
 Information sharing enhances the quality of information and shared     
situational awareness. 
 Shared situational awareness enables collaboration and self-
synchronization, and enhances sustainability and speed of command. 
 These, in turn, dramatically increase mission effectiveness. 
While it is not suggested that the governing principles for a network-centric 
force have supplanted or are going to replace the time-tested principles of war—
mass, objective, offensive, security, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, 
surprise, simplicity—they provide added direction for the execution of military 
operations in the Information Age. 
 Fight first for information superiority 
 Access to information: shared awareness 
 Speed of command and decision-making 
 Self-synchronization 
 Dispersed forces: non-contiguous operations 
 De-massification 
 Deep sensor reach 
 Alter initial conditions at higher rates of change 
 Compressed operations and levels of war (Cebrowski, 2003, p. 8). 
The source of the NCW warfighting advantage is the improved capabilities 
that networked forces experience over those that are not.  Capabilities such as 
sharing, accessing and exchanging information improve operations in the 
information domain and provide warfighters with a significant advantage over forces 
that are not networked or are less networked.  The implementation of NCW is 
providing an advantage for US forces (2003).  Digitization and networking can be 
combined and employed to develop a common operational picture that reduces the 
ambiguity and confusion of combat to clearly identify the positions of friendly forces 
and the known positions of the enemy (2003).  This common operational picture has 
proven to increase the warfighters’ awareness and their understanding of tactical 
and operational situations.  The ability to develop a higher level of situational 
awareness in less time than an adversary, combined with an ability to act on it, is a 
source of significant warfighting advantage for the ground combat soldier (2003).  
The Director, Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense, states: 
In the conduct of information age warfare by networked forces, the 
relative information advantage of U.S. forces, as compared to our 
opponents, will be key to deterring threats and coercion against U.S. 
interests, or if deterrence fails, to decisively defeating the enemy. 
(Cebrowski, 2003, p. 4) 
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Appendix D. The Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System (JCIDS) 
The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), normally 
a methodical and sequential process, provides the framework under which all joint, 
top-driven acquisition programs are structured. 
JCIDS is the most current procedure used by the DoD to meet warfighter 
needs and forms the foundation for future defense acquisition programs.  The JCIDS 
process replaced the Requirements Generation System (RGS).  The JCIDS process 
streamlined the acquisition process and deleted numerous redundancies in a 
Service-specific, “stove-piped” process.  The intent of JCIDS is to provide a guide for 
requirements generation and identification of needs that are joint in nature.  The 
process is highly dependent on warfighter feedback during the early stages of 
development of a program.  The JCIDS is a fail-safe method of ensuring that 
warfighters’ needs and concerns are being addressed (Jones & McCaffery, 2008). 
Three key processes within the DoD must work hand-in-hand to ensure that 
warfighters’ needs are met.  As illustrated in Figure 25 below, they are the 
requirements process (JCIDS), the acquisition process, and the Planning, 
Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process.  To provide systems that 
meet the required capabilities, these three processes must be synchronized to 
support decision-making (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006).   Considering 
the long-term nature of budgeting within the federal government, the PPBE process 
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Figure 27. Major Decision Support Systems 
(Nowalski, 2007) 
The JCIDS process was developed not only to identify joint warfighting 
requirements, but also to prioritize them.  While the central objective of JCIDS is to 
attend to the shortfalls of joint operations as defined by combatant commanders, the 
primary objective is to ensure that warfighters receive what is needed to accomplish 
the mission.  The decision authority for the capabilities requirements is the Joint 
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), which reviews, validates, and makes 
recommendations on acquisition programs based on their categories and key 
performance parameters.  The JROC prioritizes acquisition programs and validates 
capabilities as well as performance criteria for these programs (CJCS, 2006). 
The first step in initiating the JCIDS process is to conduct a capabilities-based 
assessment (CBA) that identifies the capabilities required, performance criteria, and 
shortfalls of existing systems to meet those requirements.  This process results in a 
Joint Capabilities Document (JCD) or Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) that 
validates the need to address a capability gap and verifies that affordable and 
technically feasible solutions exist to address those requirements.  Following 
validation, the JCD or ICD becomes the basis for further analysis by the assigned 
action service or agency.  This analysis results in a capability development 
document (CDD) that identifies the best technical approach.  CDD approval by the 
JROC validates the key performance parameters of the selected approach, 
assesses the risk with respect to cost, schedule, and technology maturity, and 
assesses the affordability of the system based on available resources.  JROC 
approval of the CDD is one of the key factors involved in the decision to initiate a 
program (CJCS, 2006). 
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The JROC’s role during the entire process and in approving the ICD, CDD, 
and the Capabilities Production Document (CPD) is to make certain that the system 
being developed meets the warfighters’ needs, does not stray from the original 
requirement as defined in the JCD or ICD, and remains at an affordable cost.  The 
JCIDS process has been continually refined since its inception, and the information 
required at each level is well scrutinized to ensure that effective and appropriate 
decisions are made.  The following passage from the executive summary of the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 6212.01D, the JCIDS overview 
document, summarizes the process’s intent: 
The JCIDS process was designed to be a robust process to support 
the complex decisions required of the JROC and the acquisition 
community in identifying and procuring future capabilities. Recognizing 
that not all capabilities/weapon systems require the same level of 
consideration, the JCIDS process is tailorable. The JROC has 
identified several alternative paths to allow accelerated identification of 
capability gaps and potential solutions, and to allow them to enter into 
the JCIDS process at the appropriate stage to deliver those capabilities 
more rapidly. (CJCS, 2006) 
The JCIDS is one component of the capability-based planning (CBP) process.  
The CBP process encompasses the principal DoD decision-support processes for 
transforming the military forces to support the national military strategy and the 
defense strategy. JCIDS plays a key role in identifying the capabilities required by 
the warfighters to support the National Defense Strategy and the National Military 
Strategy, but successful delivery of those capabilities relies on the JCIDS process 
working in concert with the other joint and DoD decision processes encapsulated in 
CBP. The procedures established in the JCIDS support the Chairman and JROC in 
advising the Secretary of Defense in identifying, assessing, and prioritizing joint 
military capability needs (Meyers, 2003). 
The JCIDS process implements a capabilities-based approach that better 
leverages the expertise of all government agencies to identify improvements to 
existing capabilities and to develop new warfighting capabilities.  This approach 
requires a collaborative process that utilizes joint concepts and integrated 
architectures to identify prioritized capability gaps and integrated joint DOTMLPF 
and policy approaches (materiel and non-materiel) to resolve those gaps.  New 
capability requirements—both materiel and non-materiel—must relate directly to 
capabilities identified through the Joint Operating Capabilities (JOpsC).  Therefore, 
the JOpsC are not intended to provide immediate solutions, but proposed solutions 
that can afford careful examination over a more extended period of time.  Concept of 
operations (CONOPs) may indicate short-term capability needs. CONOPs allow the 
joint community to adjust or divest current capabilities by providing the operational 
context needed to justify or modify current programs.  As they are developed, the 
JOpsC and, if necessary, Service concepts will provide the conceptual basis for 
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CBAs to answer these questions by identifying capabilities, gaps, and redundancies 
as well as potential non-materiel and materiel approaches to addressing the issues.  
A  CBA may also be based on a combatant command, Service, or Defense agency 
CONOPs.  Due to the wide variance in the scope of capabilities covered by the 
JCIDS process, the breadth and depth of the CBA must be tailored.  The unknowns 
identified in the process of performing the CBA may drive requirements for 
experimentation.  Joint experimentation explores concepts to identify joint and 
component DOTMLPF change recommendations and capabilities gaps.  
Experimentation provides insight and understanding of the concepts and capabilities 
that are possible given the maturity of specific technologies and capabilities that 
need additional research and development emphasis. Experimentation and 
assessment can help establish measures of effectiveness to indicate achievement of 
desired operational capabilities (Meyers, 2003). 
The prioritized joint warfighting capabilities identified through the JCIDS 
process should serve to inform the science and technology community and focus the 
developmental efforts of the community as specified in the Joint Warfighting Science 
and Technology Plan (JWSTP). 
Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations (JCTDs), Advanced Concept 
Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs), and qualified prototype projects are important 
mechanisms in this process because they are used to assess the military utility of 
new capabilities, accelerate maturation of advanced technologies, and provide 
insight into non-materiel implications. They are on a scale large enough to 
demonstrate operational utility and end-to-end system integrity. The JROC reviews 
and validates joint mission needs cited as the foundation of JCTDs/ACTDs. Follow-
on JCIDS action is taken as appropriate (Meyers, 2003). 
Throughout the JCIDS analysis process, the FCBs will provide oversight and 
assessment as appropriate to ensure the analysis takes into account joint 
capabilities, concerns, and approaches to solutions (CJCS, 2006).  The FCBs are 
also responsible for assessing capabilities, priorities, and trade-offs across the range 
of functional areas using the JCAs as an organizing construct. The FCBs provide 
recommendations to the JROC.  Each FCB will be supported by one or more O-
6/Colonel-level-led FCB working groups (Meyers, 2003). 
In a capabilities-based approach, decision-makers must establish a common 
understanding of how a capability is identified and expressed in the ICD. A capability 
is the ability to achieve a desired effect under specified standards and conditions 
through combinations of means and ways to perform a set of tasks. The top-down 
capabilities identification methodology provides a method to identify gaps in the 
ability of the combatant command to execute assigned missions and assess 
associated risk(s). This methodology also establishes the link between the 
characteristics of the future joint force identified in the Capstone Concept for Joint 
Operations (CCJO) and individual capabilities (Meyers, 2003). 
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The individual JCIDS documents support the implementation of non-materiel 
solutions and the development and production of materiel solutions.  Key 
components of the CDD and CPD are: 1) the integrated architecture products that 
ensure the Department of Defense understands the links between capabilities and 
systems and can make appropriate acquisition decisions, and 2) the performance 
attributes—including key performance parameters (KPP) and key system attributes 
(KSAs) that define the most critical elements of performance for the systems under 
development (Meyers, 2003). 
The documentation developed during the JCIDS process provides the formal 
communication of capability gaps between the operator and the acquisition, test and 
evaluation, and resource management communities. The document formats and 
review processes are mandatory and are to be used throughout the DoD for all 
acquisition programs, regardless of acquisition category (ACAT) (Meyers, 2003). 
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Appendix E. Dismounted Battle Command 
System (DBCS) 
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Figure 30. Dismounted Battle Command System  
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Figure 31. Dismounted Battle Command System  
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Appendix F. Future Force Warrior Advanced 
Technology Demonstration Purpose, Description, 
Scope and Timeline 
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Future Force Warrior: A Revolutionary 





Reduced weight fighting load; ergonomic design for 
improved mobility, fightability; enhanced protection
Integrated, modular, tailorable 
combat ensemble & helmet
Mission-ready Soldiers via 





Soldier robotics and interface 
with FCS robotic platforms
Small combat unit info 
dominance w/superior 
SA/UDOP, synchronized 
platoon combat power; 
faster decision cycles, 
optempo
SRW-compatible
Networked effects tools to manage, 
integrate & synchronize combat power 
w/FCS and joint fires via AFATDS; 




Lightweight hybrid power 
system & power mgt
Increased lethality and 
area of influence via 
enhance SA, networking, 
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FFW in the Bigger Army Picture
































































Incr 2 Goal: Demo FFW
SoS capability and 
interoperability with FCS Assets
OTM 06: 12 Inc 1 systems and 
5 Early Incr 2 systems
AAEF/C: 12 Early Incr 2 systems
FCS Exp 1.1: Sqd of Early Incr 2 systems;
Sqd of prototype combat ensembles
OTM 07 & AAEF/D:





























1.1 Exp 2 Exp 3
FCS 
Experiments
Incr 1 Goal met: Demo initial 
network interoperability 
LW “terminated” Feb 07
Follow-on Soldier S&T (Proposed name: SaaS Technology Testbed)
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Appendix H. Mounted Warrior 
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Appendix I. Ground Soldier System (GSS) Program 
Description 
1
Description:  An integrated dismounted Soldier situational
awareness (SA) system for use during combat operations
that consists of:
• a hands free display to view information
• a computer to process information/populate screen
• an interface device for user-screen interaction
• a system power source
• a SW operating system for system functionality
• tactical applications and battle command (FBCB2)
• a networked radio transmitter/receiver device to
send/receive information
Ground Soldier Ensemble(GSE)
Capabilities:  GSE provides unparalleled SA/understanding
to the Dismounted Leader (Team Leader and above) allowing
for faster, more accurate decisions in the tactical fight and
connecting the dismounted Soldier to the Future Combat
System (FCS) Spinout as a complementary program.
Incremental Acquisition Approach:
GSE Increment 1: SA to dismounted leaders, position location 
information/voice communications at the rifleman level (capabilities 
increase with increased rank).  P3I: Incorporates JTRS HMS SFF-B radio 
with SRW when available.
GSE Increment 2: Increases capabilities, i.e., voice control, Warfighter 
Physiological Status Monitor, networked lethality, and full interoperability 
with FCS assets (e.g. Tactical Unattended Ground Sensors, Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicles (UAV)), using Unified Battle Command.
Program Objective: Integrate GSE components while leveraging 
emerging technology to provide overmatching capabilities that increase 
small unit SA, BC, lethality, mobility, survivability, sustainability, & 
integration with FCS.
Authorization: JROC-validated SaaS ICD, 21 Oct 05
AAO:  Initially 18 IBCTs pending further analysis
% AAO Funded: 0.0%
% of AAO Fielded: Fielding scheduled to begin in FY12
Joint: Interest (USMC)
FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15




















0 0 0 4598 9196
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 2.0 118.0 243.0




















• GSE Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) – TBD
• Award of 3 competitive prototyping contracts by 31 Mar 09
• CDD AROC-validation by 2QFY09; JROC-validation by 1QFY10
• Milestone C/B scheduled 1QFY11
• Procurement funds 18 IBCTs at Team Leader and higher 
Issues
• No RDT&E funding in FY08; $4.8M Reprogramming/New Start 
Request at Congress
• MDA Delegation to Army as ACAT 1C
• BOI and AAO determination
• Paper DAB based on approved TDS and ADM required for 
contract RFP Release
• Milestone A delayed due to Section 2366a certification 
requirement.
POC: Mr. Jeff Witherel, SFAE-SDR-SWAR, DSN 654-3860  
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Appendix J. Recommended Further Reading and 
Supporting Studies 
Burch, G.L. (2001, April). An examination of Land Warrior’s contribution to combat 
power on the battlefield. Washington, DC: United States Army.  
Centric, J.H., Wampler, R.L., Dyer, J.L., & TRW Systems and Information 
Technology Group. (2000, January). Observations of infantry courses: 
Implications for Land Warrior training (ARI Research Note 2000-04).  
Arlington, VA: US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social 
Sciences. 
Douglas, R., Downing, W., & Steele, M. (2001a, November). The objective force 
soldier/soldier team—Volume II: The science and technology challenges 
(Army Science Board 2001 special study final report). Washington, DC: Army 
Science Board. 
Douglas, R., Downing, W., & Steele, M. (2001b, November). The objective force 
soldier/soldier team—Volume III: Background and context (Army Science 
Board 2001 special study final report). Washington, DC: Army Science Board. 
Dyer, J.L. (1999, November). Training lessons learned on sights and devices in the 
Land Warrior weapon subsystem (Research Report 1749). Arlington, VA: US 
Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. 
Dyer, J.L., & Martin, G.H. (1999, December). The computer background of 
infantryman: FY99 (Research Report 1751). Arlington, VA: US Army 
Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.  
Dyer, J.L., Salvetti, J., Vaughan, A.W., & Beal, S.A. (2005, May). Reduced exposure 
firing with the Land Warrior system (Research Report 1834). Arlington, VA: 
US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. 
Dyer, J.L., Wampler, R.L., & Blankenbeckler, P.N. (2005, September). After action 
reviews with the ground soldier system (Research Report 1840). Arlington, 
VA: US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. 
Dyer, J.L., Singh, H., & Clark, T.L. (2005, September). Computer-based approaches 
for training interactive digital map displays (Research Report 1842). Arlington, 
VA: US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. 
Dyer, J.L., Centric, J., & Dlubac, M. (2006, January). Training impact analysis for 
Land Warrior block II (Research Report 1846). Arlington, VA: US Army 
Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. 
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General Dynamics Decision Systems. (2004, October). Advance soldier wearable 
embedded training system final report. Orlando, FL: GD Battle Management 
Systems Division. 
Glaze, G.A. (2001, May). Understanding the situation in the urban environment. Ft. 
Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, School of 
Advanced Military Studies. 
Krausman, A.S., Boynton, A.C., Harper, W.H., Ortega, S.V., Jr., & Wilson, R.M. 
(2004, July). Human factors evaluation of Land Warrior, Version 1.0. Adelphi, 
MD: Army Research Laboratory. 
Marth, R.B., Sr., et al. (1998). The integrated navigation capability for the Force XXI 
Land Warrior. In Proceedings of the Position, Location and Navigation 
Symposium, IEEE, 20(23), 193-200. 
Ralph, J.R., O’Neil, H.F., Drenz, C.F., Freeman, M., & Hoffman, M. (2001, June). 
Manpower and personnel for soldier systems in the objective force (Army 
Science Board 2001 special study final report). Washington, DC: Army 
Science Board. 
Salter, M.S. (1993, June). Soldier integrated protective ensemble: The soldiers’ 
perspective (Research Report 1640). Arlington, VA: US Army Research 
Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.  
Sherman, P., & Holmes, S. (2005, October). Personal navigation. Cambridge, MA: 
Draper Laboratory. 
Singh, H., & Dyer, J.L. (2002, October). The computer backgrounds of soldiers in 
Army units: FY2001 (Research Report 1799). Arlington, VA: US Army 
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Appendix K. Top Ten Process and Unit System 
Integrator 
 
Figure 45. Top-ten Process 
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Figure 46. Unit System Integrator Description 
(Augustine, 2008b, p. 3) 
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Figure 47. Unit System Integrator in the Development Cycle 
(Augustine, 2008b, p. 4) 
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Figure 48. Integration of New Technologies 






do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 231 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 
Figure 49. Unit System Integrator for the 5-2  
Stryker Brigade Combat Team 
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Figure 50. Responsibilities of a Company Unit System Integrator 
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Figure 51. Responsibilities of a Battalion Unit System Integrator 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 234 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 
Figure 52. Responsibilities of a Brigade Unit System Integrator 
(Augustine, 2008b, p. 9) 
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Appendix L. Program Manager Land Warrior 




Mr Spears - PM
Mr Lamprecht – CLS
Mr Hyneman – Ft Lewis
Site Mgr
Mr Tomczewski – Lead FSE
Land Warrior Team at Ft Lewis
TSM-SoldierPM-Soldier Warrior
COL Hansen        PM-SWAR
LTC Cummings    PM-LW
Mr Meese PM-SWAR LTD
Mr Junor               DPM-LW
MAJ Tyler APM-LW
MAJ Edmonds APM-LW 
MAJ Mote             APM-MW
CPT Schow          APM-LW 
Mr Routzohn        APM-LW 
Mr Mosely            APM-LW 





MAJ Wanner  ATSM-Sdr
CPT Copeland ATSM-Sdr
SSG Romero Demo
Mr Wainer  TRAC-WSMR
Omega Training Group
Mr Stone – Warrior Mgr
Mr Foley – PM
Mr Hill – LW
Mr Garrison - MW
LW Opns Center
Mr Witherel – Opns Chief
Mr Korzeniewski – T&E
Mr Lambiase – Engr
Mr Drennen - Engr
Mr Meyer – SW Engr
Mr Senter – Engr
Mr McDuffie – Engr
Mr Sass - Engr
Mr Lowden – Log
Ms Lutsky – Log
Ms Green - Log
T&E/Analysis
MAJ Cavedo - ATEC
Mr Bailey - OTC
PM-LW Unit Sys Integ
Mr Augustine – Site Mgr
Mr Fisher – USI
Mr Hollenbaugh – USI







Figure 53. Land Warrior Equipping and Assessing Team Organization 
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B. INTENT: Keep PLL bags stocked at prescribed levels while fixing forward;  
FSR’s keep PLL bag stocked as Master Warrior Draws from bag to fix-forward





















FOB; Turn-in to Land 




8 RTD (Available Inventory)
12
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LW/MW Logistics Forward Support Activity
LW/MW soldiers
exit
Each container will 
be a series of Tri-
Cons,  Quad-Cons 
and 20ft containers





60KW for support 
operations
Connectivity: Internet 
capability bandwidth of 4MB 
download and 750 KB 
Upload Minimum
Fuel: Gator buggy for 
parts/ensemble transport 
in/around the FOB
Physical Footprint: 4 – 20 
foot containers (3 Tricons, 
12 Quadcons and a 20ft 
container) & 1-2 GP Medium  
sized TEMPER tents
Personnel: 23 Land Warrior 
support personnel  (6 
Military, 1 Government, 16 
Contractor)
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Appendix M. TRADOC Capability Manger 
Organizational Chart 
  
REQ AUTH O/H 
OFFICER        9          9         6
ENLISTED      1          1         2
DAC                2          2         2
Contractors  3
12 12    13
As of




Yellow = Acq Corps





ATCM-S (Fort Rucker, AL)
Vacant
ATCM-S (Fort Knox, KY)
MAJ Cahill
ATCM-S (Fort Benning, GA)
MAJ Qualls
ATCM-S (Fort Benning, GA)
CPT Rosen
ATCM-S (Fort Benning, GA)
LTC Sweat






ATCM-S (Fort Benning, GA)
Mounted Soldier System (MSS)
Mounted Warrior (MW)
Air Soldier System (Air SS)
Air Warrior (AW)
Ground Soldier System (GSS)
Land Warrior (LW) Support
Core Soldier System (CSS)
Soldier System Training / LW / GSS Support
Soldier Systems Testing
LW / GSS Support
Soldier Systems Battle Command
LW / GSS Support
Mr. House
Fort Benning, GA




Soldier as a System (SaaS) ICT POC




SaaS / SEP / Analysis & Experimentation Support
Everything Worn, Consumed, Carried
Post Combat Survey Review – Soldier Issues
Army Uniform Board Member





ATCM-S (Fort Benning, GA)
Soldier Systems Testing




TCM Soldier is the user 
representative and conscience 
of the Army for the Soldier –
all Soldiers – Core, Ground, 
Mounted and Air Soldiers 
within Army formations.  TCM 
Soldier centrally manages and 
ensures DOTMLPF integration 
of Soldier capabilities across 
and within Army formations to 
ensure success on the 
battlefield.  TCM-Soldier 
provides intensive system 
management of everything 
worn, consumed or carried for 
individual Soldier use in a 
tactical environment to 
maximize lethality, command 
and control, survivability, 
sustainment, and mobility…
...to maintain the battlefield primacy of our Soldiers and the formations in which they fight.
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Appendix N. DOTMLPF Assessment and Limited 
User Test Results 
The following is reprinted from “Stryker Unit Deploys with Land Warrior—
Getting Dismounted Soldiers in the Future Network” and “Land Warrior DOTMLPF 
and LUT Results” by MAJ Doug Copeland (2007, May-June, Infantry, 96(3), 23-30). 
TRADOC Capability Manager (TCM) Soldier conducted a full DOTMLPF 
(doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, education, personnel, and 
facilities) assessment of the Land Warrior System with 4-9 Infantry at Fort Lewis, 
Washington, over the past 18 months. In conjunction with the TCM Soldier 
assessments, the Army Test and Evaluation Command conducted an independent 
limited user test (LUT) in September and October of 2006. Land Warrior proved to 
mitigate 13 of the 19 TRADOC Analysis Command (TRAC) White Sands Missile 
Range (WSMR) US Army Small Unit Capability Gaps. Land Warrior proved to 
provide increased capabilities to small units and their leaders. The most significant 
impacts were in the areas of lethality, battle command, voice communications, and 
situational awareness. 
Lethality 
Day and night vision enhancements are integrated through thermal imagery, 
image intensification, and daylight video. Land Warrior provides the capability to 
engage targets by viewing through the helmet-mounted display while exposing 
hands and arms only (reduced exposure firing technique). This integrated capability 
is not found on the battlefield today. This technique has proven to reduce Soldier 
exposure to hostile fire by up to 82 percent.  
The Land Warrior-integrated Multi-Function Laser (MFL) also allows Soldiers 
to quickly determine the accurate location of targets as well as their own location 
and send accurate, digital calls for fire or target descriptions (e.g., sniper or 
improvised explosive device locations).  Land Warrior was not used as a sole source 
for clearance of fires, but was another tool for the fires clearance authority to use to 
verify the situation and help alleviate fratricide.  
Land Warrior provided increased small unit lethality through controlled, 
efficient maneuver combined with a greater ability to mass combat power (direct and 
indirect) at the proper point and time. Similar to the effect FBCB2 has on mounted 
warfare, Land Warrior provided added situational awareness to dismounted and 
mounted personnel. This is a current capability gap that FBCB2 does not fill for 
dismounted personnel. Mounted personnel have enhanced situational understanding 
of where dismounted Soldiers are located and how they are arrayed on the 
battlefield. Dismounted personnel have increased situational understanding of where 
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other dismounted and mounted elements are located and how they are supporting 
their maneuver. Digital, real-time reporting creates a common, easily accessible 
medium for all to monitor enemy and friendly situational updates. This combination 
of information enhances situational awareness and fosters greater understanding for 
mounted and dismounted leaders, which enables efficient, coordinated maneuver to 
the decisive point.   
The MFL provides the user with the ability to call for fire by using its 
integrated functionality of laze, auto fill, call for fire, or terrain association and 
verification on the helmet-mounted display using a host of maps and imagery 
(1:50,000, 1:25,000, satellite imagery, pictures, etc). This capability provides a 
bridge to controlling precision fires, another current capability gap for the small 
combat unit. Call-for-fire missions using the MFL have proven to provide more 
responsive and accurate fire missions. Clearance of fires procedures are reduced 
due to two factors: increased situational awareness and enhanced communications 
between initiator and clearance-level authority with the additional capability to 
interface with digital call-for-fire procedures. These additional procedures support 
the “see first, understand first, and act first” philosophy. The combination of these 
capabilities in a unit equipped with Land Warrior results in a more agile and 
responsive unit that leverages all enablers available to the force.  
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Battle Command 
Command and control is greatly enhanced by the ability to communicate 
orders to all elements simultaneously. Precise unit locations on the digital map that 
show the relationship of friendly and known hostile elements on the battlefield help 
reduce the fog of war created by voice-only situation reports.  Situational awareness 
allows leaders to track the progress of subordinate elements as they maneuver, 
allowing them to make corrections or changes as necessary. Warning orders, 
fragmentary orders, and operations orders are digitally transmitted to higher, 
subordinate, attached, and supporting units and greatly reduce the time and error 
associated with an otherwise lengthy analog process. Land Warrior provides the 
user with a greater degree of situational awareness than ever before available. 
Land Warrior situational awareness provides every Soldier the capability to 
view his position on the digital map and show his relationship to other friendly and 
known hostile elements on the battlefield. This enhanced SA capability also allows 
the leader to track the progress of subordinate elements as they maneuver allowing 
for on-the-move corrections as necessary. Situations that previously could take 
considerable time and effort to overcome are now streamlined to a common, 
accurate medium that facilitates informed individual and collective synergy. Real-
time communications and employment of accurate supporting fires give forces the 
ability to maintain an unprecedented operational tempo.   
Voice Communications 
Land Warrior provides voice communications between mounted and 
dismounted leaders and Soldiers. Land Warrior-equipped users are able to monitor 
up to three nets simultaneously, a feature that currently only resides in mounted 
forces. Mounted Soldiers are able to monitor internal and external communications 
within their vehicle and have the additional capability to monitor Land Warrior 
communications through a gateway. The Land Warrior Vehicle Integration Kit 
creates this gateway and allows GPS tracking and normal radio communication 
between mounted and dismounted forces on the move. This eliminates the need for 
an intercom headset and the associated communication lapse prior to dismounting. 
The Land Warrior Soldier radio and noise-reducing headsets facilitate briefing all 
Soldiers prior to dismounting. Each Soldier’s ability to refer to his own helmet-
mounted display and map products further enhances comprehension of the leader’s 
plan. Real-time, secure voice communications bolster efficient vertical and horizontal 
digital communications. The coupling of these two mediums allows users to report 
quickly, exchange critical information between mounted and dismounted forces and 
discuss the situation while looking at a real-time depiction of the operational 
environment (friendly and enemy). A more holistic individual and collective 
understanding allows collaboration. This results in faster maneuvering and accurate, 
coordinated supporting and organic fires with less risk of fratricide. This ability to 
collaborate creates momentum within an organization. Coordination can be made on 
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a common waveform for pick-up, drop-off, supporting fires, maneuver, etc., without 
having to repeat orders or change frequencies. Fifty percent of mounted leaders 
reported an increased ability to coordinate with mounted squads before they 
dismount (35 percent report “about the same” and 15 percent report a decreased 
ability). 
When mounted, leaders are generally limited to monitoring radio traffic 
through a dedicated headset because current squad radios are incapable of 
receiving or transmitting through armored vehicle hulls. Monitored radio traffic 
provides leaders with a general understanding of the larger scale tactical situation, 
but provides little information on their immediate surroundings upon dismounting. 
When available, FBCB2 displays provide additional detail and terrain products, 
allowing general analysis of the terrain near the dismount point. This allows the 
leader to identify enemy positions and plan a tentative route for his assault. 
Currently, mounted leaders prepare their units for dismount by providing a verbal 
briefing of the expected situation upon dismounting. This can be difficult in the loud, 
dark, and cramped confines of a moving armored vehicle, and Soldier 
comprehension of detailed briefings in this environment can be limited. Squad 
leaders receive a general description of the situation and a direction to move when 
they are ordered to dismount, but this can still be insufficient to overcome the 
disorientation that accompanies exiting an armored vehicle in unfamiliar terrain. 
Immediately prior to dismounting, the leader must also remove his vehicle intercom 
headset. This prevents communication between the leader and the remainder of the 
platoon (including the vehicle crew) until the leader is outside of the vehicle. This can 
be particularly dangerous when dismounting in contact, as the leader has no means 
to receive reports of changes in the enemy situation. During dismount, the squad 
leader must rapidly assess his surroundings, identify terrain references for 
orientation, and find a covered position for his unit. He must accomplish all of these 
tasks before he can begin any offensive action. In a Land Warrior-equipped unit, this 
can all be accomplished before dismount. 
Digital Communications 
Land Warrior connects the dismounted leader and Soldier to the digital 
battlefield. Users send and receive digital messages (SALUTE reports, situational 
reports [SITREPs], unit position reports, known and suspected enemy positions, 
calls for fire, medical evacuations [MEDEVAC]), which are fully interoperable with 
FBCB2 and the entire suite of the ABCS. Digital graphics that are created, shared 
and leveraged are extremely beneficial. A picture is worth a thousand words to users 
and can be shared instantly to all members of a unit without having to print and 
distribute manually. Using mission data support equipment, units can distribute 
black, grey and white list pictures to checkpoints and patrols in a digital package that 
can be quickly referenced. In addition, Soldiers and leaders can send messages in a 
free text or preformatted message format. These messages streamline otherwise 
busy verbal radio communications.  While inputting free text messages can be a 
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lengthy process, they are effective. Radio silence can be maintained and purely 
digital messages can take their place. Creating pre-formatted digital messages prior 
to a mission has proven to speed up the process of reporting during movement. 
Phase lines, rally points, operational schedules and call-for-fire messages that are 
preformatted prior to crossing the line of departure can be sent much like an instant 
message on e-mail. This method accelerates operational tempo during mission 
execution. Land Warrior-equipped units have proven that when voice 
communications fail, digital communications are still possible. In one instance, an 
entire brigade’s voice communications were inoperable, and a Land Warrior-
equipped battalion was able to take control of the fight using their Land Warrior 
systems. Lastly, users can send an automated call for medic digital message, 
depicting their exact location on the battlefield. Medics equipped with Land Warrior 
can maneuver directly to the location of the injured Soldier. This streamlines the 
process if the Soldier is incapacitated and in a hard-to-find location. 
Situational Awareness 
Soldiers and leaders can view the current location of all Land Warrior-
equipped personnel in the helmet-mounted display. The display allows the user to 
view a digital map, imagery, position location information, as well as view sight 
picture in thermal and daylight modes. The Soldier or leader views his common 
operating picture on a screen that replicates a 17-inch monitor. The helmet-mounted 
display allows the user to view information while maintaining light discipline during 
hours of limited visibility. He can move the display out of the way when he doesn’t 
want to view it and rotate it in front of his eye when he needs to check his position or 
his unit’s friendly and/or enemy situation. The user checks his situation in a similar 
manner to conducting a map check; however, unlike using a protractor and map, he 
can get digital updates while on the move. Real-time position location information 
provides improved, accurate and efficient knowledge of locations of all mounted and 
dismounted personnel. The shared common picture of geo-referenced maps and 
images enhances battle tracking, streamlines reporting and drives efficient 
application of combat power. Small units have greater maneuverability and can 
cover greater distances due to shared, accurate position location information. 
Accurate situational awareness allows all users to efficiently control fire and 
maneuver with increased dispersion. Shared, accurate fire control, position location 
information and real-time enemy situation updates facilitate efficient battlespace 
management. Users better understand and execute plans and orders because of 
collaborative understanding of the total picture.  Leaders can mass and prioritize 
fires with less risk of fratricide while retaining the flexibility of better informed 
maneuver.  Land Warrior’s automatic execution of these reports enables more 
consistent reporting.  Based on questionnaire data collected from the Land Warrior 
experimental unit, 60 percent of leaders reported a “better” or “much better” ability to 
monitor the activity of their own unit, and 63 percent reported “better” or “much 
better” ability to monitor the activity of adjacent units when using Land Warrior.  Land 
Warrior is continuously updated and its use as a common reference mitigates the 
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effects of adverse conditions or geographic dispersion on the unit’s situational 
awareness.  Sixty-six percent of leaders and 48 percent of non-leaders surveyed 
reported a “better” or “much better” understanding of other unit members’ position. In 
addition, 38 percent of leaders and 26 percent of non-leaders reported that Land 
Warrior provided a “better” or “much better” ability to avoid situations of fratricide. 
The greater perceived benefit reported by leaders is likely due to their greater 
awareness of this issue and their application of greater significance to it.   
Digital Mapping and Topographic Capability 
Land Warrior-equipped Soldiers and leaders fight using recent, relevant 
imagery, rather than outdated maps, rough sketches, piles of acetate and/or 
memorization. Users can choose the map, map scale and imagery to use in current 
operations and have the ability to store these products for reference in the future.  
Land Warrior-equipped leaders can manipulate digital maps during the conduct of an 
operation to facilitate FRAGOs and/or follow-on OPORDs while on the move.  
Common graphic formats such as Falcon View, geo-referenced satellite images, 
Microsoft Office products, pictures and FBCB2 overlays can be loaded through the 
Land Warrior mission data support equipment. Land Warrior-equipped mounted 
personnel are also able to view all of these products.   
Survivability 
Land Warrior aids overall unit survivability. When leveraged by a unit, Land 
Warrior functionalities increase speed and accuracy of collective maneuver and 
allow greater tactical dispersion during a variety of dismounted and mounted 
missions. Land Warrior equipped squads demonstrate enhanced movement and 
more accurate navigation as compared to Rapid Fielding Initiative equipped units. 
Opposition forces and subject matter experts’ observations concluded that the Land 
Warrior-equipped unit was less detectable than a standard modified table of 
organization and equipment (MTOE) unit.  These same observers concluded that 
the observed unit could do extremely difficult, dispersed missions during hours of 
limited visibility and in difficult terrain with unprecedented success, while other 
observed non-equipped units took hours longer to conduct the same missions.  The 
combination of these effects increases unit survivability because the unit can get the 
job done faster with total unit understanding and reduced tactical confusion.  This 
constitutes a decrease in massed unit exposure to enemy direct and indirect fires 
during deliberate offensive operations.  Land Warrior-equipped personnel 
survivability is enhanced by increased situational awareness, call-for medic function, 
reduced exposure fire and observation capabilities.  
Land Warrior allows for better situational awareness through the common 
operating picture displayed in the helmet-mounted display. The COP shows 
mounted and dismounted friendly locations, known and suspected enemy forces and 
known and suspected friendly and enemy obstacles and hazards. In addition, the 
ability to manipulate situation reports and geo-referenced graphics, pictures and 
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overlays allows for real time situational understanding on current visual products. 
Land Warrior-equipped personnel can avoid potential hazards, such as known or 
suspected IEDs. Known or suspected enemy locations can be taken into 
consideration during planning and execution. Updates to the situation are reported 
digitally and are not relayed by grid and plotted on the map using a protractor. Land 
Warrior-equipped personnel conducting operations over large areas do not have to 
carry around large sets of maps. Land Warrior-equipped leaders do not have to copy 
several sets of graphics that may or may not lose accuracy in translation that in the 
past has contributed to confusion and in some cases fratricide.  Multiple maps, 
overlays and paper documents can fall into the hands of the enemy and may be 
used against friendly forces. This creates a substantial operational security issue for 
our forces. Instead, Land Warrior data is stored digitally in the Soldier’s computer 
subsystem. Operational security is enhanced because Land Warrior-equipped 
personnel can purge their data if they feel imminent compromise. In addition, Land 
Warrior systems can be remotely purged by others. All equipped users have instant 
access to all materials that are relevant (because of messaging filters), accurate 
(real time) and tailorable (leaders can distill higher-level graphics and make their part 
of the plan without loss of accuracy of the overarching order). The synergistic effect 
of having these materials has the potential to decrease fratricide and increase 
survivability and overall force effectiveness.   
Land Warrior-equipped Soldiers also have the ability to remotely call for 
medical assistance using a digital message. This message can either be sent by 
pressing the call-for-medic button on the Soldier Control Unit or by text message. If a 
Soldier is wounded, he can press his call-for-medic button and send an 
instantaneous report to his leadership and medical personnel. If his buddy is 
incapacitated, he can send a preformatted call for medic. This streamlines the 
casualty evacuation process which takes up precious time and radio messages over 
the command net. A Soldier that is wounded and unable to move can be located 
more quickly on the battlefield by the aid and litter teams, medics or the platoon 
sergeant since the wounded’s position is instantly available to all on the common 
operating picture. These support personnel are better informed as to the situation 
around the casualty thereby setting the conditions for safe extraction.  
Land Warrior-equipped Soldiers in covered and concealed positions utilizing 
the Daylight Video Sight (with image displayed in the helmet-mounted display) for 
observation have a considerable reduction (40-80 percent) in individual vulnerability 
or exposure to direct fire survivability. The Daylight Video Sight can magnify 1.5x, 
6x, and 12x. This capability has shown utility when scanning for snipers, obstacles, 
improvised explosive devices and other battlefield hazards by both infantrymen as 
well as sniper teams.  Land Warrior-equipped personnel can conduct detailed 
reconnaissance of the surrounding terrain using the reduced exposure observation 
capability only exposing their hands and a portion of their arms. Soldiers using their 
naked eyes or binoculars in the current fight must expose their heads, upper torso, 
hands and arms to the enemy. While reduced exposure observation improves 
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Soldier survivability during stationary reconnaissance, he is still subject to detection 
due to the additional time required to scan a comparable area. This is due to the 
limited Daylight Video Sight field of view (1x, 18.91 degrees horizontal; 6x, 4.69 
degrees horizontal; 12x, 2.4 degrees horizontal). This could increase scanning times 
and the enemy’s chances of visually detecting the Soldier. Land Warrior also offers 
improved survivability while conducting reconnaissance before beginning individual 
movement under direct fire, but, again this advantage may be partially negated by a 
possible increase in likelihood of detection by the enemy. 
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Mobility 
Mobility, as relayed by a 4-9 IN company first sergeant, is the balance 
between added capability to the Soldier/Unit and added weight to the Soldier/Unit. 
The Land Warrior Capabilities Production Document threshold for Soldier fighting 
load is 77 pounds. Recent additions to Soldier-worn body armor have increased the 
Soldier fighting load to 80.8 pounds. The total Manchu configuration ensemble 
fighting load is 96.6 pounds, 19.6 pounds over the threshold. The currently 
configured Land Warrior system has reduced weight from 34 pounds (FY 1998) to 
15.8 pounds (FY 2007). A future weight reduction of 3 pounds is planned for FY 
2008. This would equate to a total reduction in weight of 150 percent. At the same 
time, Individual Body Armor (IBA) has gone from 12.5 to 33.2 pounds — a 145-
percent increase. The Land Warrior system offsets current Soldier equipment. The 
15.8 pounds of added Land Warrior equipment offsets the need to carry a GPS, 
binoculars, separate aiming light (PAQ 2 or PEQ 4) and almost half of 22 separate 
batteries. The functionalities of Land Warrior replace the need to carry these items. 
This integration of functionalities renders a net gain of 9.3 pounds of equipment for 
the Soldier. Soldiers and leaders all agree the 15.8 pounds of Land Warrior 
equipment increases weight and degrades mobility. They also agree that 31 pounds 
of body armor increases weight and is restrictive when it comes to mobility.  
The Soldiers load issue is an Army issue and not just a Land Warrior issue.  
Modularity changes to the Land Warrior ensemble have shown improvements in 
weight reduction, distribution and an overall increase to Soldier acceptance. Initial 
findings indicated Soldiers associated Individual Body Armor and Land Warrior 
weight as one. The unit was fielded both at the same time therefore no differentiation 
was made between the two.  As Soldiers became more accustomed to the Land 
Warrior ensemble and more reliant upon its added capabilities, the added weight 
became tolerable.  During the land navigation experiment, Land Warrior-equipped 
units maneuvered more rapidly and accurately than units without Land Warrior.  It 
should be noted that every other Soldier system has increased Soldiers’ load in a 
modular fashion with little regard to integration. Land Warrior has provided an 
integrated Soldier system that has decreased in weight and volume over time. See 
weight comparatives chart above.   
As stated, the Land Warrior system replaces approximately 8 pounds of 
current equipment, generating a net gain of 9 pounds.  This represents a 14-percent 
increase in equipment weight compared to the average RFI-equipped Soldier’s 
fighting load. This is an increase when one considers that it equates to degradation 
in Soldier agility of 10-15 percent and a 20-percent increase in energy required for 
movement. Sixty-two percent of Soldiers surveyed reported that Land Warrior made 
their ability to move tactically under direct fire “worse” or “much worse.” Land Warrior 
will affect the individual Soldier’s ability to move under direct fire under some 
circumstances. The increase in the weight of Land Warrior-equipped Soldiers’ basic 
fighting load will have the most significant consequences. While Soldier conditioning 
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will compensate for this weight increase during limited-duration missions, current 
operations have shown that Soldiers’ mobility will suffer greatly when their fighting 
load is excessive. Soldiers engaging in extended operations are likely to find the 
increased weight of Land Warrior to be an encumbrance.  
 
Figure 63. LW Weight Comparatives 
(Copeland, 2007) 
During the equipping and conduct of the DOTMLPF assessment, dismounted 
Soldiers fighting within task organized infantry companies, selected battalion 
command and staff personnel, and selected Soldiers in direct support of maneuver 
elements employed Land Warrior systems. Upon completion of the DOTMLPF 
assessment (September 06) and following subsequent program decisions, 4-9 
Infantry asked to take the system with them to combat. The unit is currently 
conducting offensive, defensive, and stability and support missions across the full 
spectrum of military operations in theater now. Some of 4-9 Infantry’s key likes and 
dislikes of the system: 
 Likes 
  • Friendly, enemy and environment SA when dismounted; 
  • Multi-functional Laser (MFL); 
  • Graphics on the move; and 
  • Stryker integration to the dismounted Soldier 
 Dislikes 
  • Daylight Video Sight (DVS) as a weapon sight; 
  • Cables; and 
  • Space requirement on IBA 
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Fundamental principles of doctrine form the basis upon which Army forces 
guide their actions in support of national objectives. Throughout past analysis events 
and the Land Warrior DOTMLPF assessments there have been no indication that 
the capabilities provided by these systems will have any impact on these principles. 
The observations and analysis conducted during the Land Warrior DOTMLPF 
assessment indicate that there will be little or no impact on the basic way the Army 
conducts its missions. These systems’ capabilities have the greatest doctrinal impact 
in the areas of techniques and procedures. Doctrinal impacts to terms and symbols 
are minimal. Two symbols were added to depict areas of interest and Soldier 
locations. These symbols are recognized by FBCB2 and are subject to further 
development by units as they incorporate them into their own standard operating 
procedures. All other Land Warrior symbols are doctrinally accurate and all Land 
Warrior messages are in compliance with Joint Variable Format Message standards 
and architecture.  
Land Warrior Soldier systems have evolved over time and are continuing to 
evolve based on the current fight and current technology. These systems are not 
revolutionary, but evolutionary in their approach to answering evolving Soldier 
capability gaps based upon an asymmetrical and fluid threat. How the Army intends 
to conduct operations in the future, and the capabilities required to execute those 
operations, may determine the need for further doctrinal review, design, and/or 
development. Draft recommendations for techniques and procedures have been 
developed, but require validation through their use in an operational environment. To 
accomplish this, TRADOC Capabilities Manager-Soldier is conducting further 
assessment during combat operations in Iraq with 4-9 IN. This portion of the 
assessment will determine Land Warrior’s impact to small units in combat, with a 
particular focus on fightability, lethality, survivability, battle command and situational 
awareness from squad to company-level operations. All unit leaders (from team 
leaders through battalion commander) are equipped with Land Warrior. TCM Soldier 
teamed with the Computer Science & Information Assurance Department of the 
Samuel Ginn College of Engineering at Auburn University to create a dynamic, 
“change-on-the-fly” database for this operation. This database is a compilation effort 
from input received from TCM Soldier, the US Army Infantry Center Directorate of 
Combat Developments, TRAC WSMR, TRAC-Monterey, Army Research Institute 
(ARI), Program Manager Soldier Warrior and Product Manager Land Warrior. This 
information will provide valuable DOTMLPF insights regarding dismounted Soldier 
requirements, will inform future Army procurement decisions, as well as inform the 
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 DOTMLPF Assessment Summary
Agency Data Source Key Findings
Doctrine TCM-S




• LW and MW will require changes to small unit 
techniques and procedures.
• Benefit of emerging techniques demonstrated in M&S 
platoon deliberate attack.
• TCM-S will continue to evaluate/document impact during 
unit deployment to OIF.
Organization USAIS OIP Survey results and PMJ
• Under current LW/MW Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) 
concept, no organizational changes are required.  






NET Assessment findings 
and Subject Matter Expert 
(SME) input.
• LW NET as executed was not sufficient. NET did not leave 
the unit with the capability to conduct sustainment training.
• Recommend expanding training time to four weeks, 
combining MW and LW NET, and development of separate 
leader and Soldier tracks with culminating collective 
training event.  
Materiel and 
Logistics
PM SWAR & 
TRAC-Lee
Capabilities Production 
Document req., Logistics 
Impact Assessment and 
SME input.
• LW System demonstrated a high system reliability
(despite negative Soldier perception possibly related to 
NET sufficiency and over-reliance on CLS).
• Contractor Logistic Support concept minimizes unit 
maintenance and support requirements.
Personnel USAIS OIP Survey results and PMJ.
• No requirement for new ASIs or SQIs.
• Recommend assigning Project Development Skill Identifier 
for LW trained Soldiers.
Facilities PM SWAR
Survey results, daily user 
comments, observations, 
and SME assessment.
• A maximum of 9 containers per Bn for Full LW and 4 
containers per Bn for Limited LW are required.
• Mobile storage container concept proved viable for the 
Test Unit (one container is 40’ x 9’).
• Containers are easily portable and securable.
 











Small Unit Capability Gap Analysis Process 











• The 19 Small Unit Capability Gaps were identified by USAIC during the LW 
Analysis of Alternatives Phase I (2005).
• LW AoA Phase I gap analysis provided tasks, conditions, and standards to describe 













Identify current standard of 
execution (Non LW/MW) 
Compare standards of 
execution to objective 
standards
Identify current standard of 
execution (LW/MW) 
Task standards from LW AoA Phase I are used to identify the LW/MW impact the 
capability gaps.
Study Issue 4: 
How well does MW and LW mitigate the 19 small unit capability gaps?
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In-country DOTMLPF Results 
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  Land Warrior Basis Of Issue
Month / Year / Event Capability / Findings / Decision
MAR 05: Land Warrior (LW) / Rapid 
Fielding Initiative (RFI) Side-by-Side
Findings: All 9 squad members felt that only Soldiers in leadership positions TEAM 
LEADER UP TO PLATOON LEADER should have LW 
JUN 05: Land Warrior Analysis of 
Alternatives
Findings: Soldier and Leaders indicated that the preferred LW BOI is to TEAM
LEADER  AND ABOVE…HOWEVER, AT A MINIMUM A VOICE RADIO SHOULD BE 
PROVIDED TO EVERY SOLDIER
MAY 06: LW DOTMLPF Assessment New Equipment Training (NET) to 4/9 INF focused on equipping ALL SOLDIERS AT BN LEVEL
JUL 06: Land Warrior (LW) CPD
LW will be deployed within task organized Infantry Companies, selected Battalion
Command and Staff personnel, and selected Soldiers in direct support of maneuver
elements – ALL SOLDIERS IN A RIFLE SQUAD
SEP 06: LW Limited User Test (LUT) B Co, 4/9 INF is equipped at TEAM LEADER AND ABOVE for conduct of the LUT
SEP 06: LW DOTMLPF VIP Day
BN CDR, 4/9 INF states “We want to take LW with us to War”; changing BN BOI to TEAM 
LEADER AND UP; RF BEACON AND LW COMPATIBLE RADIO NEEDED AT 
SOLDIER LEVEL
APR 07: LW DOTMLPF Assessment 
Report
Findings: Soldiers and Leaders indicate that the preferred LW BOI is to TEAM LEADERS 
AND ABOVE…HOWEVER, AT A MINIMUM A VOICE RADIO SHOULD PROVIDED TO 
EVERY SOLDIER
APR 07 – Present: Combat Operations 4/9 INF has been conducting combat operations in Iraq – BOI REMAINS TEAM LEADER AND UP, and selected others (BDE PSD, 2-1 CAV) and potentially 1/38 INF
18 NOV 07: BOI Survey – PL / PSG to 
SQD LDR / TM LDR (In Country Survey)
88% of those surveyed recommended - TEAM LEADER AND UP
12% of those surveyed recommended – ALL SOLDIERS
JAN 08: Land Warrior Impacts to
Task Force Operations Survey
Results (In Country Survey)
- Need “BEACONS” or a way for leaders to see their subordinates who do not carry LW
- Units not having CNRS RADIO hampers SA for BN level operations and also neighboring 
units in the BN to see and know placement of friendly forces
- Organizations or attachments outside the TF need to be able to observe blue feed from 
the LW SYSTEMS – e.g., logistical units transitioning through the battle space…
- If attachments had LW they would be better integrated into the unit fight
Bottom Line:
- Preferred LW BOI – TEAM LEADER AND UP (Demonstrated in 10 Months of Combat Operations)
- Non-equipped Soldiers - VOICE COMMUNICATIONS and a POSITION INFORMATION reporting 
capability
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- Increase unit involvement in operation and maintenance (ownership) – lessens reliance on contractors
- Correct connectivity issues – this would greatly increase capabilities of the system
- Greater operational range – especially in dismounted / air assault operations
- Smaller, lighter and more storage and data transmission capability
- Provide “Beacons” to every Soldier so the Leader can see his men
- Make weapon subsystem “better” - Soldiers will see benefit (cordless, photo capture, integrate night sights
Land Warrior Impacts to Task Force Operations
Survey Results
January 2008
¾Where would you want to see LW evolve to support TF OPS?
- TASKO changes not effected by LW – I do not consider LW a large factor in such decisions
- Major impact on integration of attached units – if they are not equipped it hampers SA at the BN level
- Attachments who don’t have LW may not be able to keep up
¾ Does LW impact integration of attachments and task organization changes?
- However, whenever attachments can get LW – it helps to integrate them and makes unit more capable
through robust network
- Attachments must be similarly equipped to improve TF OPS – SA and Battle Command
- Units outside of the TF (e. g., logistical units) moving through TF battlespace need same SA as the TF  
¾ How would you improve LW to accommodate these changes?
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Monitor Location of: Unit Members
N/A





Monitor Location of: Adjacent Units
N/A
Much Better X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Better X
About Same X X
Worse
Much Worse
Monitor Location of: Enemy
N/A
Much Better X X X X X X X X X
Better X X X















































































































Given LW Capabilities – What level BOI
All Soldier X X
TL and UP X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
SL and UP
14 of 17 = 82%
2 of 17 = 12%
1 of 17 = 6%
14 of 17 = 82%
2 of 17 = 12%
1 of 17 = 6%
9 of 17 = 53%
5 of 17 = 29%
3 of 17 =18%
15 of 17 = 88%
2 of 17 =12%
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 Land Warrior Basis Of Issue
Month / Year / Event Capability / Findings / Decision
MAR 05: Land Warrior (LW) / Rapid 
Fielding Initiative (RFI) Side-by-Side
Findings: All 9 squad members felt that only Soldiers in leadership positions TEAM 
LEADER UP TO PLATOON LEADER should have LW 
JUN 05: Land Warrior Analysis of 
Alternatives
Findings: Soldier and Leaders indicated that the preferred LW BOI is to TEAM
LEADER  AND ABOVE…HOWEVER, AT A MINIMUM A VOICE RADIO SHOULD BE 
PROVIDED TO EVERY SOLDIER
MAY 06: LW DOTMLPF Assessment New Equipment Training (NET) to 4/9 INF focused on equipping ALL SOLDIERS AT BN LEVEL
JUL 06: Land Warrior (LW) CPD
LW will be deployed within task organized Infantry Companies, selected Battalion
Command and Staff personnel, and selected Soldiers in direct support of maneuver
elements – ALL SOLDIERS IN A RIFLE SQUAD
SEP 06: LW Limited User Test (LUT) B Co, 4/9 INF is equipped at TEAM LEADER AND ABOVE for conduct of the LUT
SEP 06: LW DOTMLPF VIP Day
BN CDR, 4/9 INF states “We want to take LW with us to War”; changing BN BOI to TEAM 
LEADER AND UP; RF BEACON AND LW COMPATIBLE RADIO NEEDED AT 
SOLDIER LEVEL
APR 07: LW DOTMLPF Assessment 
Report
Findings: Soldiers and Leaders indicate that the preferred LW BOI is to TEAM LEADERS 
AND ABOVE…HOWEVER, AT A MINIMUM A VOICE RADIO SHOULD PROVIDED TO 
EVERY SOLDIER
APR 07 – Present: Combat Operations 4/9 INF has been conducting combat operations in Iraq – BOI REMAINS TEAM LEADER AND UP, and selected others (BDE PSD, 2-1 CAV) and potentially 1/38 INF
18 NOV 07: BOI Survey – PL / PSG to 
SQD LDR / TM LDR (In Country Survey)
88% of those surveyed recommended - TEAM LEADER AND UP
12% of those surveyed recommended – ALL SOLDIERS
JAN 08: Land Warrior Impacts to
Task Force Operations Survey
Results (In Country Survey)
- Need “BEACONS” or a way for leaders to see their subordinates who do not carry LW
- Units not having CNRS RADIO hampers SA for BN level operations and also neighboring 
units in the BN to see and know placement of friendly forces
- Organizations or attachments outside the TF need to be able to observe blue feed from 
the LW SYSTEMS – e.g., logistical units transitioning through the battle space…
- If attachments had LW they would be better integrated into the unit fight
Bottom Line:
- Preferred LW BOI – TEAM LEADER AND UP (Demonstrated in 10 Months of Combat Operations)
- Non-equipped Soldiers - VOICE COMMUNICATIONS and a POSITION INFORMATION reporting capability
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Land Warrior Impacts To Task Force Operations
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Land Warrior Impacts to Task Force Operations
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Appendix O. TRADOC Capability Manager 
Deployment Plan 
Provided by Major Mike Cahill, Assistant TCM Soldier 
TCM Soldier “Fightability” Concern 
TCM Soldier’s major concern regarding LW is its fightability. 
TCM-S defines “fightability” as: the impact on performance of individual, leader and 
collective tasks at all leadership echelons. 
Fightability encompasses HFE, MANPRINT, and the six combat domains: lethality, 
survivability, mobility, sustainability, command and control (C2)/situational 
awareness (SA) and training (Cahill, 2008, 15 July). 
The assessment as planned will cover these 6 combat domains: 
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Figure 91. Assessment Products 
(Cahill, 2007) 
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Appendix P. Evolution of the LW-SI (Block II) 
Improvements to the MANCHU and 4-9 Infantry 
Systems  
 
Figure 98. Land Warrior System 4-9 Infantry Configuration 
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Figure 99. Land Warrior System Configuration after User Input 
(Cummings, 2008, September 22) 
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Figure 100. Land Warrior System Configuration during Deployment 
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Figure 101. Land Warrior Improvements for 5-2 SBCT 
(Cummings, 2008, September 22) 
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Figure 102. Land Warrior Support to the Operational Force 
(Cummings, 2008, September 22) 
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Appendix Q. Land Warrior Budget Breakdown 
Below is a brief chart showing the appropriations, authorizations and 
conference report funds for the LW Program from 1996 to 2009.  There were many 
smaller programs that were given appropriated and authorized funds for LW-related 
RDT&E work that are not reflected in the chapter above or in the chart below.  These 
funds were excluded in order to keep the focus strictly on the RDT&E and 
procurement of the LW system as a whole. 
 
Figure 103. Land Warrior Budget Data 
(Clifton & Copeland, 2008) 
FY 1996  
The breakdown of the requested FY 1996 funding was as follows:  
• $10.4 million was spent to complete funding of the “Generation II Soldier” 
ATD, to begin risk reductions in weight of some of the advanced 
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components like the radio packet and integrated sights, and to complete 
the technology-insertion plans for LW upgrades.  
• $20.1 million was spent to initiate Engineering and Manufacturing 
Development (EMD), establish integrated product teams, complete 
preliminary design reviews and critical design reviews, perform iterative 
development incorporating user feedback and procuring prototype 
components for the helmet, digital radio, laser rangefinder and image 
intensifier, and perform LW EMD program management scheduling, 
program controls, program documentation and reviews of performance, 
cost and schedule, system analysis and logistics support (Office of the 
Secretary of the Army, DoD, 1997b). 
FY 1997 
The planned expenditures of the FY 1997 funding included: 
• $15.5 million for the completion of risk-reduction designs, development 
and fabrication of advanced technology components, procurement of  
long-lead items for additional LW systems for evaluating advanced 
technology components and development of component enhancements 
based on early operational experimentation. 
• $389,000 on small business innovation research and small business 
technology transfer programs to support LW system development (Office 
of the Secretary of the Army, DoD, 1997b). 
FY 1998 
No breakdown was found for FY 1998. 
FY 1999 
The breakdown of the RDT&E funding for Engineering and Manufacturing 
Development was as follows: 
• $15.9 million to complete operational testing and fix deficiencies from 
operational testing. 
• $250,000 dollars was budgeted to ensure system compliance with Joint 
Technical Architecture-Army. 
• $6.8 million for program management and engineering support from other 
government agencies to provide oversight of the contractor’s efforts and to 
conduct technical and program reviews to achieve a low-rate initial 
production decision (LRIP).  
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• $5.8 million to begin EMD on mature technology-insertion candidates for 
insertion into the LW production baseline. 
• $8.7 million for contractor program management and contract award fee 
and $2.4 million for small business innovation research and small 
business technology transfer programs. 
• $5.6 million for continued assessment and development of future 
technology insertions into LW and complete fabrication and completion of 
early user test items. 
• $3.7 million to perform early user testing of LW systems, prepare 
documents for transitioning successful early user test advanced 
technology components to the LW system, and to demonstrate future 
component integration onto the LW system platform (Office of the 
Secretary of the Army, DoD, 1998b). 
FY 2000 
The breakdown of the requested funding for Engineering and Manufacturing 
Development was as follows: 
• $1.0 million to complete LW fightability assessments. 
• $12.7 million to complete LW software builds (LW V2.0), to build and 
integrate systems for development and operational testing. 
• $10.6 million to procure long-lead materials for the first 500 LRIP systems 
to be used by one Airborne Battalion for IOT&E purposes. 
• $10.2 million for program management, engineering and additional 
support from other agencies for overall program efforts.  These efforts 
included evaluation of the LRIP proposal and document preparation and 
award fee for successful completion and delivery of prototypes. 
• $11 million to evaluate and integrate LW enhancements to meet 
operational requirements.  
• $18 million to initiate production tooling and establish an automated LW 
test bed (Office of the Secretary of the Army, DoD, 1999b). 
The breakdown of the funding planned for FY 2000, ATD, Warfighter 
Advanced Technology were as follows: 
• $4.1 million to upgrade seven LW systems with system voice control and 
integrated land-navigation upgrades, complete the Future Warrior (FW) 
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Architecture study and transition the system voice control and integrated 
navigation to the LW Engineering and Manufacturing Development 
program. 
• $2.2 million to participate in the Military Operations in Urban Terrain 
(MOUT) Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) Advanced 
Concept Excursion (ACE) with upgraded LW systems, develop a LW 
interface with the Objective Crew-served Weapon (OICW) and develop 
transition documents for the transitioning of MOUT/OICW-related 
technologies into the LW system (Office of the Secretary of the Army, 
DoD, 2000b). 
FY 2001  
The breakdown of the requested $60.1 million for Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development was as follows: 
• $36.4 million to fabricate 55 LW prototypes for a platoon Limited User Test 
(LUT), conduct confidence testing, functional qualification testing and 
production qualification testing. 
• $9.7 million to complete the Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio 
System (SINCGARS)-compatible Leader Radio Improvement program, 
complete the LW integration of the Embedded Battle Command (EBC) 
software into Windows NT, ensure interoperability with FBCB2 and the 
tactical internet, obtain National Security Agency (NSA) Communications 
Security (COMSEC) level one certification for the leader radio, incorporate 
Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System and Combat Identification 
Dismounted Soldier, and incorporate the integrated navigation 
functionality.  Completion of these areas would allow LW to meet system 
threshold requirements. 
• $4.6 million to conduct airborne certification, user fightability assessments, 
obtain a safety release, update the training packages and manuals for the 
platoon LUT and transition the training packages and manuals to 
electronic format, develop interactive training scenarios, evaluate 
integrated training environment, and finally conduct training for a platoon-
sized LUT. 
• $9.4 million for program management and systems engineering support 
from other Government agencies, conduct technical and program reviews, 
as well as continue to conduct LW demonstrations to higher headquarters 
and other countries to demonstrate system capability and functionality and 
to support NATO Land Group 3 and other partnered countries to ensure 
compatibility with potential multi-national military operations (Office of the 
Secretary of the Army, DoD, 2000b). 
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The breakdown of the requested $6.3 million under Warfighter Advanced 
Technology, Future Warrior Technology Insertion (FWTI) was as follows: 
• $3.2 million to develop and integrate advanced technology upgrades for 
LW systems, demonstrate and assess upgraded LW systems and perform 
user evaluations of upgraded systems. 
• $3.1 million to perform experiments with emerging technologies and other 
related efforts to validate the performance of LW systems, and perform a 
baseline performance of production quality LW systems to aid in 
technology investment decisions (Office of the Secretary of the Army, 
DoD, 2000b). 
FY 2002 
A breakdown of the requested RDT&E finding for Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development was as follows: 
• $42.2 million to fabricate the remaining 120 LW Block 1.0 spare 
prototypes for Operational Testing (OT) and conduct contractor 
acceptance testing and risk-reduction activities to improve the LW system 
functionality and integration prior to testing, provide contractor logistics 
support of hardware and software on units that were to be tested with the 
LW system. 
• $7.5 million to complete Developmental Testing (DT) and OT on the LW 
system, conduct airborne certification, user fightability assessments, 
obtain necessary safety releases for the Airborne testing, develop 
interactive training scenarios and evaluate the integrated training 
environment, conduct tactics training, operators and leaders training, 
conduct maintenance training prior to OT and initiate IOT&E for the LW 
system.   
• $12 million was budgeted for program management and systems 
engineering support from other Government agencies for overall program 
efforts, to conduct technical and program reviews, to continue to conduct 
LW demonstrations to higher headquarters and other countries to 
demonstrate system capability and functionality, and to continue to 
support NATO Land Group 3 and other partnered countries to ensure 
compatibility with potential multi-national military operations (Office of the 
Secretary of the Army, DoD, 2000b). 
FY 2003 
The breakdown of the requested Engineering and Manufacturing 
Development funding was: 
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• $35 million to continue to incorporate IOT&E software and hardware fixes 
into LW Block 1.0 and to begin LW Block IIA development, which 
addressed LW integration to meet key performance parameters (KPPs) for 
Army Battle Command System (ABCS) interoperability and provided an 
on-board power recharging capability in the interim force vehicle for LW-
equipped soldiers.  
• $10.7 million to conduct OT readiness reviews and finalize training 
materials and training packages, to continue to conduct IOTE and provide 
Contractor Logistics Support during DT and IOTE, and to conduct 
Government system assessment of the LW operational test results. 
• $6.2 million to initiate procurement planning efforts for follow-on, full-rate 
production, full and open LW competition contract, to prepare for Source 
Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB) for production contract award, and to 
conduct technical and program reviews for In-Process Review (IPR) or 
Army System Acquisition Review Council (ASARC) reporting or briefings 
in preparation for a Milestone C Production decision. 
• $8.8 million for program management and systems engineering support 
from other Government agencies (Office of the Secretary of the Army, 
DoD, 2002). 
FY 2004 
A breakdown of the requested RDT&E funding for RDT&E, SDD was: 
• $1.6 million to fabricate LW systems to be used for development testing 
and operational testing for LW-IC, conduct contractor acceptance testing 
to validate system functionality and integration prior to formal government 
testing, provide contractor logistics support and obtain pre-production 
prototype Multi-function Laser Systems (MFLs) that will be Government-
furnished Equipment (GFE) to support LW-IC systems.   
• $26.7 million to incorporate software and hardware fixes from DT and 
IOT&E.  
• $9.6 million to conduct airborne certification, user fightability assessments 
and to obtain necessary safety releases, conduct developmental tests to 
measure reliability and performance test reports, and complete the 
development of training programs of instruction, lesson plans and 
computer-based training and interactive multimedia instruction.   
• $11.3 million to provide program management and systems engineering 
support for the program, initiate procurement planning efforts for follow-on 
LW competitive contracts, conduct a Source Selection Evaluation Board 
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(SSEB) for the production contract award, and continue LW 
demonstrations to other countries to demonstrate system capability and 
functionality (Office of the Secretary of the Army, DoD, 2003). 
FY 2005 
The breakdown of the requested RDT&E, SDD funding was: 
• $2.2 million to obtain miniaturized Global Positioning System (GPS) 
Selective Availability Anti-spoofing Module (SAASM) Cards and other 
government-furnished equipment (GFE) to support the LW-SI Block II 
system. 
• $52.4 million to transition from LW-IC, Block I, to a LW-SI, Block II design, 
and to begin LW-SI development (which addresses LW to Stryker 
integration to meet the KPPs for the Army Battle Command System 
(ABCS) interoperability with the Light Digital Tactical Operations Center), 
and to fabricate and conduct contractor testing on General Dynamics LW-
SI systems that will be used for formal Government DT.  
• $11.8 million to conduct user fightability assessment, obtain necessary 
safety releases, conduct limited operational assessments, conduct 
Government system assessment of operational test results, develop 
detailed test plans and OT threat instrumentation to support DT and OT, 
develop interactive training scenarios, evaluate integrated training 
environment, and develop training aids, devices, simulators and 
simulations. 
• $20.3 million to provide program management and systems engineering 
support for overall program efforts, continue program development and 
execution of Memoranda of Agreements and support agreements with 
other Program Managers related to LW vehicle and communication 
integration kit activities, conduct technical and program reviews for 
Department of the Army Level, In-process Reviews, ASARC Milestone C 
preparations, and development, and report-out on required ACAT I 
program documentation requirements.  
• $4.6 million to ensure continued small business innovative research and 
small business technology transfer programs (Office of the Secretary of 
the Army, DoD, 2004). 
FY 2006 
The breakdown of the requested RDT&E, SDD and was: 
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• $32.2 million to allow the prime contractor to continue development of both 
the engineering efforts for the Dismounted Battle Command System 
(DBCS) capabilities as well as the engineering efforts for the LW 
integrated ensemble systems for the Stryker Battalion. 
• $7.2 million for OT for the DBCS efforts and for the LW integrated 
ensemble systems for the Stryker Battalion. 
• $10.7 million for program management and systems engineering support 
for overall program efforts, continued program development, and 
execution of Memoranda of Agreement and support agreements with 
other program managers related to DBCS and FCS capabilities (Office of 
the Secretary of the Army DoD, 2005b). 
FY 2007 
A breakdown of the requested RDT&E, Soldier Systems-Warrior 
Demonstration and Evaluation was: 
• $13.5 million for the prime contractor to continue development engineering 
efforts for the LW integrated ensemble for the Stryker Battalion. 
• $7.5 million for continued testing for LW integrated ensemble system 
capability efforts, and to continue to train and support the LW integrated 
ensemble systems for the Stryker Battalion DOTMLPF assessment.  
• $6.5 million to continue to support the program management and systems 
engineering for overall LW Program efforts (Office of the Secretary of the 
Army, DoD, 2006). 
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Appendix R. International Soldier Efforts 
In the face of the challenges being faced in today’s complex and ever-
changing battlefield, the need for our NATO allies to upgrade their defense forces, 
equipment and network systems is a must and should not be put off for future 
consideration.  Currently, many nations—with the backing of their governments—
have spent years researching and developing ways to make their forces lighter, 
more mobile and more lethal—all the while providing greater command-and-control 
and connectivity.  These modernization efforts are “capability focused,” with an 
emphasis on risk and cost reduction (White, 2007).  These efforts are based on 
NATO’s lessons learned from deployments in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Congo and 
Kosovo.  European soldier modernization efforts are a result of shortfalls 
experienced in the following areas: identification of enemy and specific targets in 
built-up areas, communicating with sections and platoons while operating in close 
terrain, the heavy weight soldiers were expected to carry for upgraded capabilities, 
night operations hindered by night-vision systems requiring ambient light, transition 
from combat operations to reconstruction efforts, and heat injuries due to harsh 
environments and additional weight (2007). 
No one country can afford to tackle this effort alone.  While the United States 
leads this effort, soldier system development has been a team effort as global 
breakthroughs are made in combat technologies, ideas are shared, principles are 
proven and lessons are learned.  Every year, multiple trade shows, conferences, 
consortiums and meetings take place among the NATO allies, industry and 
academia to discuss new developments and to trade ideas on how and what to 
improve in future soldier systems.  The intent in the end is to ensure compatibility as 
missions require—not only for joint operations but when implementing multi-partner 
coalitions. 
The EDGE 
One of the leading efforts assisting NATO nations in their soldier 
modernization is being conducted through the General Dynamics EDGE facility 
located in Scottsdale, Arizona (see Figure 80).  The EDGE facility, originally opened 
in November 2006, is capable of developing and testing new capabilities and 
technologies.  It is a facility formed out of a joint venture of academia, US 
Government and industry and is, to date, credited with supporting more than ten 
technology initiatives since it opened.  The facility is free to users and is sponsored 
by the US Government and academic institutions (White, 2007).  The EDGE is 
characterized as a one-stop-shop for soldier modernization programs and is 
described as a catalogue for tactical systems, accessories, software and 
components—all of which are open to coalition and international partners (2007).  
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The EDGE provides an operating process that will bring cutting edge 
technology to the tactical edge of the battlespace faster. By aligning the 
innovations of EDGE members with requests and feedback from warfighters 
and warfighting programs, we can deliver capabilities quickly that are 
relevant, interoperable and responsive. (as cited in White, 2007, p. 2)   
To date, countries such as Australia, Britain, and Canada have all used the 
EDGE facility, as have some high-profile modernization programs like the Land 
Warrior, Air Warrior and the Future Warrior Technology Insertion (FWTI).  The 
EDGE has assisted with modifying Australia’s Land Warfare Acoustic System 
(LWAS) into an advanced capability for the United States’ Land Warrior Initiative or 
as a stand-alone component for other interested NATO countries (2007).  In 
addition, the EDGE facility has assisted in work on Britain’s Bowman tactical digital 
communication system, Australia’s Battlefield Command System and the Royal 
Netherlands Navy’s Integrated Marine Command Information Systems program 
(2007).  The EDGE brings “commonality” to systems so multiple countries can 
benefit from current technology.  The EDGE facility’s common architecture allows 
customers to access a “plug and play” capability—making quick adaptation of new or 
emerging technologies and incorporation of the needs of the customer possible.  
The EDGE has proven its worth by greatly assisting the US’s Land Warrior efforts by 
combining the existing computer subsystem, navigation module, helmet-mounted 
displays, communications, power application and soldier control unit into a single 
component called Fusion 1.0.  The EDGE reduced the weight of the original Land 
Warrior computer subsystem from 4.2 pounds to 1.49 pounds and decreased the 
overall size of the component from 2000 cubic centimeters to 580 cubic centimeters.  
Because the EDGE facility was able to dramatically reduce the size and weight of 
the Land Warrior system, General Dynamics has been able to incorporate the 
“Fusion” principle into all future soldier technology (2007). 
 
Figure 104. General Dynamics EDGE Facility 
(General Dynamics, 2008) 
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Canada 
The Canadian efforts in soldier modernization programs can be traced back 
as far as 1988 to the “Soldier of Tomorrow” initiative.  This effort, now officially called 
the Canadian Forces Integrated Soldiers System Project (ISSP) (see Figure 105), is 
unique within NATO because it focuses on the human factors of soldier systems—
specifically, the dynamics of giving junior-ranking soldiers information to make life-
or-death decisions in tense, stressful situations (Gillespie, 2005).  The Canadian 
ISSP effort also focuses on the key aspects of situational awareness, information 
gathering and command-and-control.  Canada has spent $7-$10 million dollars 
conducting tests and trials to see if the idea of a fully integrated soldier makes 
sense.  If soldiers cannot process and disseminate the flood of information coming to 
them, then—to the Canadian government—it does not make sense to spend millions 
of dollars to upgrade to the new ISSP system, as soldiers will not be able to take full 
advantage of all its capabilities.  To date, Defense Research and Development-
Canada has run 70 separate experiments and sent Canadian soldiers to Fort 
Benning’s McKenna MOUT site more than seven times to determine the best way to 
use existing technology to benefit the soldier (Gillespie, 2005).  It has investigated 
various ways of displaying information to the soldier, either visually through an 
eyepiece, on the chest through a flip-down module or through a PDA-like device 
attached to the wrist or arm.  It has also conducted tests to determine the best 
means of providing a soldier protection against a potential chemical or biological 
attack while wearing devices around the face or head.  It has examined the 
effectiveness of placing “directional finders” on the shoulders and sides of soldiers to 
direct them to turn right or left when navigating through terrain at night (2005).  
Following the Defense Research and Development Center’s successful 
solider testing and feedback, the Canadian ISSP program now plans to use three 
separate builds in order to fully integrate its ISSP capabilities into its armed forces: 
one in 2010, another in 2013, and the last increment in 2017.  This incremental 
approach will allow for technology and systems refinements/upgrades based on 
soldier feedback and operational usage reports.  Rather than waiting for one 
“perfectly designed” system to arrive, this incremental fielding will bring proven, 
ready technologies to the soldiers faster.  The Canadian government has budgeted 
$310 million dollars for the ISSP.  The Canadian government is now looking at the 
EADS Warrior 21 system, which is already currently in use with the German Army in 
both Kosovo and the Congo.  Warrior 21 integrates radios, digital maps, and range 
finding into one system—all controlled by a palm-sized computer and linked to a 
global positioning system that integrates all soldiers together and can be tracked 
through the headquarters command center (“Canadian Troops,” 2008). 
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Figure 105. Canadian Soldier Using the ISSP Capabilities 
(“Canadian Troops,” 2008) 
Singapore 
The Singapore armed forces began their solider modernization program in 
2002 (after the testing of the United States Land Warrior system), calling it the 
Advanced Combat Man System (ACMS) concept and technology development 
program (see Figure 106).  The ACMS is designed around the concept of a seven-
man squad, two three-man teams (grenadier, light machine gunner and 
sharpshooter) and a squad leader (Pengelley, 2008).  The squad leader will have 
the full complement of components that make up the ACMS, while the other squad 
members will have variations of the system based upon their particular job within the 
squad.  
The ACMS is currently made up of: a computer command-and-control 
information system (CCIS), which processes data in real time; a helmet-mounted 
display, which transmits the data from the CCIS; weapons camera with sensors; and 
several individual units of soldier protective gear, such as the ballistic vest, goggles, 
hydration system and weapon (Pengelley, 2006).  The personal weapon has an 
integrated hand-grip with a weapons activator, allowing the soldier to control several 
weapons functions without removing his hand from the weapon.  The weapons 
activator also allows the soldier to activate the networking capabilities of the 
ACMS—including calling for indirect fire and controlling unmanned aerial vehicle 
imagery or several unattended sensors (2006).  Under the ACMS system, each 
soldier will be issued an individual wireless radio system, enabling him to talk 
wirelessly to every squad member, while the squad leader is issued a UHF voice 
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and data radio that has a range of 250-500 meters in urban terrain and up to 2000 
kilometers in open terrain (2006). 
 
Figure 106. Singapore Soldier Wearing the Advanced Combat Man System 
(Pengelley, 2006) 
European Allies  
The European efforts in areas of soldier modernization are forging ahead 
through shared cooperation, knowledge, and open architecture.  These efforts are 
expected to almost double in value from 2006 through 2015, with the largest growth 
seen in the procurement of equipment to improve sustainability, survivability and 
mobility.  Currently, C4I makes up 62% of the market and is expected to comprise 
60% of the European market in 2015.  For a breakout of soldier modernization 
market value by country, see Figure 83 below. 
 =
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 310 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 
Figure 107. Projected Spending on Soldier Modernization Efforts 
(Frost & Sullivan, 2007) 
Britain 
The UK is the biggest and perhaps the most ambitious NATO ally to pursue a 
soldier modernization program.  Projections currently stand at $1.4 billion dollars to 
modernize its soldiers by 2015.  The UK sees the challenges of modernizing in 
areas of weight reduction, usability and power management as key to its program: 
the Future Integrated Soldiers Technology, or FIST (see Figure 108).  The FIST 
program will provide the UK soldier with significantly improved situational 
awareness, lethality and survivability.  The UK has identified five main areas in its 
modernization program: C4I, lethality, mobility, survivability and sustainability.   
When implementing the FIST program, the UK’s Ministry of Defense has 
adapted an incremental approach to developing and fielding the FIST components.  
In the FIST program, technology is only introduced if there is clear benefit to the 
program and if the technology has been proven to withstand the harsh environments 
in which it is intended to operate (White, 2007).  The FIST system is expected to 
enter service between 2015 and 2020.  
Thales UK is the prime contractor developing the FIST.  Thales is currently in 
the test and development phase of appropriate C4I and surveillance and target 
acquisition (STA) capabilities for the FIST Version 2, pending investment appraisal 
in 2008 (which could lead to a possible program procurement plan and the possibility 
of competing various systems) (White, 2007).  The UK’s “main gate” approval is 
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expected in mid-2008, to be followed by the demonstration and manufacturing phase 
that will allow 29,000 soldiers to be equipped with FIST (2007).  The initial operating 
capability is planned for 2010.  In total, 35,000 FIST systems will be deployed 
throughout the British Army, Royal Air Force Regiment and Royal Marines.  
Under the UK’s FIST program, the infantry soldier is the key factor in 
implementing the UK network-enabled force.  The FIST soldier will enable integrated 
communication above the company level and at the individual soldier level with 
his/her encrypted, line-of-sight, short-range radio.  Voice, data communications, 
battlefield commands, and images from forward observers will be relayed to the 
soldiers via unmanned aerial vehicles.  Soldiers will have a global positioning 
system, line-of-sight capability and graphic map displays that, when combined, will 
increase situational awareness (2007). 
The UK is improving its lethality through the use of an enhanced sighting 
system that will be linked to the soldiers’ helmet-mounted sight.  The linked sighting 
system will enable the soldier to fire around corners while maintaining his protected 
position (2007).  Another weapon enhancement available for the UK soldiers is the 
FIST laser rangefinder.  This rangefinder will be able to transmit the range data to 
the weapon’s munitions, enabling the round to detonate above the hidden target.  
The FIST power requirement is estimated to be at least ten times that of 
current power needs.  In 2004, the UK Ministry of Defense announced a bilateral 
information exchange with the United States, covering power cells, power 
management, fuel cells and batteries.  Thales UK is closely monitoring the UK’s 
three-year battery research and development program—a program aiming to 
develop the UK military’s next-generation portable battery power system.  The plan 
for the battery system is for it to be worn like the current Camelback water hydration 
system.  Thales UK will try to integrate the future battery system when the 
technology is mature enough to determine if the fuel cells can operate in the extreme 
conditions in which the FIST equipment will be required to operate (White, 2007). 
Cobham Defense Communications (CDC) Integrated Digital Soldier System 
(IDSS) is working closely with Thales UK to provide an integrated, self-contained, 
command-and-control unit that will provide the necessary capability and interfaces 
needed to build an overall soldier modernization ensemble.  The IDSS system uses 
a suite of software that is designed to be scalable from command platforms down to 
the individual soldier level.  The IDSS system runs on Windows XP and incorporates 
a single screen and stylus that enables the user to determine the receiving person or 
groups for messages, and then to send and receive messages.  In addition, it has 
the capability of sending these messages wirelessly and will have a port to allow 
integration of a monocular device for night vision (2007). 
Cobham Defense Communications is also completing work on 3D software 
that visualizes terrain high points to allow the soldier to view an image from any 
direction and then notionally allow him to “walk through” the image.  Cobham has 
 =
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 312 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
tested the IDSS with laser binoculars to potentially identify a target, geo-locate it on 
a map and send the information to headquarters.  This particular software used by 
the geo-location technology can be set to update as fast as every three seconds, 
continuously providing soldiers and leaders with the most accurate and up-to-date 
information.  The IDSS will also have a hub and USB interfaces so the soldier can 
update the system when mounted in a vehicle, giving him unlimited access to 
information (White, 2007).  
 
Figure 108. United Kingdom Soldier Wearing FIST 
(Army-Technology, 2008) 
France 
The French army was one of the first NATO nations in the early 1990s to sign 
on for the soldier modernization program.  The French have taken the lead role in 
Europe in the fielding of modernization efforts, moving ahead with its Fantassin a 
Equipments et Liaisons Intergres system, better known as FELIN (see Figure 109).  
The FELIN system has four types of configurations: platoon leader, squad leader, 
rifleman and sniper. The FELIN system starts with the modernization of the uniform 
and nuclear, biological and chemical clothing.  The uniform is made of water 
repellant, rip-proof, fireproof fabric with camouflage pattern to attenuate the user’s 
visible and infrared signatures (Pengelley, 2008).  
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In the area of soldier protection, the French FELIN system has an upgraded 
modular ballistic vest, allowing modification for different types of missions.  It 
includes an upgraded ballistic helmet with attachment points for light-intensification 
night-vision goggles, which can double as a data or imagery display for the C4I 
system, anti-laser goggles and anti-fragmentation jaw pads.  The FELIN system 
requires two 14.8 V high-capacity lithium battery packs (each weighing 600 grams), 
with spare 7.4 V batteries used to power items that require standalone capabilities 
(Pengelley, 2008).  For lethality, the French have modified their individual weapons 
with new front handles, three improved sights for both day and night use, as well as 
modifications on the top part of the weapons.  These modifications allow the soldier 
to control all functions of the weapon—including acquiring a target, firing the 
weapon, using his personal radio, switching to remote observation, capturing images 
and video, altering the field of view from the weapon sight and switching between 
day and night functions of the weapons.  The user can perform all these functions 
without removing his eyes from the target (2008). 
At the platoon level, the FELIN offers a personal digital radio or Reseau d’ 
Information FELIN (RIF).  This RIF system consists of a wearable headband, can 
support 192 soldiers per network and has an encryption capability.  The RIF can be 
used to send emergency signals, transmit images or videos and to monitor a 
soldier’s location through the use of embedded GPS technology.  The RIF network 
architecture allows for different configurations—allowing two networks to be 
monitored at the same time and for multiple sub-nets for squads and soldiers (2008).  
Another capability the FELIN has is the use of an Interface Homme Machine, or 
IHM.  It is the display portion of the dismounted soldiers’ control/management 
system.  The IHM provides the means to compose and receive data messages and 
allows the monitoring of his and other squad members’ positions (2008).  A unique 
ability of the FELIN system is its ability to be purged remotely.  In the event that a 
soldier is going to be captured or is killed, the soldier’s system can be remotely 
turned off and wiped clean by the squad leader so information does not fall into 
enemy hands.  
As of March 2004, Sagem Defense Securite is the prime contractor for 
development of the FELIN system.  The French Defense Ministry tasked Sagem with 
delivering 31,600 FELIN systems: 22,600 for 20 infantry regiments and 9,000 more 
for the French armored cavalry, engineer and artillery units (Pengelly, 2008).  All of 
the 20 infantry regiments are scheduled to be outfitted with the FELIN system by the 
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Figure 109. French Soldier Wearing the FELIN System  
(Pengelley, 2008) 
Germany 
The German military has been involved in the NATO working group for soldier 
modernization since the early 1990s; however, it left the working group to develop its 
own program in 1996 because of a fundamental shift in the German military doctrine 
that allowed it to deploy forces outside of European borders.  That is when the 
Infanterist der Zukunft (IdZ) program was born (see Figure 110).  Germany’s focus 
on soldier lethality, situational awareness, survivability and operational capability 
became the foundation of the IdZ program.  The IdZ consists of modular, easily 
upgradable body armor, integrated communications and night-vision equipment; it 
also includes a personal radio and handheld digital assistants that can send and 
receive imagery wirelessly (Kenyon, 2004).  
Germany uses a base model system for the IdZ that can quickly be adapted 
and integrated with new technology as it is developed and proven in operational 
tests.  The IdZ is built around the soldier, not the soldier around the technology.  It is 
based on a 10-man mechanized infantry squad, with the squad armored personnel 
carrier being used to transport equipment, recharge batteries and provide data links 
and communication to higher echelons (2004).  The squad is equipped with body 
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armor, load-bearing vests, an integrated C4I system, laser rangefinder, observation 
gear, night-vision equipment and thermal sights.   
The hub of the IdZ system is its C4I capability (called the navigation, 
information and communication system, or NAVICOM), which consists of a voice 
and data individual radio.  The NAVICOM operates on an encrypted Bluetooth 
network, providing mapping and imagery data (Kenyon, 2004).  The squad is issued 
one laser rangefinder, but—through the use of this wireless technology—data can 
be sent from the rangefinder to a soldier’s NAVICOM and then shared with other 
squad members or with different units operating in the area (2004).  In addition, the 
IdZ system has a digital camera that allows soldiers to take photographs and send 
the images wirelessly to other users.  The IdZ digital camera allows three-
dimensional digital pictures of potential objectives to be constructed for soldiers to 
better view the potential operating area during combat operations or preparations.  
In the future, the IdZ program leaders hope to incorporate micro-unmanned aerial 
vehicles and unmanned wheeled robots that can provide reconnaissance behind 
enemy lines, sending real-time streaming video data and digital imagery directly to 
the soldiers’ NAVICOM.   
 
Figure 110. German Soldier Conducting Operations with the IdZ  
(Kenyon, 2004) 
The Netherlands 
The Netherlands’ soldier modernization efforts, along with those of Germany, 
France and the United Kingdom, make up 62.8% of the soldier modernization 
programs in Europe (Frost & Sullivan, 2007).  The Dutch soldier modernization 
program started in 1998 to integrate with ongoing programs within other NATO 
countries.  The Dutch modernization program was tasked with improving the 
effectiveness and protection of soldiers due to the improved professionalism of its 
armed services, an increase in the mindset that high losses of personnel are not 
acceptable and to technological developments that have changed the perspective of 
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decision-makers—urging them to view soldiers as a system and less as a person.  
The Netherlands views its soldier modernization program as a process rather than 
as a project with an end date to deliver a certain capability or system.  This is 
because the Dutch modernization program is a Joint-Services program that has a 
very long timeframe and consists of various interrelated projects (Urlings, 2004).  
Initially, the Dutch modernization program only focused on upgrading combat 
soldiers, to include marines, air soldiers and ground-based Air Force personnel.  
However, after careful consideration, decision-makers determined that almost all 
soldiers are under the same type of conditions in the same harsh environments.  
Thus, the determination was made that the modernization program would 
encompass all Dutch military personnel; nonetheless, the equipment would be 
tailored to fit the individual soldiers’ job position. 
In June of 2000, the Netherlands hosted the “Soldier 2000 Demonstration.”  
During that conference, it was decided that NATO would focus on “interoperability.”  
Soon after, the NATO Topical Group I on Soldiers System Interoperability was 
established with the focus of ensuring that new or existing national soldier systems 
would be interoperable and be able to communicate with one another during major 
international operations (2004). 
NATO has currently identified five areas that its members will focus on to 
improve soldier modernization programs: mobility, lethality, sustainability, 
survivability and command-and-control.  The Dutch have taken these areas and 
modified them into five areas on which they are focusing their modernization efforts: 
clothing, equipment, communication and information, armament, energy and supply 
(2004).  These five areas of focus have progressed into the current program, the 
Dutch Dismounted Soldiers System (D2S2).  The main component of the D2S2 is 
the Communication and Information Module (CIM).  The CIM has a wireless 
connection to the vehicle-arrayed Battlefield Management System, provides both the 
soldier and the commanding officer with a common operating picture, and enables 
communication between all soldiers.  The CIM will contain an individual “soldier 
computer,” a digital compass and a personal computer—all linked to a command-
and-control center for complete situational awareness of soldiers in the nearby 
operating environment (2004).  The Dutch will use the soldier as the center focus 
and build the system around him or her, basing it solely on the job the soldier 
performs. 
The Netherlands has chosen an incremental approach to fielding the D2S2 
system (see Figure 111).  This approach allows for upgrades in technology, program 
process improvements and changes to other programs that the D2S2 might leverage 
from other NATO countries. Because the Dutch program manager has a restrictive 
budget, any new product introduced into the D2S2 program must be proven and 
integrated into the program within one year, or two years at the most. 
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Figure 111. Dutch Acquisition of D2S2 Plan 
(Urlings, 2004) 
Denmark 
The Danish military has participated in the development of the soldier 
modernization program through NATO, bilateral cooperation with other countries and 
participation in international defense conferences (Kiaerskou, 2007).  The Danish 
military soldier modernization program uses a two-pronged approach: a long-term 
solution that will provide a fully integrated soldier system, and a short-term approach 
that will provide immediate capabilities for the current operational requirements.  The 
short-term capabilities will be used to establish a baseline for the long-term 
capabilities that will complete the integrated soldier system program. 
In June 2004, the Danish Parliament passed a new defense agreement 
covering the period from 2004 through 2009.  The new defense agreement focuses 
on the transformation of operational capabilities to address the needs of warfighters 
in the 21st century; these capabilities include acquisition of modern crew-served 
systems, armored vehicles, as well as communication- and battle-management 
systems to secure an integrated network-enabled base for the individual soldier 
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(2007).  Another project that came about after the defense agreement was the 
“future soldier” project.  This project enables the military to pursue a system to 
enhance soldier protection and integration into Network-centric Warfare (Kiaerskou, 
2007).  This includes individual solider equipment, enhanced protection equipment, 
personal weapons (including those with nonlethal capabilities), radios, battle-
management systems and logistics (2007).  These initial focus areas are a direct 
response to short-term operational requirements and will serve as the foundation for 
the Danish long-term “future soldier” efforts.   
The Danish military has focused its modernization program on five objectives: 
lethality, survivability, mobility, C4I and sustainability. It is using the incremental 
approach, allowing for fulfillment of capabilities needed for deployed forces while 
continuing to develop technologies that may not be ready for operational use.  The 
Danish military has had some early success in four of its five focus areas.  These 
successes include updating its small-arms family, using thermal cameras with laser 
range-finders, and procuring the following: new infantry fighting vehicles and 
reconnaissance and patrol vehicles with weapons stations, vehicle-mounted battle-
management systems, field communications and data transmission systems 
between Tactical Air Control and aircraft, the unmanned aerial system (RAVEN), 
personal role radios for individuals and reconnaissance units, sniper location 
systems, ballistic protection and improved protection of wheeled vehicles (2007).  
Currently, the Danish military does not have any programs focused on improving 
soldier sustainability. 
Italy 
The Italian military has implemented the “Soldato Futuro” soldier 
modernization program; this involves two phases, the second phase consisting of 
three prototype system phases (see Figure 112).   
The first phase consists of a 12-month technology demonstration phase, 
while the second phase consists of a 15-month operational test and evaluation 
phase.   Currently, Italy’s Soldato Futuro program is in the second phase of a three-
month series of tests conducted at the Infantry School in Cesano (Po, 2007).  If the 
operational tests are successful, they will lead to the initial production and 
deployment of 92 systems to light and mechanized Italian infantry units (2007).  The 
Italians, like most of their NATO counterparts, have taken an open architecture, 
modular and incremental approach to designing and developing the “Soldato 
Futuro,” ensuring its compatibility with other NATO nations’ efforts. 
  The Italian army has identified six specific areas on which the “Soldato 
Futuro” modernization program is focusing: lethality, command-and-control, 
survivability, mobility and flexibility.  It has identified three distinct configurations for 
the system: one for grenadiers, infantryman, and, finally, one for the squad leader 
(2007).  The C4I component of the system has two aspects—one with the ability to 
communicate with the command-and-control systems at the Brigade and Regiment 
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level and another with the ability to manage the command/control and navigation 
systems for their fighting vehicles.  The communication system relies on a 
communications node unit that handles all network-centric communication and that 
separates intra- and inter-solider communication and data transfer (Po, 2007).  All 
individual radio communication devices are voice and data and have a range up to 
1300 meters.  The system is equipped with a Wearable Personal Computer (WPC) 
with integrated Bluetooth technology, providing ease of data transfer and a wireless 
link to individual weapons systems.  The system also features a GPS receiver that is 
woven into each soldier’s load-bearing vest (2007).  The system features an 
earpiece and microphone for the soldier to communicate with the squad; these are 
linked to a physiological sensor that monitors the soldier’s heart rate and has the 
ability to erase all sensitive data from the soldier’s system, as well as to remotely 
disable the communication device if he/she becomes a casualty (2007). 
In addition, the Italians have modernized their individual weapon system.  
Their weapon has an adjustable stock, quick-change barrel and thermal imager.  
The thermal imager’s image can be sent wirelessly through a Bluetooth link to other 
squad members.  The “Soldato Futuro” system also has improved body armor, an 
improved ballistic helmet and improved lithium battery technology.  In the future, the 
upgrades to the capabilities of the “Soldato Futuro” system will include a more 
powerful radio based on integrated software, increased compatibility and 
interoperability with NATO allies, advanced lithium batteries and improved situational 
awareness through the use of laser-based “identify friend or foe” technology.    
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Belgium 
The Belgian Soldier Transformation, or BEST program, was started in 2002 
as part of a study being conducted by the Belgian Defense Staff (see Figure 113).  
The study concluded that the Belgian defense forces needed an integrated, modular, 
open architecture program that aligned with other NATO nation programs in order to 
provide improved situational awareness, lethality and soldier protection in a quickly 
changing operational environment.  The overall BEST strategy will focus on 
integrating capabilities gradually through mutual, open interfaces found in 
commercial off-the-shelf and military off-the-shelf (COTS/MOTS) technology.  This 
will give the BEST program the flexibility to change and/or modify technology as 
improvements are developed (Coupe, 2004).  
The BEST program managers perceive each soldier as an entire system 
rather than as an individual soldier and consider the entire unit as one weapons 
system. Thus, the objective of the Belgian program is to improve the soldiers’ 
individual clothing, weapons systems and communication abilities.   
The BEST program will focus on soldier-to-soldier communication—including 
network-enabled communications through the use of modular architecture.  This will 
allow alternative radio solutions to be adapted and software to be designed and 
tailored for various missions and different levels of leadership (2004).  Modular 
architecture can provide the capability of planning missions while on the move, 
providing enhanced operational flow and greater flexibility through the ability to 
upgrade technology using “plug and play” capability with new technology, and 
allowing quick upgrades to the system with minimal overall costs.  The BEST 
network communications will provide a mix of voice/data technologies and 
communications abilities that will link the soldiers to other units—such as engineers, 
artillery and reconnaissance units—to include a multi-national interoperability 
capability (2004). 
The BEST will improve the Belgian weapons system by providing advanced, 
lightweight, modular weapons and sensors with advanced fire-control systems, 24-
hour, all-weather surveillance and target-acquisition capability—including a “blue 
force tracker” capability from a helmet-mounted display and an integrated weapons 
sight.  The BEST will provide improved situational awareness through improved 
navigation and positioning systems that use laser range-finders, digital compasses 
and digital mapping technology (2004). 
The Belgian military will continue to focus on an integrated, deliberate 
approach to modernizing its armed forces by taking advantage of the most recent 
COTS/MOTS technology, ensuring it maintains open cooperation and 
communication with fellow NATO nations, and by maintaining a continual 
improvement process for its soldiers.   
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Figure 113. Belgian Soldier Displays BEST System  
(Coupe, 2004) 
The types of current, ongoing warfighting operations around the world have 
proven the need for advanced solider situational awareness, lethality, mobility and 
survivability.  To meet these needs, soldier modernization programs are progressing 
globally.  The use of an iterative, modular, open architecture approach through 
cooperation, shared technology and integration of industry, Government, and 
academia will allow many of our NATO and European allies to develop systems that 
will add to our combined ability to promote peace and stability around the world. 
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